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Abstract 
 
This report began with a Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project to 
improve Sandia National Laboratories’ multidisciplinary capabilities in energy systems 
analysis.  The aim is to understand how various electricity generating options can best serve 
needs in the United States.  The initial product is documented in a series of white papers that 
span a broad range of topics, including the successes and failures of past modeling studies, 
sustainability, oil dependence, energy security, and nuclear power.  Summaries of these 
projects are included here.  These projects have provided a background and discussion 
framework for the Energy Systems Analysis LDRD team to carry out an inter-comparison of 
many of the commonly available electric power sources in present use, comparisons of those 
options, and efforts needed to realize progress towards those options.  A computer aid has 
been developed to compare various options based on cost and other attributes such as 
technological, social, and policy constraints.  The Energy Systems Analysis team has 
developed a multi-criteria framework that will allow comparison of energy options with a set 
of metrics that can be used across all technologies.  This report discusses several evaluation 
techniques and introduces the set of criteria developed for this LDRD. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This effort started with a Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project 
intended to improve the laboratory’s multidisciplinary capabilities in energy systems analysis. In 
this context, participants from various areas of the laboratory collaborated. The initial product is 
documented in a series of white papers that spanned a broad range of topics, including:  the 
successes and failures of past modeling studies, sustainability, the intersection of power and 
water, natural gas, oil dependence, energy security, nuclear power, the role of non-governmental 
organizations in decision making, infrastructure needed if the hydrogen economy were to 
develop, the process used by the public and others in assessing risk and making decisions, the 
perceptions of nuclear power and other studies.  Several of these studies have been or are being 
documented as SAND Reports [Karas, 2004; Tatro et al., 2005; Drennen and Klotz, 2005; 
Brewer, 2005a; Brewer, 2005b].  A group of policymakers and modelers was assembled to 
discuss ways in which communication and impact between the communities might be improved.  
Summaries of these projects can be found under “White Paper Summaries” in Appendix L.  
These projects have provided a background and discussion framework for the team in carrying 
out inter-comparison of many of the commonly available electric power sources in present use, 
including consideration of how more advanced versions of these technologies might contribute to 
our future needs.  The inter-comparisons are made on the basis of cost, environmental factors, 
sustainability, and other characteristics that determine the ability of the technologies to satisfy 
the required technical and social needs. 
 
A software package, based upon POWERSIM® and containing the salient features of the electric 
power systems selected for comparison, gives the reader opportunity to learn the consequences 
of choosing various electric power options by making choices that will be available to future 
policy makers and the technical and financial communities. This report contains a short summary 
of the software, which is described in more detail in a self-contained report in process. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This analysis is aimed primarily at understanding how various electricity generating options can 
best serve needs in the United States. In addition to cost, the report examines various advantages 
and impediments for implementing electric generation options, such as environmental features, 
sustainability, technological improvements, or changes in policy or law that may be required, etc.  
Because energy fuel supplies, the equipment to generate electricity, and effluents cross borders, 
we cannot completely confine the scope of this work to the United States, but for the purposes of 
this early modeling effort, we limit ourselves as much as possible to a focus on comparisons only 
within the United States.  Others have produced comprehensive reports to establish international 
comparisons, primarily focused on energy sustainability issues;  a notable report that gives 
comprehensive reviews of previous studies,  covers all energy uses, and goes on to describe the 
means for measuring several dozen parameters to define sustainability was published by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2005). The IAEA report, like many previous 
reports, concentrates on metrics of success, but does not fully address impediments to progress 
and technological maturity. This study reported here focuses on electric power options, 
comparisons of options, and efforts needed to realize progress toward chosen options. In addition 
to this report, a computer aid has been developed to allow a non-expert to gain insights by 
making comparisons of various options based on cost and other attributes such as technological, 
social, and policy constraints [Drennen, et al., 2005, not yet published]. 
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While cost is currently the dominant characteristic in the adoption of energy technologies, other 
criteria like environmental and health impacts, energy dependence, and infrastructure 
vulnerability are becoming increasingly important values in public discourse.  Likewise, recent 
analysis commissioned by the Department of Energy (DOE) has indicated that factors other than 
cost are important in evaluating energy science and technology programs (National Research 
Council, 2001). However, there is disagreement with the NRC rules laid out for evaluating 
technology research and development (R&D) programs (Moore, et al., 2005).  Other methods 
may allow for improved assessment of the benefits of R&D investments. For all of these reasons, 
the Energy Systems Analysis LDRD team is exploring options for analysis of energy 
technologies, and has developed a multi-criteria framework that will allow comparison of energy 
options with a set of metrics that can be utilized across all technologies.  This section of the 
report discusses several evaluation techniques and introduces the set of criteria (embodied in our 
Star Diagram) developed for this LDRD. 
 
Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) frameworks have been applied in many decision-
making settings where energy and environmental issues are of similar importance (Greening and 
Bernow, 2004; Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004). Energy and environmental issues both 
embody uncertainties resulting from long time frames and capital-intensive investments (Huang, 
et al., 1995). But the sources of uncertainty can have different time frames (e.g., ecological 
impacts can long outlive the productive life of an energy technology or infrastructure); 
differences in geographic and spatial impacts exist; and the scale of required investment and 
outcome can vary widely (Munda, et al., 1994). As a result, reconciling divergent goals in the 
nexus between energy production and use and environment (particularly water resources desired 
for electric power production) is an area of research and continuing inquiry. 
 
A good application of this framework, and the focus of our efforts this year, is science and 
technology program management. Opportunities for enhancing planning and evaluation 
functions exist both internally at Sandia and for external customers like DOE.  The framework 
could be used to support both strategic-level technology program decisions and for tactical-level 
investments in projects within those programs, as illustrated in Figure 1. For planning situations 
where the goal or mission is somewhat ambiguous, MCDM can play a significant function in 
assisting the process of technology road mapping. R&D planning (e.g., technology road 
mapping) exercises where the best means to accomplish the mission is not clearly known at the 
onset can benefit from the expansion of the process to include a step where the goals or attitudes 
of the public and of decision-makers or planners toward various technology attributes are 
assessed.  An SNL report produced as a result of this LDRD covers in great detail the ways that 
people learn, remember, and assimilate knowledge and experiences, assess risks, and make 
decisions [Brewer, 2005a.]. 
 
Task 3 of the LDRD presents a method for interactively and understandably introducing our data 
to virtually any individual, whether scientifically trained or not.  In particular, the computer 
application POWERSIM® will be applied to the data generated, and the user will be able to 
interactively vary important factors and gauge the consequences on cost, environmental factors, 
etc. The application software will graphically depict such factors as whether policies and 
technology are already available to implement the chosen path, or whether such areas need to be 
improved. 
 11 
 
 
Figure 1.  Use of multi-criteria decision making in technology program management. 
 
 
Technology road mapping was developed as a process for identifying potential enhancements for 
a given technology or set of technologies (Bray and Garcia, 1998; Garcia and Bray, 1997). In its 
original implementation, the mission or stated goal of the technology is known. But, in the 
broader application of R&D planning, the means to accomplish the mission may be not only 
uncertain, but may also change over the course of time. For example, R&D for improving 
electricity delivery focused on demand-side management (DSM) techniques and was initiated in 
response to increasing dependency on foreign sources of energy, and demands for electricity that 
were rapidly outstripping generation capacity. With a decline in energy prices (1986 onward), 
the rationale for use of DSM shifted from addressing these issues to addressing environmental 
impacts, reliability issues, and similar goals. Application of MCDM to the selection of electricity 
capacity expansion options has resulted in an increased usage of DSM to meet these types of 
divergent evolving goals (Hobbs and Horn, 1997). As a result of this type of experience, we 
know that MCDM can be used to elicit from decision-makers some of the strategic implications 
and uncertainty of the environment where a technology will be implemented. Both of these 
factors have also been included in the roadmapping process where appropriate as the method has 
gained greater acceptance and application (Bonnema, 2002; Bray and Garcia, 1997). These 
factors have been shown to have significant impacts on the choices made during the R&D 
planning exercise. 
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There are several options for evaluating multiple-criteria tradeoffs within technologies and 
across technologies. One is the threshold filter wherein decision-makers can define limits on 
acceptable threshold values for various attributes. For example, if costs are a consideration in the 
generation of electricity, then R&D planners may define a maximum cost per kilowatt hour and 
focus on technologies that are less than the determined maximum or where R&D would reduce 
the costs below that value. In the case where multiple attributes are of interest, thresholds may be 
defined for each attribute; and those technologies where the majority of the attributes are below 
the threshold for a given attribute would be considered as potential candidates for additional 
R&D expenditures.  
 
In addition to a simple threshold comparison, several other MCDM methods have been applied 
to the selection of projects and the design of R&D portfolios (Kagazyo, et al., 1997; Lootsma, et 
al., 1986; Saaty and Bennett, 1977; Stewart, 1991). Perhaps the most common method used is the 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP). During the AHP, decision-makers are asked to compare 
every possible pair of criteria and give a ratio of importance for each pair. As an example, 
decision-makers might be asked to give a ratio for the importance of air quality impacts to costs. 
A suggested scale for AHP assessments is provided in Table 1 (Hobbs and Meier, 2000). 
 
Table 1. Suggested scale for AHP ratio assessments. 
 
The ratio for attribute I (e.g., cost) over attribute II 
(e.g., air quality impacts) should be: 
1 If the two attributes are judged to be equally important 
3 If attribute I is judged to be slightly more important than Attribute II 
5 If attribute I is judged to be moderately more important than Attribute II 
7 If attribute I is judged to be strongly more important than Attribute II 
9 If attribute I is judged to be extremely more important than Attribute II 
2,4,6,8 If intermediate values between two adjacent judgments are needed 
 
 
After the pair-wise comparison of attributes is completed by each decision-maker participating in 
the R&D planning process, an aggregate set of importance weightings of attributes can be 
derived. Then each alternative (i.e., a potential technology for R&D funding) may be scored by 
using this set of weights to combine attribute scores. Different groups of decision-makers at 
different periods of time may have different attribute weightings. One approach would be to 
assemble different groups of experts to provide weightings. Once technologies have been 
identified based on this process, the standard technology road mapping process can be 
undertaken identifying those components for additional R&D development. 
 
MCDM techniques (including AHP) are complementary to more conventional techniques such 
as the monetizing of non-market valued benefits and damages (Hobbs and Meier, 2000). 
However, MCDM is not restricted to a single metric as are more conventional economic 
methods, and therefore measurable physical quantities (e.g., grams of a pollutant) can be used 
directly in the analysis. Often though, the best practice is the combination of the two methods. 
Monetizing in an MCDM framework is defensible when market-determined costs truly reflect 
the economic benefits/damages (e.g., compliance costs with no additional externalities) or 
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defensible estimates of benefits/damages exist. Monetizing is arguably inappropriate when 
fundamental value conflicts might be hidden by the process; or when the decision process 
involves the public sector; or where unique local issues exist such that value judgments from 
other areas are not relevant; or when dollar values do not exist for social costs or are 
controversial. One of the main arguments for MCDM is that its use avoids some of the 
uncertainties associated with a decision-making process and reduces the problem to a clear 
choice (e.g., more or less tons of CO2). 
 
The primary benefits of adding MCDM to a decision process, including an R&D road-mapping 
exercise, are as follows (Hobbs and Meier, 2000): 
 
• MCDM helps to structure a decision process, particularly the reconciliation of divergent 
views. 
• MCDM allows for the display of tradeoffs between very different evaluation criteria. 
• MCDM includes a “learning” component where alternatives previously not considered 
can be evaluated in the light of new information. 
• MCDM methods help people make more consistent and rationale evaluations of risk and 
uncertainty. 
• MCDM methods facilitate negotiations: (1) quantify and communicate the priorities held 
by different stakeholders; and (2) move the discussion away from alternatives and 
towards fundamental objectives and tradeoffs among those objectives. 
• MCDM methods assist in the documentation of how decisions are made. 
 
The Star Diagram 
 
All MCDM processes or methods begin with the same step of the selection and definition of 
attributes. For the LDRD effort, the LDRD team has selected attributes that have or have had 
significant importance to the planning of national or local energy policy, infrastructure 
expansion, and similar undertakings. Nine criteria were identified as being significant in the 
definition of a portfolio of technologies for a technology road mapping exercise: 
 
• Cost 
• Service Limitations 
• Environmental and Natural Resource Impacts 
• Infrastructure Vulnerability 
• Energy Dependence 
• Policy Needs 
• Science and Technology Needs 
• Health and Safety Impacts 
• Sustainability Limitations 
 
Definition of these attributes is key to a successful MCDM process. Attributes are chosen to 
reflect important planning objectives or other concerns, and as a result the selection determines 
the success of the evaluation. In defining these attributes, six main issues needed to be addressed: 
boundary setting, double counting, value independence, specification of attribute definition, 
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attribute quantification, and the proliferation of attributes (Hobbs and Meier, 2000). Expanded 
discussion of these issues can be found in Appendix A. The attributes (or vectors of 
characterizing criteria) selected by the LDRD team are summarized in a table in Appendix B, 
and more detailed discussions for each attribute appear in the subsequent appendices. 
 
To summarize a technology succinctly, criteria scores obtained through technology attribute 
characterization can be converted to vectors and displayed on a “star” diagram.  Figure 2 shows 
fictional current and advanced technology options for illustration purposes.  For all criteria, a 
lower score indicates better performance or greater desirability—closer to the bull’s-eye.  Other 
presentation methods such as line shading or error bars can be used to illustrate some of the 
uncertainty in the vectors.  Interactive graphical interfaces provide a good platform for multi-
criteria scoring, and such an interface has been suggested from a previously developed Sandia 
model (Baker, et al., 2002). In any event, any number of options exist for effectively 
incorporating an MCDM process into a technology road mapping exercise. 
Current
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Figure 2.  Star diagram of fictional current and advanced energy technologies. 
Scores closer to the origin are better. Note that here we connect the dots with lines for better 
visibility, but we emphasize to the reader that the area enclosed is not indicative of the relative 
merits, because area depends upon placement of the vectors as well as their magnitude.  
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APPENDIX A.  Definition of Attributes  
for Technology Characterization 
 
 
Before any multi-criteria decision making effort can be undertaken, the attributes for 
consideration must be defined. Attributes are chosen to reflect important planning objectives or 
other concerns such as environmental and natural resource impacts or the sustainable use of non-
renewable energy resources. For this effort, the LDRD team has selected attributes that have or 
have had significant importance to the planning of national or local energy policy, infrastructure 
expansion, and similar undertakings. In defining these attributes, six main issues needed to be 
addressed: boundary setting, double counting, value independence, specification of attribute 
definition, attribute quantification, and the proliferation of attributes (Hobbs and Meier, 2000). 
 
Setting boundaries: How boundaries are drawn depends upon the perceptions of the definers as 
to what is important. For the LDRD, we are emphasizing the perceptions of US decision-makers. 
However, this strict interpretation of the defined boundary has been relaxed so that trans-
boundary pollutants such as CO2 can be included in the analysis. Although some attributes are 
purely local in nature such as land usage or footprint of a facility, in the aggregate this attribute 
can be significant in the decision to pursue the development of a technology. 
 
Double counting: Double counting may not always be undesirable.  For example, there may be a 
cost assessment for emitting a pollutant.  The same pollutant may influence climate or health. It 
would be appropriate to count all of the effects.  We list a few examples of double counting that 
need to be considered in an MCDM problem. 
 
1. The first relates to double counting in the attributes (e.g., for an electricity expansion 
planning problem, “monthly bills” and “total resource cost” would double count cost).  
 
2. A second double counting issue concerns the extent to which pollutant emissions are 
subject to tradable emissions allowances, and to the extent these emissions should also be 
used as an attribute (e.g., levels of SO2 where a viable emissions market exists). In the 
case of SO2 in the United States the total quantity emitted is fixed under the emissions 
allowance system, and the cost of purchasing attributes is already included in the cost 
attribute. However, the locality of emission does matter for this pollutant; therefore, 
whether to include SO2 as an attribute would depend upon whether a case can be made 
that there is a differential locational effect in addition. If the costs of the locational effect 
are greater than the cost of allowances which are included in the cost attribute, then the 
incremental impacts of emissions of SO2 should be counted as an attribute. 
 
3. The third double counting issue is the comparison of means and ends. Attributes (the 
ends) should represent fundamental objectives and concerns. They should not be 
confused with the means for accomplishing those ends (e.g., including coal consumed 
and SO2 emissions as attributes would penalize coal twice if coal’s pollution is 
considered during weighting). 
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Conceptual independence: Attributes should be conceptually distinct. Strict conceptual 
independence is called “preference independence” (e.g., preferences on costs of reduction of one 
type of emissions is independent of preferences for reduction of another). Decision analysis 
differentiates between statistical independence (“facts”) versus preference independence 
(“values”). A possible approach to avoiding problems with conceptual independence is to define 
an attribute that is the product of the two dependent variables. 
 
Specificity of attribute definition: The rationale for selection of a specific attribute needs to be 
clearly specified. Does the attribute clearly reflect the problem under consideration? Or is there a 
clear linkage between the attribute and the problem? For example, is there a clear linkage 
between the quantity of solid waste generated (in tons) and the impacts of solid waste disposal? 
In the case of the LDRD, for example, do the tons of CO2 emissions from an electricity 
generation technology clearly impact or relate to global climate change? As another example, do 
levels of imported fuels clearly impact economic security? 
 
Quantification of attributes: Definition and quantification are interwoven. MCDM methods 
require that attributes must be quantified. However, not every important attribute may be given a 
number. There are four ways of dealing with attributes that are difficult to quantify. 
 
1. Indirect valuation methods can be used without direct impact quantification. For 
example, “hedonic pricing” methods can be used to estimate the impact of existing power 
facilities (i.e., comparing property values between properties near a power plant with 
those at a distance). 
 
2. Costs of mitigation scenarios can be used as a proxy (e.g., the costs of sequestering CO2 
could be used as a value for avoiding a ton of emissions). 
 
3. Effects that are difficult to quantify, such as some ecological impacts, can be described 
categorically (e.g., “mild/beneficial impact” to “severe impact”). 
 
4. A proxy attribute may be selected (e.g., tons of a pollutant emitted may be a proxy for 
health effects of the pollutant). However, scientific validity for the linkage between the 
actual impact and the proxy needs to be established. 
 
Attribute proliferation: A proliferation of attributes tends to make weighting more difficult. 
Further, proliferation may introduce a bias simply because of the reluctance to weight any 
particular attribute as near zero, which results in an under-weighting of truly important attributes. 
The guiding principle ought to be that one starts from those impacts which are the most 
important, and then, if at all possible, one attribute is selected for each of those concerns. 
 
 21 
APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification 
Impact Addressed 
Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
COST (description found in Appendix C) 
Unit Overnight Capital Cost (C) 
is the total up-front cost of a 
technology if it could be built 
instantly 
 
 
Constant $/kW 
(e.g., year 2003 
$1800/kW) 
Cost to society and market penetration. 
 
Increased capital cost increases cost to society and reduces market penetration. 
 
 
 
Full fuel cycle investment 
costs including  
contingencies, owner and 
developer costs, etc. 
(everything but the 
construction loan) 
Fixed Charge Rate (FCR) 
represents the cost of 
financing a project using a 
levelized annual fraction of 
capital 
Real (inflation 
adjusted) %/yr 
Capital recovery, financial risk, and  taxation, relative importance of fixed versus 
variable costs. 
Increased FCR means higher costs of capital recovery, financial risk, or taxation 
and lower market penetration and increased importance of fixed costs relative to 
variable costs. 
EIA estimates for the US 
including the construction 
loan 
Unit Fixed Operations and 
Maintenance (FOM) cost is the 
minimum cost of operating the 
facility 
Constant $/kW-yr Cost to society and market penetration. Increased FOM results in decreased market penetration. 
National electricity 
generation system 
Capacity Factor (CF) is the 
fraction of rated output 
produced annually and may be 
constrained by economic or 
physical traits (see Service) 
% 
Relative importance of fixed versus variable costs (see also Service). 
Increased CF means decreased importance of fixed costs relative to variable 
costs. 
National electricity 
generation system 
Unit Variable Operations and 
Maintenance (VOM) cost is the 
marginal cost of operation, incl. 
fuel 
Constant $/kWh Cost to society and market penetration. Increased VOM increases cost to society and reduces market penetration. 
National electricity 
generation system 
Unit Levelized Fuel Cost (F) in 
real (inflation-corrected) terms Constant $/kWh 
Cost to society and market penetration. 
Increased VOM increases cost to society and reduces market penetration. 
National electricity 
generation system 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(description found in Appendix D) 
Global Climate Change 
(summation of CO2, 
methane, N2O, CO with 
possibly a reduction for 
aerosols such as SO2 ) 
Grams of all greenhouse 
gas (GHG) per kWh 
normalized to CO2 utilizing 
the 3rd IPCC Assessment for 
reactive forcing effects and 
$/kWh for combining into a 
scalar; each species needs 
to be broken out, e.g., 
grams CO2/kWh; costs will 
be the marginal costs of 
damage (offset by benefits) 
above and beyond 
sequestration costs or 
market value of carbon 
credits from carbon 
development mechanism 
(CDM) activities  
Increases in global temperature, and climate change resulting in 
changes in sea-level, land-use, sustainability of life on the planet as 
we know it. 
Increases in concentrations of CO2 and other GHGs in the 
atmosphere are hypothesized to lead to increases in global 
temperature, and climate change. 
Global (i.e., transboundary) 
Note: Accounting done at point of 
emission (or fuel use). 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(continued) 
Acid Rain Effects Other than 
Human Health 
Grams of SO2 per kWh and 
grams of NOx normalized 
using coefficients from 
Contadini, et al., and 
combined into $/kWh for 
combining into a scalar; 
each species needs to be 
broken out, e.g., grams 
SO2/kWh; costs will be the 
marginal costs of damage 
above and beyond costs of 
pollution control measures. 
Acid rain (changes in ecosystems and wildlife, damages to 
buildings). 
Atmospheric chemistry results in transformation of SO2 into sulfuric 
acid and NOx into nitric acid that is then deposited on various 
surfaces; increases in SO2 and NOx emissions result in greater 
levels of acid deposition. 
Local and regional; due to the 
uncertainty of the dose-
response relationships and 
other potential indicators of 
damage, accounting is done at 
point of emission (or fuel use). 
"Eutrophication" Effects 
Grams of NOx per kWh and 
$/kWh for combining into a 
scalar; costs will be the 
marginal costs of damage 
above and beyond costs of 
pollution control measures. 
Nutrient overload that deteriorates water quality and destroys 
aquatic ecosystems. 
Increased nitrogen loading into waterways results in 
“eutrophication.” Increased levels of NOx emissions result in 
increased nitrogen concentrations. 
Local and regional; due to the 
uncertainty of the dose-
response relationships and 
other potential indicators of 
damage, accounting is done at 
point of emission (or fuel use). 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(continued) 
Visibility Impacts  
Summation of grams of SO2, 
NOx, P2.5 and P10 per kWh 
using coefficients from 
DeLuchi, et al. or Contandini, 
et al. and $/kWh for 
combining into a scalar; each 
species needs to be broken 
out, e.g., grams of P2.5/kWh; 
marginal costs will be the 
marginal costs of damage 
above and beyond costs of 
pollution control measures 
with some of these costs 
measured in terms of 
reduced tourism, etc. 
Impaired visibility such as haze over the Grand Canyon. 
Increases in particulate matter are known to reduce visibility. Local and regional 
 
 25 
APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(continued) 
Particulates Damage (major 
constituents include heavy 
metals, radioactive isotopes 
and hydrocarbons, sulfates, 
and nitrates) 
Grams of P2.5 and P10 per 
kWh normalized using 
coefficients from Contadini, 
et al., and $/kwh for 
combining into a scalar; 
each species needs to be 
broken out, e.g., grams 
P2.5/kWh; costs will be the 
marginal costs of damage 
above and beyond costs of 
pollution control measures. 
Materials damage due to soiling and possibly corrosion, damage to 
foliage, and possible health effects to animals. 
Increases in particulate matter are known to reduce visibility. 
Local and regional; due to the 
uncertainty of the dose-
response relationships and 
other potential indicators of 
damage, accounting is done 
at point of emission (or fuel 
use). 
Airborne Heavy Metal 
Contamination of the 
Ecosystem 
Grams of mercury per kWh 
and $/kwh for combining into 
a scalar; costs will be 
marginal costs above and 
beyond costs of pollution 
control measures. 
Causes birth defects, reduced reproduction, organ (brain, heart, 
kidneys, lungs, and immune system) damage, and death in 
domesticated and wild animals. 
Mercury concentrations (as with other heavy metals) increase 
through the food chain. Elemental mercury is converted to 
methylmercury (a highly toxic form) in organic systems, and builds up 
in fish, shellfish and animals. 
Local and regional; due to the 
uncertainty of the dose-
response relationships and 
other potential indicators of 
damage, accounting is done 
at point of emission (or fuel 
use). 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(continued) 
Water and Ground 
Contamination Damage to 
Ecosystem from Disposal of 
Waste Products 
Grams of ash (fossil-fuel 
combustion) or heavy metal 
(nuclear spent fuel) per kWh 
and $/kwh for combining into 
a scalar; each physical 
component needs to be 
reported separately, e.g., 
grams of ash per kWh; costs 
will be the marginal costs of 
damage above and beyond 
costs of pollution control 
measures. 
Special facilities must be constructed to contain waste products to 
avoid impacts on ecosystem. In the case of ash, these facilities must 
be RCRA compliant. In the case of nuclear spent fuel, these facilities 
must meet the requirements under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982 (e.g., Yucca Mountain). 
Ash generated during fossil-fuel combustion contains high 
concentrations of heavy metals (e.g., cadmium, zinc, lead). If leached 
into ground water, these constituents pose hazards to the ecosystem. 
Spent nuclear fuel poses a radio-toxicity problem resulting in “flu-like” 
symptoms or death in animals, and potential genetic damage.  
Local and regional; due to the 
uncertainty of the dose-
response relationships and 
other potential indicators of 
damage, accounting is done 
at point of waste generation 
(or fuel use). 
Land Use and Landscape 
Degradation 
Acres of land included in a 
footprint per kWh (Note: 
landscape or visual 
degradation is highly 
variable and is excluded) 
and $/kwh for combining into 
a scalar. 
Land-use impacts evolve primarily from the conversion of land from 
other purposes such as agriculture, recreation, or commerce. 
Greater land usage for power production means less for other 
purposes; as populations increase or in already densely populated 
areas, levels of impact increase accordingly. 
Local 
 
 27 
APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS (restricted to non-human health environmental impacts) 
(continued) 
Water Consumption for 
Generation 
Acre-feet of water consumed 
per kWh and $/kwh for 
combining into a scalar. 
Additional water usage in areas of short supply impacting ecosystems 
and agriculture; and aquatic organism “impingement.” 
Diversion of water to power generation results in reduction in the 
availability of water for other purposes. Heavy dependence upon 
water requires the intake of water from streams, rivers, and lakes with 
the added risk of damage to wildlife (e.g., salmon on the Snake River, 
the snail-darter, etc.). 
Local 
Thermal Hazards to the 
Ecosystem 
Acre-feet of water released 
per kWh generated and 
$/kwh for combining into a 
scalar. 
Thermal pollution resulting in damage to flora and fauna. 
Thermal pollution may occur as a result of the discharge of heated 
water into streams; thermal pollution can also occur as a result of the 
release of steam into the local climate (i.e., changes in micro-climes). 
Local 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SAFETY AND HEALTH (description found in Appendix E) 
Construction and 
Transportation of Materials 
Hazard 
Fatalities/Injuries per 
kWh  
Size and number of plants/pipes and other energy infrastructure needed 
for each energy technology. 
Construction injuries and fatalities have a direct effect on productivity, 
facility construction costs, and societal welfare on lives and health of 
citizens. 
National 
Mining of Materials Hazard Fatalities/Injuries per kWh  
Number of plants/pipes, amount of fuel needed to meet energy needs. 
Mining/Refining injuries and fatalities have a direct effect on productivity, 
facility construation costs, and societal welfare. 
National 
On-the-Job Hazard Fatalities/Injuries per kWh  
Number and safety of plants. 
On-the-job injuries and fatalities have a direct effect on productivity, 
facility operating costs, and societal welfare. 
National 
Sabotage/Terrorism Risk per kWh* 
Vulnerability of plants and other infrastructure aspects – pipes, power 
lines, etc. 
Power sources have particular appeal among the terrorist enemies to 
the US.  In addition to disrupting the economy and energy infrastructure, 
the possibility for instant death to those in the plant's vicinity adds more 
value as a terror target. 
National 
Energy Transportation Hazard Fatalities/Injuries per kWh  
Miles of human-facilitated energy transportation. 
Energy transportation injuries and fatalities have a direct effect on 
productivity, facility operating costs, and societal welfare. 
National 
* This will be difficult to quantify, as there is no experience base, but the total risk would rise in proportion to installed capacity. 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification 
Impact Addressed 
Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SAFETY AND HEALTH (continued) 
Availability/ Reliability Proportion of time 
system is available  
Steadiness and reliability of energy system. 
During times of medical or meteorological necessity, the lack or 
intermittency of an electricity source can have dire consequences on 
those that have been depending on it to provide them energy for 
necessary processes (cooling, medical equipment, etc.). 
This impact could also be included in infrastructure vulnerability. 
National, by Region 
Malfunction/Disaster Risk per kWh  
Robustness of safety controls of plants and other infrastructure aspects. 
Akin to the terrorism/sabotage criterion – were a power source to 
malfunction, economic and infrastructure disruptions could occur along 
with injury and death. 
National 
Proliferation Threat Fissile material per kWh  
Nuclear material produced during energy generation. 
Unsecured energy by-products can be a cause for concern if it fell into 
the wrong hands. 
International 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SAFETY AND HEALTH (continued) 
Pollution Effects Fatalities/Injuries per kWh 
Amount of air pollution created during energy production; causes 
human respiratory health problems. 
There are established links between airborne particles and chemicals 
and decreased health of individuals in their general vicinity.  Moreover, 
the public perception of this problem is immense.  If we are to be 
concerned with the public’s opinion, then a cleaner energy system 
would have to be valued much more highly than a dirty one, were all 
things equal or negligibly different. 
National, by Region 
Contamination Effects Fatalities/Injuries per kWh 
Amount of soil/water contamination created during energy production; 
mercury and other heavy metals causes birth defects, reduced 
reproduction, organ (brain, heart, kidneys, lungs, and immune system) 
damage, and death. 
Akin to pollution effects – contaminated soil and water have direct 
impacts on human life, and an even bigger impact of human opinion. 
National, by Region 
Decommissioning Effects Fatalities/Injuries per kWh 
Size and number and design life of plants and other energy 
infrastructure needed for each energy technology. 
Deconstruction injuries and fatalities have a direct effect on 
productivity, facility operating costs, and societal welfare. 
National 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
ENERGY DEPENDENCE (description found in Appendix F) 
Dependence by US on 
Foreign Imports of Fuel 
Share of imports of a fuel (e.g., oil, 
LNG, or yellow cake) to US over 
time projected using AEO 2005, 
and $/kWh; costs calculated from a 
range of sources as per the 
bibliography at the end of the 
attribute description. 
Concerns over increasing or potential increases in foreign 
dependence for energy supplies. 
Increased dependence on foreign energy supplies represents a 
security threat. 
Global. Accounting done at 
point of use. 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
POLICY AND MARKET NEEDS (description found in Appendix G) 
Price Regulation: 
Government regulations of 
prices, or prices being set 
by a monopoly or 
association 
0 to 10 scale indicating the estimated 
levels of policy intervention to 
encourage market penetration of a 
technology. A score of 0 indicates 
that the technology is viable without 
any regulatory price support, and 10 
indicates that strong price support is 
a must.  
Price regulation can help establish a new technology or can accomplish 
various social objectives. Often, regulation will cause market distortion, 
and can have unintended consequences. The final cost of power can 
also be influenced by other types of credits or regulations, some of 
which are listed in this chart.  
 
Prices may be set by 
using governments or 
entities, as well as by 
cartels, such as OPEC. 
Production Credits or Use 
Taxes: Use taxes 
internalize some of the 
externalities associated 
with the use of energy; 
production credits reduce 
energy costs 
0 to 10 scale indicating the estimated 
levels of policy intervention to 
encourage market penetration of a 
technology. No production credit 
needed is scored with a 0, and a 
strong need for such credit earns a 
score of 10.  No use tax needed 
earns 0, and a high use tax could 
earn a score of 10. 
Levels and types of energy consumption:  
Production credits reduce the relative costs per kWh, and thereby 
increase demand for a given type or technology; use taxes internalize 
some of the externalities of energy consumption and result in 
reductions in demand. An example of a use tax is the federally imposed 
tax on nuclear power for waste management.  Use taxes may also be 
placed merely to raise revenue, with no direct intent to shape electric 
usage. 
Taxes may be imposed 
at many points, from 
producing country or 
region, to the user. 
Regulation for reliability or 
security reasons – or 
insistence by users for 
certain standards 
0 to 10 scale indicating the estimated 
levels of policy intervention to 
encourage market penetration of a 
technology, with 0 being no 
intervention and 10 indicating an 
overbearing regulation program. 
Economic and social concerns requiring the ready and consistent 
availability of electricity. 
Properly designed regulation can achieve social and economic goals 
for areas where markets fail, for example in allowing utilities to charge 
rate-payers for the cost of excess capacity to help assure reliability. 
US electrical generation 
system, and associated 
markets. 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
POLICY AND MARKET NEEDS (continued) 
Environmental Regulation, 
including waste disposal 
and decommissioning. This 
can include international 
agreements or treaties, 
such as Kyoto, or 
agreements concerning 
mineral rights in Antarctica. 
0 to 10 scale indicating the estimated 
levels of policy intervention to 
encourage market penetration of a 
technology.  A score of 0 denotes no 
intervention, and 10 a high level of 
binding intervention.  
Health or environmental concerns unaddressed in existing regulation. 
The impact may be direct or indirect.  Policy may regulate by direct 
regulation, or may be indirect.  For example, although the US does not 
subscribe to the Kyoto accord, some European businesses are 
interacting with US businesses in a manner dictated by Kyoto, and 
some groups of states, such as in New England, are moving ahead 
with independent carbon dioxide management efforts.  
US and global in the 
case of transboundary 
pollutants. 
Regulations on rights of 
way and land use 
0 to 10 scale indicating the estimated 
levels of policy intervention to 
encourage market penetration of a 
technology.  A score of 0 indicates 
either that adequate right-of-way 
exists, or can easily be obtained, and 
10 indicates extreme opposition.  
Land use and planning for the benefit of the public, for example the 
development the Alaskan oil fields and concerns about ecological 
preservation. 
Properly designed regulation can achieve social and economic goals 
for areas where markets fail. 
US and where 
appropriate globally. 
Regional Concerns, Public 
Perceptions, Social Equity, 
and Public Trust 
The units and quantification are often 
qualitative, but should be reduced to 
technical specifications early in any 
dispute. 
The impacts are high, and may make the difference between opening a 
new mine or power plant, for example. 
The links are often indirect, because here many emotional concerns 
are likely to arise. 
 
Power structure 
represented by various 
lobby and interest groups 
Dollars or influence from lobby 
groups in favor of a technology would 
win a score of 0, and funding and 
activity against an activity could 
produce a score of 10, if such efforts 
make it essentially impossible to 
deploy a technology. 
Perhaps more than any other single factor, influence peddling spells 
success or failure for a technology. 
The links here are sometimes technical, but more often are founded on 
economic self-interest. Understanding the strategy behind alliances can 
give invaluable perspectives. 
Influence peddling 
certainly extends to 
area of foreign 
diplomacy; there appear 
to be no well-defined 
boundaries. 
 
 34 
APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
POLICY AND MARKET NEEDS (continued) 
Jobs, and Economic 
Development 
0 to 10 scale indicating the 
estimated levels of policy 
intervention that would be required 
to encourage market penetration of a 
technology. For example, a score of 
0 indicates that no new policies are 
required to cause wide use of the 
technology, and that jobs and 
economic development are likely to 
follow.  A 10 would indicate that 
there is no hope of development 
without extensive intervention.   
Economic growth and expansion of the labor pool. 
New technologies maintain world competitiveness, can result in the 
development of new industries, often result in a more skilled work force, 
and can result in the expansion of the work force. 
National markets 
Propensity to introduce 
legislation calling for 
research and development 
or special studies to 
address a problem that 
that may not be satisfied 
by normal free market 
dynamics. 
0 to 10 scale, with 0 denoting ample 
funds available with good political 
support for continuation, and 10 
indicating great public and 
congressional resistance and no 
effort for support.  A score of 5 would 
indicate bills have been submitted 
and there is some likelihood of 
passage.  
This metric is designed to gauge the likelihood that Congress will make 
public funds available to pursue a given technology.  
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed 
Linkage between Attribute and 
Impact Boundary 
SERVICE (description found in Appendix H) 
Economic Duty Limitations 
impact the desirable capacity 
factor and are a function of the  
cost attributes (see Cost) 
Qualitative scale of 
0 to 5 with 0 as best 
or no constraints 
Economic market share limitations.  For a constant levelized energy cost 
(LEC), higher fractions of variable costs increase market share potential, but 
normally high fixed-cost technologies are lowest total cost in base-load duty. 
Because the potential market share for a particular technology depends upon 
the economic duty of other technologies in the portfolio, complex analyses (or 
expert estimates) are needed. 
National (may require 
regional analysis) 
Load Following Limitations 
indicate how well a technology 
can adjust output to meet time-
variant loads and include 
factors such as ramp rate and 
efficiency at part-load or in 
small plant sizes 
Qualitative scale of 
0 to 5 with 0 as best 
or no constraints 
Physical market share limitations.  For example, hydro can be dispatched at a 
high ramp rate to “regulate” rapidly intermittent wind. 
Higher ramp rates and part-load or small-size efficiency indicate increased 
capacity to follow loads and regulate intermittent generation and larger market 
share potential. Because the potential market share for a particular technology 
depends upon the physical limitations of other technologies in the portfolio, 
complex analyses (or expert estimates) are needed. 
National (may require 
regional analysis) 
Peak Period Capacity Credit 
(the capacity factor during the 
peak demand period) 
% 
Economic market share limitation applicable to technologies with time-
dependent resources like many renewable energy technologies.  The value 
(not cost) of power varies with economic duty. 
Increased peak periods capacity credit results in a potentially greater share of 
a critical market served. 
National (may require 
regional analysis) 
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APPENDIX B.  Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS (description found in Appendix I) 
TML 10 – Nothing known 
about how to solve the 
problem* 
TML 9 – Basic principles 
observed and reported 
TML 8 – Technology 
concept and/or application 
formulated 
TML 7 – Analytical and 
experimental critical 
function and/or 
characteristic proof of 
concept 
TML 6 – Component 
and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory 
environment 
TML 5 – Component 
and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant 
environment 
TML 4 – System/sub-
system model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant 
environment—for example, 
in a power plant on a 
simulated power grid 
TML 3 – System prototype 
demonstration in the power 
grid environment, but using 
a cadre of special experts 
The units are descriptive of how 
close to maturity a technology lies. 
One may in some cases make some 
estimates of the time and cost 
expected to be involved in advancing 
to a higher maturity status. This 
would most likely be placed in text 
describing a technology option. 
Commercial viability of technology.  Time to commercial viability 
indicates levels of R&D expenditures that must be made before 
commercialization. 
We will emphasize 
technology as it is 
practiced and is familiar 
to the US national 
community, but we note 
that we must consider 
international 
technologies, to the 
extent that technologies 
are usually fairly easy to 
import. For example, if 
we consider breeder 
reactors, one would be 
remiss not to use 
French operating 
experience. 
* These definitions are adapted from the NASA definitions of technological readiness. 
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Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS (description found in Appendix I) 
TML 2 – Actual system 
completed and qualified 
through test and 
demonstration and used on 
the grid in a commercial 
application* 
TML 1 – Actual system 
capable of turn-key 
operation by generally 
available operations 
personnel 
TML 0 – The technology is 
so mature that substantial 
improvement seems 
unlikely 
   
* These definitions are adapted from the NASA definition of technological readiness. 
 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY 
We use the Herfindahl 
index that establishes 
vulnerability by assessing 
the multiplicity of supply 
sources, or may also be 
applied to other 
“bottlenecks,” such as 
critical terminals or 
transmission lines. 
 
=
i
2
iX10H  
 
where X is the fraction of one type of 
energy from source i, or the fraction 
of energy entering a system through 
a portal i.  We multiply by 10 to make 
the number consistent with other 
metrics. 
The impact of a supply disruption may be very large if one or a few 
major suppliers are disrupted. 
An example would be the profound effect of electricity disruption if all 
the power for a city were to arrive via a single transmission line. 
National, but will extend 
across borders, 
particularly for petroleum 
products, and 
increasingly for natural 
gas. 
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APPENDIX B. Summary Table of Criteria and Defining Attributes (cont.) 
 
Definition of Attribute Units of Quantification Impact Addressed Linkage between Attribute and Impact Boundary 
SUSTAINABILITY LIMITATIONS (description found in Appendix J) 
Persistence: Length of 
time of supply of a given 
resource at current 
technology and use 
 
ratio of time scaled between 0 to 
10 
 
Concerns over long-term energy supply, prices, and economic 
growth and maintaining a standard of living 
Utilizing persistent energy sources expands the time horizon over 
which less persistent sources are available without sharp price 
increases. 
 
National; domestic production 
and use rates; current 
production efficiencies; and 
domestic pop growth. 
 
Capacity Matching: 
Compares the net exergy 
produced in a system with 
the exergy needs of the 
consumer 
 
# ratio of unmet needs scaled 
between 0 to 10 
 
Maintaining a certain way or quality of life requires continuous 
exergy production. 
Matching exergy sources with exergy needs can sustain a way of 
life. 
 
National; domestic exergy 
applications. 
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APPENDIX C.  Cost Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
The cost of energy from a technology strongly correlates with its penetration into a competitive 
market.  Costs also impact the quality of life and national economic competitiveness in global 
markets.  Higher energy costs relative to other costs would reduce the share of income available 
for other goods and services that are deemed to promote the quality of life, for example, by 
increasing the cost of travel the share of personal income available for medical services is 
reduced.  Further, higher energy costs relative to global competitors makes energy-intensive 
products less competitive in the global market.  To address the aforementioned issues, the 
Levelized Energy Cost (LEC) is used as the figure of merit. 
 
Importance 
 
Currently and historically, cost is the dominant criterion in energy system evaluation and 
deployment.  Often, consideration of alternative technologies is framed as a trade-off between 
societal benefits and private or internalized costs.  While opinion varies about the monetary 
value of the other criteria, cost reduction is almost always a key R&D goal for energy 
technologies. Lower costs encourage broader acceptance and wider market penetration. 
 
Impacts 
 
Costs directly impact the market penetration of new technologies. Costs also determine the order 
of dispatch and preferred operating capacity factor. Lower costs result in increased use whether 
in a regulated environment or in a competitive market. Even in the case of renewable portfolio 
standards, cost is a major consideration in setting targets. Therefore, the cost attribute is a driving 
factor for the acceptance of a new technology. 
 
Attributes Quantification 
 
The key attributes for calculation of LEC are listed in the table included in Appendix B.  In order 
to fairly compare technologies, it is important to consider the service provided (see Service 
criteria in Appendix H).  In the case of electricity, this means the duty cycle (as captured by the 
capacity factor) as well as the transmission requirements.  Distributed generation may avoid the 
need for additional electrical transmission.  However, it may require additional fuel 
transportation infrastructure or local storage for distributed resources like solar photovoltaics.  
Generally, the infrastructure requirements used in this analysis should reflect a scenario wherein 
the energy technology is at least half its potential market penetration (Nth plant installed). 
Further, emissions mitigation measures such as scrubbing equipment are included in the cost 
vector; marginal environmental damage costs for emissions above scrubbed levels are used in the 
calculation of the environmental and natural resource vector. 
 
The fixed charge rate is the percentage of capital costs per year allocated to the LEC and 
includes all financial costs such as capital recovery, taxes, construction loan, etc.  The fixed 
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charge rates used in this study vary by technology and are based on DOE/Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) estimates from National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).  
Documentation is available on the web at www.eia.doe.gov: 
 
• Annual Energy Outlook 2005 with Projections to 2025.  DOE/EIA-0383(2005). 
• Electricity Market Module of the National Energy Modeling System, Model 
Documentation Report 2000.  DOE/EIA-M068(2004). 
 
The EIA fixed charge rates include current tax law and trends in power plant finance. 
 
Constraints 
 
The costs should include the full life cycle when data are available (decommissioning costs are 
often difficult to estimate).  The costs should also be compared on an equal basis of service 
(utility) delivered.  For example, the costs of transmission and distribution of electricity (and 
fuel) must be considered when comparing distributed generation with centralized generation 
options. 
 
Mathematical Model 
 
The LEC in $/kWh is calculated as follows: 
 
FVOM
8760CF
FOMFCRCLEC ++
•
+•
=  
 
where 
 
C = Unit overnight capital cost, including project development and contingencies in 
$/kW 
FCR = Fixed charge rate in real terms (inflation-adjusted) in fraction/yr 
FOM = Fixed real annual operation and maintenance (O&M) cost in $/kW-yr 
VOM = variable real O&M cost (including fuel) in $/kWh 
F = levelized fuel cost in constant $/kWh 
CF = percentage of full-load annual energy production as a fraction 
8760 = hours/year. 
 
Uncertainty 
 
In reality, costs are not known precisely, particularly estimates for future technology costs.  
There are several reasons that quantifying this uncertainty is useful, but basically it helps one 
understand the system and better compare options and potential outcomes. 
 
Much of the energy infrastructure in the United States is built, owned, and operated by private 
industry.  Different companies have different risk tolerances and targets, but all want to 
maximize return for a given risk level and make their investments accordingly.  For example, 
some estimates of the LEC from nuclear power plants is competitive with coal.  However, the 
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uncertainty in the nuclear power costs is much greater than that for coal.  The majority of power 
plants built from 1990 to early this decade were fueled with natural gas because new technology 
made them less expensive, cleaner, and easier to site than several competitors and their low 
fraction of fixed costs seemed to reduce financial risk (due to discounting future fuel costs).  
However, natural gas prices have increased several fold and appear likely to remain volatile for 
some time.  Some plants had contracts that transferred this fuel cost risk to a customer.  Since 
someone is always left holding the bill, these increased risks have led to an environment where 
other plant types are being deployed in greater numbers. 
 
In managing research and development (R&D) programs, such information is useful in 
developing appropriate portfolio diversity.  A sensitivity analysis provides valuable information 
on the key drivers and key unknowns.  This can be used to tailor R&D programs and individual 
projects to maximize benefits.  For example, reducing the LEC is a prime objective of the DOE 
Solar Energy Technologies Program.  Having a good knowledge of the impacts of various inputs 
and uncertainties on the LEC permits better evaluation of programs or individual projects to 
reduce the cost or uncertainty.  Another important aspect of uncertainty in this context relates to 
risk management of R&D projects that themselves have uncertainty related to cost, duration, and 
ability to meet technical objectives.  The combination of uncertainty information about both the 
system in question (e.g., cost of solar) and the R&D projects under consideration (e.g., cost, 
duration, impact or probability of meeting goals) provides program managers insights that help 
make difficult funding decisions and achieve the desired portfolio diversity.  
 
Crafting public policy in the energy arena is a difficult task; there are so many divergent 
perspectives that can often be effectively argued.  Energy infrastructure typically also has a long 
lifetime, from ~15 years for autos to ~30 years for power plants and refineries to 70+ years for 
pipelines, dams, etc.  Once infrastructure is installed, the investment cost is stranded, making a 
change to a different approach that much more expensive to society.  However, predicting that 
far into the future, the inputs most valuable for infrastructure decisions are rife with uncertainty.  
Policymakers benefit from better understanding these uncertainties, and from approaches that 
help them create robust or “no-regrets” solutions.  Such solutions, while maybe not optimal for 
all futures, are often good solutions, and rarely bad solutions. An example of current interest is 
the hydrogen economy that offers the potential for domestic production of energy and low 
environmental impacts1.  However, the hydrogen economy faces a common conundrum for 
energy technologies. Costs are currently much higher than current approaches and are predicted 
to decrease with further development and deployment, but deployments are unlikely until costs 
become competitive with current approaches.  Furthermore, it is uncertain when, if ever, costs 
would become competitive with other options.  This is important because global economic 
competitiveness can be impacted by local energy costs.  Conversely, the energy infrastructure 
cannot be changed quickly to respond to a problem such as rapid climate change or an oil 
production rate peak.  If changes do not start before economic competitiveness is reached, it may 
be too late. 
                                                 
1
  Not all hydrogen-related technologies offer these potential advantages, but several do. 
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Scoring 
 
The impact of uncertainty on LEC was investigated for several electrical generation technologies 
using a Monte Carlo analysis approach.  Tables C-1 and C-2 list low, most likely, and high 
estimates and the sources for these estimates.   Triangular distributions were used to represent the 
attribute uncertainty.  While this diminishes the tails of the results distribution, it was deemed 
appropriate for this application where the input distributions are essentially opinion and the 5- 
and 95-percentile bounds are probably the best fidelity that might be achieved.  Commercially 
available @Risk software was used to perform the Monte Carlo analysis.  Figure C-1 shows the 
capital cost distribution for residential photovoltaics (PV) in 2004. 
 
 
Table C-1.  Cost attributes for current (2004/2005) and future (2020) concentrating 
 solar power (CSP), residential and commercial photovoltaics (PVr, PVc),  
pulverized coal (PC), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC). 
 
Overnight Capital Cost, $/kW Real Fixed Charge Rate, % 
Fixed O&M, 
Constant $/kW-yr Technology 
Low Most Likely High Low 
Most 
Likely High Low 
Most 
Likely High 
CSP 20044  $  3,582   $  3,980   $  5,174  8.0% 12.5% 16.0%  $   65   $       71   $   85  
CSP 20203  $  2,270   $  3,102   $  4,653  8.0% 12.5% 16.0%  $   49   $       64   $   79  
PVr 20051  $  8,000   $  8,470   $12,770  3.9% 4.3%1 5.2%  $   92   $     102   $ 305  
PVr 20201  $  2,250   $  2,500   $  5,000  3.9% 4.3%1 5.2%  $     9   $       10   $   92  
PVc 20051  $  6,830   $  7,440   $  9,500  4.5% 5.0%1 6.0%  $   37   $       42   $   83  
PVc 20201  $  1,999   $  2,221   $  4,442  4.5% 5.0%1 6.0%  $     8   $         9   $   37  
PC 20042  $  1,115   $  1,239   $  1,363  15.5% 17.0% 18.0%  $   22   $       24   $   27  
NGCC 20042  $     521   $     579   $     637  14.5% 16.1% 17.5%  $     9   $       10   $   11  
1 DOE, 2006, Solar Energy Technologies Multi-Year Technical Plan (Draft September, 2005).  Costs are per nameplate 
power rating in peak Watts DC.  Year 2004 low, most likely, and high capital costs are from DOE data. Year 2020 low 
and high costs are 90% and 200% of 2020 DOE goal that was used as the most likely value. 
2 EIA, 2005, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2005. www.eia.doe.gov.  Low and high capital cost estimates 
are 90% and 110% of most likely. 
3 Sargent & Lundy LLC Consulting Group, 2003, “Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar Technology 
Cost and Performance Forecasts,” NREL/SR-550-34440. This is the Solar 220 plant.  Low, most likely, and high 
capital costs estimates are from SunLab, S&L, and 150% of most likely. 
4 Stoddard, L., B. Owens, F. Morse, D. Kearney, 2005, “New Mexico Concentrating Solar Plant Feasibility Study. Draft 
Final Report.” Prepared for New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department.  This is a 50 MW 
trough plant with 6 hours of thermal storage.  Low and high capital costs are estimated at 90% and 130% of most 
likely. 
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Table C-2.  Cost attributes for current (2004/2005) and future (2020)  
concentrating solar power (CSP), residential and commercial photovoltaics 
(PVr, PVc), pulverized coal (PC), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC). 
 
Capacity Factor, % Variable O&M, 
constant$/kWh Fuel, constant$/kWh Technology 
Low Most Likely High Low 
Most 
Likely High Low 
Most 
Likely High 
CSP 20044 32% 34% 36%  $0.003   $0.003   $0.004   $-     $-     $-    
CSP 20203 40% 70% 73%  $0.001   $0.001   $0.001   $-     $-     $-    
PVr 20051 14% 16% 20%  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
PVr 20201 14% 16% 20%  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
PVc 20051 14% 16% 20%  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
PVc 20201 14% 16% 20%  $-     $-     $-     $-     $-     $-    
PC 20042 81% 85% 89%  $0.004   $0.004   $0.005   $0.011   $0.012   $0.014  
NGCC 20042 81% 85% 89%  $0.001   $0.001   $0.001   $0.028   $0.037   $0.056  
1 DOE, 2006, Solar Energy Technologies Multi-Year Technical Plan (Draft September, 2005).  Costs are per 
nameplate power rating in peak Watts DC.  Year 2004 low, most likely, and high capital costs are from DOE 
data. Year 2020 low and high costs are 90% and 200% of 2020 DOE goal that was used as the most likely 
value. 
2 EIA, 2005, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2005. www.eia.doe.gov.  Low and high capital cost 
estimates are 90% and 110% of most likely. 
3 Sargent & Lundy LLC Consulting Group, 2003, “Assessment of Parabolic Trough and Power Tower Solar 
Technology Cost and Performance Forecasts,” NREL/SR-550-34440. This is the Solar 220 plant.  Low, 
most likely, and high capital costs estimates are from SunLab, S&L, and 150% of most likely. 
4 Stoddard, L., B. Owens, F. Morse, D. Kearney, 2005, “New Mexico Concentrating Solar Plant Feasibility 
Study. Draft Final Report.” Prepared for New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department.  
This is a 50 MW trough plant with 6 hours of thermal storage.  Low and high capital costs are estimated at 
90% and 130% of most likely. 
 
 
Overnight capital cost includes all development, construction, and owners costs, but assumes the 
plant is built overnight.  The fixed charge rate includes capital recovery costs, interest during 
construction (because large facilities cannot be installed overnight), and tax effects. 
 
The most likely FCR values are based on the average used in the EIA NEMS model over the 
calculation horizon of 2005 to 2031 that is based on project finance, a 20-year project life, and 
US tax law in effect at the time of the analysis.  The PV most likely FCR values are based on the 
DOE solar program financial assumptions such as adding the residential system cost to a 30-year 
home mortgage.  High and low FCR estimates are from the author.  In the case of concentrating 
solar power (CSP) technologies, the range is large to represent the impact of different financing 
approaches (e.g., utility, municipality, etc.) and possible incentives (taxes, loan guarantees, etc.) 
or lack thereof. 
 
Fixed O&M, variable O&M, and fuel costs are levelized constant dollar (real) costs over the 
project life.  CSP variable O&M costs are assumed to be 10% of total O&M, which appropriately 
yields similar costs to gas and coal plants.  While the CSP values have greater uncertainty, 
variable O&M contributes little to the LEC of any of these technologies.  Most likely fossil fuel 
costs are assumed to be the mean EIA estimate over the period 2005-2025; coal bounds are 
assumed to be 90% and 115% of most likely, while more volatile natural gas cost bounds are 
assumed to be 75% and 150% of most likely. 
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Figure C-1.  2004 residential photovoltaics triangular distribution of overnight capital cost 
($/kWpeak) used in Monte Carlo modeling. The 5% and 90% probabilities are indicated. 
 
 
The most likely capacity factor of the fossil plants reflects how new plants are typically run.  
Upper bounds are typically constrained by planned and forced outages for maintenance and 
repair, while the lower bounds represent the potential for lower utilization.  The capacity factor 
of the PV technologies depends on local resource conditions, primarily solar insolation and 
temperature.  To be consistent with the PV cost attribute, capacity factor is the estimated annual 
production in useable Watt-hours AC per Watt DC peak system nameplate rating.  The most 
likely capacity factor is from the best data available for Phoenix, Arizona (Moore et al., 2005a), 
the site selected by the DOE solar program for use in program planning and evaluation.  The 
high bound is for Prescott, Arizona, a cooler site than Phoenix and one for which good 
experimental data also exists (Moore et al., 2005b).  The low bound estimate is 90% of most 
likely.  Less desirable solar sites may actually have lower values. Year 2020 capacity factor 
estimates are the same because it is assumed that the convention used in rating nameplate power 
and relative performance impacts of temperature and part-load operation remain unchanged. 
 
The results of LEC calculations using 10,000 samples2 from these distributions for attributes are 
shown in Figure C-2. Several items are noteworthy.  First is that there was no attempt was made 
to address the potential non-uniformity in optimism or pessimism of estimated inputs obtained 
from the various sources.  For example, one could argue that estimates taken from program goals 
could represent an optimistic or advocate position. 
 
                                                 
2
  The Latin hypercube sampling methodology was used. 
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Figure C-2.  Levelized energy cost (electrical generation) estimates for current (2004/2005) and 
future (2020) concentrating solar power (CSP), residential and commercial photovoltaics (PVr, 
PVc), pulverized coal (PC), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) facilities.  The diamonds 
represent the most likely cost, while the whiskers show the 5% and 95% probability bounds.  No 
attempt was made to address the potential non-uniformity in optimism or pessimism of 
estimated inputs obtained from the various sources. 
 
 
The current and future PV generation costs are higher than the solar and fossil central generation 
technologies. However, photovoltaics generally compete with retail electricity costs,3 not 
wholesale generation costs. In 2003, the average residential cost of electricity4 was $0.087/kWh 
including an average cost of transmission and distribution of $0.026/kWh (EIA, 2005a).  
 
The uncertainty of future CSP and PV cost estimates is less than for current costs, which seems 
counterintuitive.  However, the uncertainties actually increase from 2004 to 2020 as a fraction of 
the mean cost estimate.  The ratio of 2 standard deviations to mean for CSP, PVr, and PVc 
increases from 25% to 45%, 25 to 41%, and 22% to 39% respectively.  This still implies that 
solar cost reductions will definitely occur during this period.  While not certain, a history of prior 
cost reductions, likely continued R&D, and increasing deployments make this likely.  The fossil 
technologies included here are mature, so potential future cost reductions likely have a modest 
                                                 
3
  Local generation that offsets power produced.  Excess generation that is returned to the grid is currently often also 
priced at retail rates in “net metering” contracts.  However, photovoltaics without storage are intermittent, so it 
does not eliminate the need to construct generation and transmission facilities as backup.  Consequently, only a 
small fraction (currently 0.5% in California) of total capacity is often allowed in net metering agreements. 
4
  Prices can vary significantly, typically between $0.05-0.15/kWh. 
Monte Carlo Most Likely, 5%, 95%
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
CS
P 2
00
4
CS
P 2
02
0
PV
r 2
00
5
PV
r 2
02
0
PV
c 
20
05
PV
c 
20
20
PC
 
20
04
NG
CC
 
20
04
LE
C 
(20
04
$/k
W
h)
 46 
impact on LEC, especially when compared with future fuel costs.  More environmentally 
friendly fossil technologies under development have larger uncertainties on cost and 
performance and would certainly be interesting to evaluate in a similar manner. 
 
The lower uncertainty in LEC of pulverized coal (PC) compared to natural gas combined cycle 
(NGCC) is reflected in industry trends.  The number of NGCC plants proposed for construction 
has declined while increases have occurred in proposed PC plant construction.  While nuclear 
power is not shown, it also competes with coal power and has higher uncertainty for several 
reasons beyond the scope of this section. 
 
In this study, as is often the case, some input distributions were skewed with the most likely 
value closer to the best case. This leads to the interesting result that using the most likely point 
estimates for each input yields a resultant that is not the most likely LEC.  For example, Figure 
C-3 shows the resultant LEC distribution for residential PV in 2004.  The most likely cost from 
Monte Carlo analysis is $0.38/kWh, whereas using the most likely point estimates for each input 
yields $0.33/kWh, a 13% error. 
 
 
 
Figure C-3. Resulting LEC ($/kWh) distribution from 10,000 samples. 
The most likely value is $0.38/kWh, whereas using the most likely point  
estimates for each input yields $0.33/kWh, a 13% error. 
 
 
Another benefit of sensitivity analysis is the identification of key inputs, in this case that impact 
LEC.  Table C-3 lists the top three drivers for each technology and their regression sensitivity.  
Positive values indicate that an increase in that input increases LEC and vice versa. 
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Table C-3.  Top three regression sensitivities for calculation of LEC for  
current (2004/2005) and future (2020) concentrating solar power (CSP),  
residential and commercial photovoltaics (PVr, PVc), pulverized coal (PC),  
and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC).  FCR is the fixed charge rate. 
 
Technology Top Sensitivity Value 
Second 
Sensitivity Value 
Third 
Sensitivity Value 
CSP 2004  FCR 0.84  Capital cost 0.50  Capacity factor -0.14 
CSP 2020  Capacity factor  -0.60  Capital cost 0.58  FCR 0.52 
PVr 2005  Fixed O&M 0.59  Capital cost 0.57  Capacity factor -0.49 
PVr 2020  Capital cost  0.75  Fixed O&M 0.52  Capacity factor -0.34 
PVc 2005  Capacity factor -0.63  Capital cost 0.58  FCR 0.49 
PVc 2020  Capital cost  0.87  Capacity factor -0.35  FCR 0.28 
PC 2004  Capital cost  0.68  FCR 0.51  Capacity factor -0.38 
NGCC 2004  Fuel  0.99  Capital cost 0.09  FCR 0.08 
 
 
Some technologies are dominated by one factor, such as the NGCC plant dominated by fuel cost, 
while others are more evenly impacted by several factors, such as the 2005 residential and 
commercial photovoltaics. 
 
Simplified Uncertainty Analysis 
 
The preceding analysis was performed using the Monte Carlo approach.  In some cases, a 
simpler, faster analysis methodology may be desirable.  Initially, a first-order analytical approach 
was investigated.  In this approach, a Taylor-series expansion is constructed around the mean 
value and the higher-order terms are discarded.  This provides estimates of the mean and 
variance (2) of the output distribution from knowledge of the mean and variance of the input 
distributions (Ang and Tang, 1975). This results in nine algebraic equations that could easily be 
implemented into software such as EPSim. 
 
Table C-4 compares the accuracy of this first-order approach with the Monte Carlo results.  The 
5th-percentile and 95th-percentile estimates for the first-order approach were assumed equal to the 
mean ± 2.  In most cases, the errors were optimistic (lower LEC), but sometimes they were 
pessimistic.  While the error in standard deviation was sometimes large, the error in 5th-
percentile and 95th-percentile estimates was typically less than 10% in magnitude.  This first-
order approach should be sufficient for the application illustrated here given the level of 
confidence in the input distributions. If the application requires more accuracy in an analytical 
approach, several options exit.  Higher-order terms could be added to the Taylor series 
expansion.  First- or second-order reliability methods could be used. Finally, the input 
distributions could be selected to make analytical solution easier, which would provide the full 
output distribution, not just mean and variance.  For example, the input distribution for the 
ln(CF) could be used to simplify the LEC equation to a linear form. 
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Table C-4.  Error of first-order method compared to Monte Carlo results for current (2004/2005) 
and future (2020) concentrating solar power (CSP), residential and commercial photovoltaics 
(PVr, PVc), pulverized coal (PC), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC). 
 
Technology Error Mean Error  
Error 5th-
percentile 
Error 95th-
percentile 
CSP 2004 -0.1% -3.6% -5.6% 2.4% 
CSP 2020 -1.6% -45.6% 7.8% -12.7% 
PVr 2005 -0.5% -28.9% 0.9% -4.3% 
PVr 2020 -0.5% -13.0% -8.6% -1.4% 
PVc 2005 -0.5% -55.0% 8.3% -8.3% 
PVc 2020 -0.5% -14.2% -9.3% -2.1% 
PC 2004 0.0% -15.4% -0.3% 0.1% 
NGCC 2004 0.0% -0.2% -6.1% 1.9% 
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APPENDIX D.  Environmental and  
Natural Resource Impacts Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
As the energy infrastructure in the United States has developed, it has been recognized that 
production and use of energy has significant impacts on environmental and natural resource 
quality. This criterion is defined to capture those effects above and beyond (or in addition to) the 
environmental effects currently mitigated under various types of environmental regulation. 
Current mitigation or control measures that require additional investment are captured in the cost 
vector. Further, this criterion is restricted to the non-human safety and health aspects of a 
technology; human safety and health aspects are considered separately under the safety and 
health criterion. 
 
Importance 
 
Electricity generation has a major impact on the US and world environment. Perhaps the biggest 
environmental challenge is the emission of greenhouse gases. With approximately 4 percent of 
the world’s population, the United States currently accounts for about 24 percent of total global 
emissions of greenhouse gases; the United States now emits greenhouse gases at levels more 
than 13% above levels mandated by the Kyoto Protocol. US power generation is responsible for 
approximately two-thirds of all domestic SO2 emissions and approximately one-third of US 
nitrogen oxide emissions, both of which are precursors to acid rain, cause materials damage and 
visibility impairment, and, in the case of NOx, contribute to eutrophication. Power generation 
also results in the emissions of mercury and other heavy metals that have been shown to cause 
serious damage to ecosystems. Finally, power generation results in land use, landscape 
degradation, and additional demand for water. Particularly, in the case of water in semi-arid 
regions such as the southwestern United States, this increasing demand could result in an 
environmental crisis exceeding current proportions before mid-century. 
 
Impacts 
 
New technologies would be expected to effect significant reductions in environmental loadings 
or natural resource degradation. Those improvements might include: (1) mitigation of global 
climate change; (2) further reduction in the precursors of acid rain; (3) lessening of 
eutrophication; (4) improvement in visibility; (5) further reductions in particulate damage 
resulting from materials soiling, corrosion, and damage to foliage; (6) reduction in airborne 
heavy metal contamination of the ecosystem; (7) further reduction of water and ground 
contamination from disposal of waste products; (8) lessening of land use and landscape 
degradation from the installation of power generation facilities; (9) reductions in water 
consumption for electricity generation; and (10) lessening of thermal pollution caused by the 
discharge of heated water or the release of steam. 
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Attributes Quantification 
 
Several different physical measures of quantification will be used for this metric: (1) grams of a 
pollutant per kWh; (2) in the case of land use, acres of land included in a facility footprint per 
kWh; (3) in the case of water consumption, acre-feet of water consumed per kWh; and (4) in the 
case of thermal pollution, acre-feet-degrees of water per kWh. These rather disparate units are 
still usable since they will be combined only after being mapped to a scoring system common 
across the different attributes.  The table in Appendix B provides a listing of the attributes for the 
environmental and natural resources (non-human-related effects). 
 
Constraints 
 
This measure will be restricted to impacts in the United States.  In the case of cross-boundary 
impacts (e.g., greenhouse gases), generally accepted levels of importance will be employed; 
these levels will have appropriate international concerns taken into account. 
 
Mathematical Model 
 
The Environmental and Natural Resource Impacts (ENRI) criterion contains many possibilities 
for scoring.  This is because many well-defined types of data are at our disposal, particularly 
when it comes to different emissions and pollutants that are often tabulated for the spectrum of 
technologies.  From this wide selection, one can easily choose which factors appear to have the 
greatest impact on the environment, although in some cases, the choice is not so simple and may 
involve subjective judgments. 
 
Unfortunately, this wealth of information can be distracting when it comes to finding an 
aggregate score for a technology’s ENRI variable.  Determining a per-kilowatt value of carbon 
dioxide or mercury emissions for a technology is straightforward, but combining the two into a 
cohesive number is a more difficult proposition, due to (among other things) their disparate 
impacts and scales. 
 
To combat this problem, these quantities will be compared on a relative scale to benchmarks that 
are easily determined and can be consistently applied across different categories, both within and 
outside of the environmental criterion.  The following rubric will be employed to produce a score 
for categories (such as pollutants) that cannot otherwise be combined very easily: 
 
Physical Data 
 
The first key step towards determining an aggregate criterion score is to find the physical 
information related to each constituent factor in the analysis.  During the selection of these 
factors, one must ensure that no quantities are double-counted.  For this reason, care has been 
taken to use unambiguous chemical formulae instead of more generic terms such as “greenhouse 
gases.” 
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For the ENRI criterion, the following environmental quantities have been chosen for the study: 
 
Emissions 
CO2 produced (g/kWh) 
SO2 produced (g/kWh) 
NOx produced (g/kWh) 
PM2.5 and PM10 produced (g/kWh) 
Mercury produced (g/kWh) 
VOC produced (g/kWh) 
 
Water Use 
Water consumed (acre-feet/kWh) 
Water released (acre-feet/kWh)  
 
Land Use 
Land used in fuel harvesting and plant footprint (acres/kWh) 
 
It is understandable that there may be some uncertainty inherent to these numbers.  This 
uncertainty is welcome and can be effectively propagated through the subsequent steps, after 
which uncertain physical quantities will be converted to an uncertain criterion value. 
 
Preliminary Scores 
 
While the physical data should certainly be the true determining factors in the scoring, some 
work is needed to get a better grip on these numbers.  It is desired that all scores be between 0 
and 10, so clearly some normalization is needed.  Moreover, this normalization should somehow 
be hardwired to realistic values; in other words, there should be a clear reason why a technology 
received a particular score in a category, and the more obvious and sensible the reason, the 
better. 
 
In a sense, it would be best to map the continuum of possible physical quantities to the 
continuum that runs from 0 to 10.  This works perfectly at the lower bound, where a quantity of 
zero corresponds directly to a preliminary score of zero – both being the ideals in their respective 
categories.  However, these quantities, by their very nature, have no absolute maximum values.  
Furthermore, even if there were a theoretical maximum value in any of these categories, it could 
possibly be so far detached from today’s realities of relatively clean and environmentally 
friendly energy sources as to render the score worthless. 
 
However, since this project is intended to determine sensible alternatives to today’s current 
energy policies, it is appropriate to use today’s energy portfolio in this part of the analysis.  Since 
data collection is already being performed for the technologies that comprise the bulk of US 
electricity generation, it is possible to use these numbers to derive a logical benchmark.  For this, 
the following is proposed: 
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(To see a more detailed concept for normalizing category values within a criterion as well as then 
combining these criteria scores into an overall portfolio number, please see Concepts for 
Determining an Overall Technology Score and Portfolio Mix in Appendix L.) 
 
A preliminary score of 0 will be earned for a technology in a particular metric if its 
corresponding physical quantity value is identically 0. 
 
A preliminary score of 5 will be earned for a technology in a particular metric if its 
corresponding physical quantity value is the same as the weighted average of the physical 
quantities for the five most dominant electricity-producing technologies.  This average is 
determined by using the weights listed in the following table, which lists the national share of the 
electricity portfolio for these technologies. 
 
Table D-1.  Proportion of current electricity portfolio devoted to five largest sources. 
 
Coal Nuclear Natural Gas Hydropower Oil 
53% 21% 15% 7% 3% 
 
Note: These values only sum to 99%, so the results will need to be normalized by division by 0.99 
to find the true weighted average. 
 
Preliminary scores not identically equal to 0 or 5 will have their value determined by either linear 
interpolation or extrapolation through use of this weighted average and the zero-score value. 
 
Weighting of Metrics 
 
At this point, it is desired to combine the 10 to 12 preliminary scores into one criterion value.  It 
is here where the importance of the physical quantities will be taken into account.  This is done 
by multiplying each preliminary score by the weight for that category. 
 
This is the appropriate time to bring scientific considerations into place to determine and utilize 
natural weightings among the variables.  As an example, while one may find both CO2 and NOx 
to be pollutants that one should seek to limit, that same person may find NOx to be a more 
dangerous contributor; this is generally the scientific consensus on the issue as well.  As such, by 
including a sensible weighting scheme, the program will have taken the metric scores and 
combined them properly into a criterion score. 
 
What follows is a description of the areas of impact for each of the categories mentioned above 
as contributors to the environmental criterion.  There is a weight listed for each of the categories 
as well.  Clearly, this is a subjective judgment on the part of the author, but it is based on the 
severity of the environmental damage that is caused by the existence of or an increase in the size 
of a physical quantity. 
 
(Note that these weights are based on how much of an issue the quantity is currently in the 
United States.  This distinction is needed because not all of these categories endanger the 
environment at the moment.  Put another way – were this to be a ranking of diseases and their 
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threat to society, while polio is more debilitating than the common cold, it would not be ranked 
very high because it is mostly eradicated.  The same concept applies here.) 
 
CO2 – primary contributor to global warming; 20% 
 
SO2 – leads to the formation of acid rain and regional haze, inhibits cloud formation; 25% 
 
NOx – leads to the formation of smog, acid rain, and ozone, decreases crop yields, causes 
eutrophication; 25% 
 
PM2.5 and PM10 – decreases visibility, causes corrosion to metal objects, leads to damage of 
vegetation; 10% 
 
Mercury – negatively affects bird and mammal reproduction, makes fish toxic; 6% 
 
VOC – secondary contributor to global warming, contaminant of soil and groundwater; 6% 
 
Water consumed – damages ecosystems in excess; 5% 
 
Water released – leads to thermal pollution; 2% 
 
Land use – restricts land from other purposes; 1% 
 
These weights are subject to change as perception is altered or the environmental opinion 
adjusts.  If acid rain were to become a larger nuisance, for example, then categories like SO2 and 
NOx would get a larger share of the weight.  The weights listed above are adequate for finding a 
reasonable ENRI score, but should be open to adjustment based on the feelings of the researcher. 
 
Finding the Criterion Score 
 
With the above steps completed, finding the ENRI score is straightforward.  One first takes the 
intermediate values, determined through interpolation or extrapolation based on the physical data 
and the current portfolio’s weighted average, and multiplies them by the corresponding 
weightings, found in the previous section.  These numbers are summed to find the criterion 
score, which will be a positive value; all values larger than 10 should be rounded down to 10 so 
as to keep the criterion scores within the desired range. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is much debate about the importance of environmental issues with respect to other worldly 
concerns.  Among those that put a high value on the environment, there is still discussion about 
which factors are more important than others.  The methods described herein do not seek to 
define importance, but rather to allow all researchers to use their own (or someone else’s) trusted 
judgments to determine it for them.  With these weights now in place, the process computes a 
normalized ENRI score, which can safely be compared with the ENRI scores from other 
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technologies for ranking purposes.  Since care was taken in the criterion formulation, these 
results will add value to those wishing to compare technologies. 
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APPENDIX E.  Safety and Health Impacts Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
The availability of energy is sometimes seen as a quality-of-life issue; in the United States, on-
demand available electricity is so common as to be taken for granted.  On the flip-side of this 
issue are the negative health effects, often unseen or indirect, that come along with the 
generation and distribution of the aforementioned electricity.  This criterion will be defined as 
the amount of risk to the public that results from the creation and distribution of electricity.  It 
will consider issues encompassing the excavation to post-processing of fuel, the creation to 
removal of specific electricity transportation means, and the creation of the materials used to 
make an electricity-generating mechanism (e.g., power plant) through its decommissioning.  As 
an example, safety issues relating to the making of steel or the drilling of oil will be considered 
here, while issues relating to the creation of steel-making machinery or oil rigs will not. 
 
Importance 
 
It is reasonable to assume that it is in the best interest of the country to take steps so that its 
citizens’ lives are not unduly threatened by death or harm on account of the nation’s energy 
infrastructure.  As such, limiting the risk associated with the creation and maintenance of the 
national energy infrastructure is of the utmost importance, as this has a most direct impact on the 
lives of citizens. 
 
Impacts 
 
It is understood that there will always be some degree of risk associated with the production of 
electricity.  The impact this criterion will have on the selection of an energy technology will be 
to bring attention to those methods that carry with them an inherent risk far beyond that to which 
the public has become accustomed.  Energy-related fatalities, injuries, and debilitations are not 
likely to be an overwhelming factor in the selection process – even the most risk-prone 
technologies tend to have strikingly low numbers of incidents – but will instead play a role in the 
trade-off phase of the analysis.  Providing values for this criterion for each technology will allow 
for a greater flexibility of choice, depending on how risk-tolerant the country is at the moment of 
decision. 
 
Attributes Quantification 
 
The units of interest, at least initially, will be the frequencies with which certain incidents 
(injuries, deaths, instances of disease/illness) occur as a result of a technology and its associated 
aspects, as well as the risk of certain incidents (e.g., reactor meltdown) that carry significant 
enough consequences to merit mention.  In order to come up with a measure that fits onto our 
overall “target” graphic, these disparate units will have to be combined into one number.  This 
can be accomplished in several ways, such as providing a dollar value for each expected instance 
of injury/illness/death, or accumulating the expected number of years of life lost as a result of the 
technology choice.  It should be stressed that monetizing lives or the quality of life is to be 
 58 
avoided in the overall analysis of an energy technology, and that the above suggestion of 
monetization is merely to be used for comparisons of technologies within the Safety and Health 
criterion. The attributes used in the definition of this criteria are described in the table presented 
in Appendix B. 
 
Constraints 
 
The boundary for this metric should rest between those living in the United States and those 
outside of this country’s borders.  It is believed that safety and health issues affecting residents of 
other countries are implicitly reflected in the cost or availability of the goods and services from 
those countries. 
 
Mathematical Model 
 
The mathematics behind calculating the safety and health incidents involving a given energy 
technology will be rooted in pragmatism more than anything.  The data expected to be found and 
used in this analysis will most likely be based on national levels of incidents.  A simple ratio 
method, such as the following, will be the most useful way to incorporate some of these data: 
 
MaterialsNeededTechnology IncidentsTechnology = AnnualMaterialsProduced 
* 
Total Incidents related to 
production of material (E-1) 
 
where Materials Needed = amount of material needed in extraction, production, and 
construction. 
 
In this manner, it will be possible to estimate the materials-related safety and health factors.  
Harmful pollution levels will be treated in a similar way, with an expected increase in pollution 
leading to an expected increase in incidents. 
 
In the case of other contributing factors (such as those risk related, or the threat of proliferation), 
a general risk analysis paradigm will be followed.  In these instances, the generic product of 
consequence and probability will be considered and used as a proxy for actual occurrences.  This 
methodology may at first appear to be directed against the nuclear technologies, but in reality all 
possible events with a substantial enough risk term will be considered in this analysis. 
 
Challenges 
 
We can find some of the raw data needed for evaluating this criterion.  Because such small 
numbers are expected, it is vital that the data that are found be viewed with close scrutiny, or else 
one stray source may greatly skew the relative ranking of these technologies.  If sufficient and 
sufficiently accurate data are found, melding the disparate units into one overall number will 
present a challenge of its own.  However, this latter challenge is subject to discussion, while 
potential data-related issues provide a possibly insurmountable impediment. 
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APPENDIX F.  Energy Dependence Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
In the United States much of the rationale for energy research, energy policy, and the US DOE 
evolves from concerns about dependency on foreign sources of energy. As a result, this criterion 
is defined as the share of imports serving the demand for a specified fuel, e.g., imported oil as the 
share of total oil consumption in the United States. 
 
Importance 
 
Since before the initial oil price shock in October 1973, and then reinforced by the second oil 
price shock in 1979, US policy-makers have been very aware of the consequences of a disruption 
of foreign oil supplies. Political uncertainty and conflict in the primary petroleum-producing 
regions of the world have heightened this awareness. Most recently, this awareness has been 
demonstrated by an active military presence in the Middle East; this region has been prone to 
continuing political and social upheaval since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of 
World War I. 
 
Disruptions of supplies of energy can depress macroeconomic activity and overall growth, and 
pose threats to human health, safety, and security. Supply disruptions may evolve from a number 
of sources including loss of foreign supplies, and domestic infrastructure damage due to weather, 
hostile incursions, and mechanical failure. With the anticipation of apparent increasing 
dependence on imports of oil for US transportation needs, and the potential increasing 
dependence on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to satisfy the demand for natural gas, 
impacts of R&D and new technologies on reducing levels of imports is assuming new 
importance. This importance is reflected in the use of this criterion by several offices at US DOE 
in the fulfillment of their Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) requirements. 
 
Impacts 
 
New technologies focused on energy import reduction would be expected to either shift 
consumption from fuel types with high levels of imports to indigenous or domestic fuels, or 
reduce consumption of an imported fuel type through gains in efficiency, i.e., less input per unit 
of output. In either case, a new technology would be expected to reduce the requirement for 
imported fuels and the corresponding risk. 
 
Attributes 
 
Six attributes will be used for this criterion:  
 
• Versatility of technology 
• Impact of fuel on GDP 
• Value of import and percentage of total consumption 
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• Portfolio diversification 
• Strategic Fuel Stocks 
• Surge Capacity 
 
These attributes will be rated on a scale between 0 and 1.0, and then summed up to a combined 
score.  This implies each attribute used to determine energy dependence has equal weight in the 
combined score. This method of simple summation will give some qualitative measure of 
dependence. We realize that this is a simplification and that dependency has many aspects that 
are being force-fit into a simple metric as a starting point for discussion. 
 
Versatility of Technology* 
 
The key to enabling a competitive and stable market is the use of substitutes. If a given 
electricity-producing technology is able to easily switch to substitute fuel when the primary fuel 
source has become economically unstable, this technology can reduce the impact of foreign 
dependence of a resource, providing there is a substitute fuel readily available.  Versatility will 
be scored either as a 0 (zero) if a technology has fuel switching capability or a 1.0 if it does not.  
A score in mid-scale would result if the substitute fuel use results in secondary shortages. 
 
* This attribute may not be used in the final quantification of this criterion. 
 
Impact of Energy Type on GDP 
 
This attribute measures the relative impact a fuel has on the production of goods and services. 
Changes in the cost of resources ripple throughout the economy and create price changes with 
other goods and services. The greater the percentage of a resource reflected in the GDP, the 
greater the impact on the economy. This attribute will be reflected in decimal form of the 
monetary value of fuel consumed/GDP. 
 
Percentage of Net Imports 
 
The net amount of imported resource as a percentage of the total resource supplied reflects the 
relative impact importation may have on the economy.  Although modified from gross imports to 
net imports in 1982, this attribute has been regularly published as a measure of oil import 
dependence used by the Energy Information Administration since 1979 (Kendall, 1998).  We 
note that fuel imports currently account for about 25% of our exchange deficit, so the entire 
picture of economic impact must be considered. 
 
This attribute will be reflected as a proportion of net fuel imported/total fuel supplied. Physical 
units, such as million cubic feet for natural gas and barrels for oil rather than Btu’s, will be used 
because a physical measure of dependence should use physical units rather than a heat value 
because producers and consumers typically sell and buy fuel in barrels or cubic feet, not in Btu’s 
(Kendall, 1998). 
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Portfolio Diversification 
 
Kendall (1998) suggests that oil dependence does not necessarily indicate vulnerability to a 
disruption. He further explains that if “supply came from many small producers and one of them 
suddenly stopped exporting oil, it would have little effect on U.S. and world supplies and prices, 
even at a high rate of U.S. dependence.” Kendall (1998) contends that resource concentration is a 
key factor in the security of our oil supply and has been a commonly used measure by the GAO 
in measuring energy security.1 
 
The resource concentration of a given supplier identifies the relative impact one supplier may 
have on the economy regardless of the diversity. To account for this, a common approach used in 
the financial markets and in antitrust law is the “Herfindahl Index.”  This index is a measure of 
diversification that accounts for the market concentration of a supplier.  This approach can be 
used to calculate the average diversification of supply in a company or country basis.2 
 
The Herfindahl Index may be expressed as: 
 
=
i
2
ixH  
 
where xi is the fraction of total fuel type supply from source “i.” 
 
If the concentration among the different suppliers is equal, the equation will equal 1/ the number 
of suppliers.  The index value declines with increases in the number of suppliers; as the number 
of suppliers increases, this score will approach 0.  The index increases with rising inequality of 
supply among any given number of suppliers. 
 
Strategic Fuel Stocks 
 
Maintaining commercial and noncommercial fuel stocks, such as the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, is another method to reduce the impact foreign sources has on the economy. This 
provides a somewhat broader measure. The greater the fuel stock, the better equipped we are to 
mitigate economic impact of a supply disruption. This attribute could be expressed in physical 
units (MMcf or barrels) relative to the consumption in physical units specified over a one-year 
time interval. 
 
This attribute Strategic Fuel Stocks (SFS) will be quantified on a national level as 1 minus (total 
reserves (R) /total consumption (C)), or 
 
SFS = 1 - R/C 
 
                                                 
1
  Kendall, James (1998).  Measures of Oil Import Dependence. Energy Information Administration, Issues in 
Midterm Analysis and Forecasting. 
2
  Neff, Thomas (1997). 
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Based upon this equation, if total reserves in one year equaled total consumption for that year, 
the equation will approach 0. 
 
Surge Capacity* 
 
Excess surge capacity (storage) and production capacity can reduce the impact of price 
fluctuations due to periods of high process and declining periods of low prices (Kendall, 1998).  
This attribute attempts to measure the excess capacity of suppliers to compensate for supply 
disruptions that can be sustained for a specific number of days. 
 
Quantification of this attribute SC will be measured as  
 
SC =1 - (actual output/rated output) 
 
*This attribute may not be included in final calculation due to the extreme uncertainty in 
identifying this factor from foreign sources. 
 
Quantification of Measure 
 
The output of each attribute will be measured with values between 0 and 1.0.  The final 
summation for this criterion will also use the Herfindahl approach.  The output of each attribute 
will be squared, summed, then multiplied by 10 to reflect a score between 0 and 10. 
 
Constraints 
 
Developing a concise measure of energy dependence as an economic indicator of energy security 
requires a higher level of detail than what is incorporated into this criterion.  The political 
stability of foreign sources and the strength of the dollar on the world market have a major 
impact on the US economy.  Additionally, the development of supporting infrastructures, such as 
LNG terminals, which measures the capacity to support any increase in importation, requires 
further exploration.  Further studies on measuring the economic vulnerability are necessary, and 
such studies can assist policy makers in gauging their progress towards insulating the nation 
from the harmful effects of sharp changes in the world market (Kendall, 1998)3. 
 
This criterion will be restricted to US imports of fuels for domestic consumption and total 
domestic consumption of the specified fuel. 
 
                                                 
3
  Kendall, James (1998).  Measures of Oil Import Dependence. Energy Information Administration, Issues in 
Midterm Analysis and Forecasting. 
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APPENDIX G.  Policy Needs Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
“In those instances where change is warranted, the reasons frequently seem technical. But it is 
the nature of politics that the technicians themselves often are not able to make the necessary 
changes.  That requires the attention and persuasive powers of people at the highest levels of 
government.”  This quote from Richard D. Morgenstern and Paul R. Portney, writing in New 
Approaches on Energy and the Environment (Resources for the Future, Washington D.C., 2004 
page 1), highlights the need to consider policy during the course of technology development.  
The authors go on to say that the problem of policy formation is especially acute in 
environmental science areas, because those on opposite sides of the environmental and industrial 
fence are particularly polarized and view the environmental debate as a zero sum game with 
winners and losers.  
 
Importance 
 
Policy considerations are often important during the introduction and further implementation of 
new technologies.  As one of many examples, one might recall the introduction of the railway to 
the west.  A generous incentive was required to attract investors, so land and exclusive rights 
were granted.  During various phases of introducing electric power and telephone service, a wide 
variety of regulatory tools were used.  Regulations that may serve well during introduction may 
become outmoded as conditions change.  For example, if only a few motor vehicles are on the 
road, emission or performance standards are not important.  
 
Impacts 
 
The purpose of this metric is to call attention to policy considerations that might be necessary 
during the introduction and evolution of a new technology.  Anticipating what is needed, and 
preparing the ground work with agency officials, law makers, the potential investment 
community, service providers, the public, and regulators could make the difference in setting the 
conditions between success and failure. It appears that technology developers do not often 
account for such considerations, and the aim of this metric is to assess the difficulty of 
implementing policies needed for a technology to capture a market share, and to assure that 
policy considerations remain in view during the technology development process and are 
researched as part of the R&D investment process. 
 
Attribute Quantification 
 
We will not attempt to provide a highly quantified metric, because the considerations form too 
large a parameter space, and differences from one technology to another make it advisable to 
make only qualitative comparisons.  We recommend looking at the policy literature specific to 
each technology selected for study.  We suggest summarizing key considerations as supporting 
material for the evaluation vector, which is proposed to span a range of 0-10 with 0 indicating no 
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policy or market intervention while 10 represents substantial intervention; the components of this 
vector are described in the table presented in Appendix B. 
 
Policy considerations include topics such as: 
 
1. Price regulation. 
2. Comfort level and familiarity with a technology; this will often determine whether 
policy makers or financial supporters will back an effort. 
3. Consumption or use taxes. 
4. Tax credits for building infrastructure, production credits, tax incentives for 
employing a technology, or requirements to use specified technologies; for example, 
government agencies may be mandated to purchase a specified fraction of renewable 
energy. 
5. Regulation or user requirement of reliability or security, such as excess capacity 
requirements or other performance standards.  International agreements like Kyoto, or 
expansions of such agreements that cause companies to deal only with those who 
conform. 
6. Environmental regulations, including waste disposal. Regulations concerning 
decommissioning. 
7. Regulations and policies on rights-of-way, land use leases. 
8. Public perceptions. Regional concerns. Public trust in government or other 
institutions. 
9. Social equity issues, perceived or real. 
10. Power structure as reflected by business and lobby activity; for example, coal 
interests may effective in lobbying against nuclear, because they compete. 
11. Economic needs, such as job preservation; for example, would a switch to renewables 
or nuclear using domestic equipment and supplies be superior, even if energy costs 
were more than from imported fuels, simply because more of the economic 
transactions stay at home? 
 
A score of 0 will denote that no policy considerations or changes will be required for the 
introduction of a new technology or the continuation of a present technology. 
 
A score of 10 indicates that implementation is completely dependent on policy changes and 
incentives, and that the technology is unlikely to succeed or continue in the absence of special 
policies or incentives. 
 
A score of 5 would indicate that modest policy changes or incentives will be required to jump-
start a technology, or that considerable red tape and delays are common for the technology. 
 
Constraints 
 
For purposes of an initial investigation for each technology, consideration will be given only to 
policy intervention that may be implemented in the United States.  International agreements 
other than the ratification of existing agreements (e.g., the Kyoto protocol) will not be 
considered. 
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APPENDIX H.  Service Limitations Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
The service provided by an energy technology often constrains the potential market share due to 
physical or economic reasons. While a detailed analysis of these issues is not needed when 
evaluating the merit of technology for continued R&D funding, it is useful to understand the 
approximate contribution that a technology might make towards meeting the service needs. 
 
In the electricity markets, the ratio between peak and minimum demand can be 3:1 over a 
seasonal timeframe and 2:1 over a 24-hour period, so a portfolio of technologies is used for 
physical and economic reasons to address this load variability.  For example, the intermittent 
nature of wind power without storage limits the practical market share it can serve.1  Conversely, 
a nuclear power plant in some cases may take hours to days to restart once it is shut down; the 
lives of the fuel rods are shortened if subjected to wide fluctuations in activity; and a fairly steep 
energy penalty is extracted if a nuclear plant is not operated as a base-load facility.  Distributed 
photovoltaics can eliminate the need for electrical transmission and distribution lines only if they 
reliably produce during peak load times, which is not possible without storage. 
 
Also, the technology-related components of a technology’s cost structure can impact its useful 
service when compared to other competing technologies. Technologies with high fixed costs 
(e.g., construction) and low variable costs (e.g., fuel) have much lower unit energy cost ($/kWh) 
when run as base-load facilities with high levels of annual utilization (capacity factor).  In 
contrast, technologies with low fixed costs and high variable costs can be run at low capacity 
factor with much lower impact in unit energy cost—see Figure H-1.  Pulverized coal plants are 
the least expensive at high capacity factor, but more expensive than the two natural gas 
technologies at low capacity factors. Recent increases in natural gas prices since 2000 have made 
gas less economical.  Table H-1 lists the mix of US electricity generators in 2002.  Capacity 
factors are listed both for the nameplate rating and for the net summer capacity rating.  It should 
be noted that to be consistent, the capacity factor used in economic calculations should have the 
same basis (nameplate or net summer) used in the calculations of the cost criterion in Appendix 
C.  Normally, costs are given on the basis of nameplate capacity. 
 
                                                 
1
  This limit depends upon the local wind resource and the ability of other technologies to dispatch to meet load.  
Consequently, this limit will vary geographically, and it is also the subject of debate.  Estimated limits typically 
range from 10-30% of capacity. 
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Figure H-1.  Effects of capacity factor on unit cost (EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2001). 
 
 
Broad energy economic models often address these economic trade-offs between technologies 
and optimization of the system.  Depending upon the model, limited or no consideration is given 
to physical constraints such as peak length and duration.  However, physical constraints are often 
addressed in greater detail via load dispatching analyses done by utilities and regulatory agencies 
for short- and long-term planning, interconnection requests, and reliability studies.  These 
analyses are often complex, time consuming, and are limited to only small subsets of the national 
grid.  This criterion is intended to summarize the current state of knowledge, including some of 
the uncertainties, about the potential national market share a given technology could provide, and 
not to replace detailed local or regional analyses. 
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Table H-1.  U.S. Electricity Sources in 2002 
 
Energy Source 
Nameplate 
Capacity 
(MW)a 
Fraction 
Summer 
Capacity 
Fraction 
Annual 
Generation 
Capacity 
Factor 
(Nameplate) 
Capacity 
Factor (Net 
Summer) 
Coal1 338,199 34.8% 50.1% 65.3% 70.0% 
Petroleum2 43,206 4.2% 2.5% 25.0% 28.3% 
Natural Gas 194,968 19.0% 
Dual Fired10 180,174 17.9% 
17.9% 21.0% 23.6% 
Other Gases3 2,210 0.2% 0.3% 59.2% 65.2% 
Nuclear 104,933 10.9% 20.2% 84.9% 90.3% 
Hydroelectric4 96,343 11.0% 6.6% 30.3% 29.3% 
Other Renewables5 18,797 1.9% 2.3% 52.8% 59.2% 
Other6 756 0.1% 0.1% 86.3% 101.8% 
Total / Average 979,585 100.0% 100.0% 45.0% 48.7% 
Source: EIA 2002-Electric Power Annual 
a p.16, Table 2.2 
1 Anthracite, bituminous coal, subbituminous coal, lignite, waste coal, and synthetic coal. 
2 Distillate fuel oil (all diesel and No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 fuel oils), residual fuel oil (No. 5 and No. 6 fuel 
oils and bunker C fuel oil), jet fuel, kerosene, petroleum coke (converted to liquid petroleum, see 
Technical Notes for conversion methodology), and waste oil. 
3 Blast furnace gas, propane gas, and other manufactured and waste gases derived from fossil fuels. 
4 Conventional hydroelectric power and hydroelectric pumped storage facility production minus energy 
used for pumping. 
5 Wood, black liquor, other wood waste, municipal solid waste, landfill gas, sludge waste, tires, 
agriculture by-products, other biomass, geothermal, solar thermal, photovoltaic energy, and wind. 
6 Batteries, chemicals, hydrogen, pitch, purchased steam, sulfur, and miscellaneous technologies. 
7 Electric utility CHP plants are included in Electricity Generators, Electric Utilities. 
8 Small number of commercial electricity-only plants included. 
9 Small number of Industrial electricity-only plants included.  
10 Most “dual fired” generating plants consume natural gas most of the time and use oil as a backup 
source. 
Note: Totals may not equal sum of components because of independent rounding. 
Source: Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-906, "Power Plant Report," and predecessor forms. 
 
 
Importance 
 
The service traits of a technology are important to consider when evaluating a portfolio of 
technologies for R&D funding or for public policy measures.  It is probably unwise to have a 
portfolio consisting of single technology (e.g., all electricity from natural gas combined cycles) 
because diversification reduces risks arising from such factors as fuel supply and price, 
projections of load and load-shape, and similar factors.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that a single 
technology will be deemed most desirable in all markets, considering geographical, financial, 
regulatory, and resource variability.  Nonetheless, the lower the potential unserved market share 
of a technology the better, in general, it may be for further development. 
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Impacts 
 
Improvements that enable a technology to serve more of the market are desirable.  Additionally, 
technologies that leave large portions of the market unserved may warrant less public policy or 
R&D support.  In performing such evaluations on a portfolio of technologies, it is critical to 
consider not just the fraction of the market unserved, but also which fraction (e.g., base, 
intermediate, or peak load in the case of electricity) because of the potential for complementary 
portfolios.  For example, assume nuclear and coal can each serve 50% of the market, but they 
both serve base load duty, so are not able to be combined to serve 100% of the market. 
 
Attribute Quantification 
 
The complex and interdependent calculations that would be needed to estimate market share of 
various technologies require quantiative economic and physical attributes as inputs.  The 
attributes for the cost criteria are sufficient for economic considerations.  Physical attributes 
needed include factors like ramp rate, planning horizon, and part-load efficiency. 
 
However, because such calculations are beyond the scope of this project, and because a simple 
mathematical relationship between attributes and criteria is not possible, three qualitative 
attributes are used instead to aid in the estimation of criteria scoring and associated uncertainty: 
(1) economic duty limits, (2) load following limits, and (3) peak period capacity credit.  Table 
H-2 lists attribute scoring for several technologies as well at the typical duty cycle.  Lower scores 
are better except for peak period capacity credit where the opposite is true. An intermittent duty 
cycle means that the timing of power production cannot be well controlled, and typically applies 
to renewable energy technologies without any storage or backup capability. 
 
Table H-2.  Qualitative Service Limitations Attribute Scoring and Duty Cycle 
 
Technology 
Economic 
Duty 
Limits 
Load 
Following 
Limits 
Peak Period 
Capacity 
Credit 
Typical Duty 
Cycle 
Pulverized Coal 4 4 1002% Base 
Nuclear 5 5 1002% Base 
Photovoltaics w/o storage 5 3 372% Intermittent 
CSP-molten salt tower 5 2 90-100% Intermediate 
CSP- trough hybrid 5 2 881-1003% Intermediate 
Wind 5 5 261-402% Intermittent 
Natural gas combined cycle 2 1 1002% Intermediate 
Natural gas combustion 
turbine 1 0.5 1002% Peak 
Hydro 5 2 1002% Intermediate 
1 California Wind Energy Collaborative, California Energy Commission Consultant Report P500-
04-054, "California Renewables Portfolio Standard Renewable Generation Integration Cost 
Analysis Phase III: Recommendations for Implementation", July 2004.  Please note these 
estimate are for Effective Load Carrying Capability, which differs slightly in definition. 
2 Energy Information Agency, Annual Energy Outlook 2004 data files: aeo2001.d101600a, 
hirenew.d101800a.  These are national average estimates.  Local or regional variations can be 
significant for renewable energy resources. 
3 Price, H. and R. Cable (2001). "Parabolic trough power for the California competitive market." 
International Solar Energy Conference. 2001 International Solar Energy Conference, a Part of 
Forum 2001, Solar Energy: The Power to Choose; Apr 21-25 2001; Washington, DC, United 
States: 399-403. 
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Constraints 
 
For purposes of the initial evaluation of electricity options, the scope is the aggregated US 
market.  However, local variances are very important in this analysis, so regional analyses that 
are then aggregated into a national summary may reduce uncertainty. 
 
Mathematical Model 
 
For an example of a detailed model addressing the economics and some of the physical 
constraints, see the Energy Information Administration National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) documentation available on the web at www.eia.doe.gov: 
 
• Electricity Market Module of the National Energy Modeling System, Model 
Documentation Report 2000.  DOE/EIA-M068(2004). 
• Renewable Fuels Module of the National Energy Modeling System 2004, Model 
Documentation. DOE/EIA-M069(2004). 
• Load and Demand Side Management Submodule Vol. 1, Model Description, Model 
Documentation.  DOE/EIA-M068-A1. 
• Load and Demand Side Management Submodule Vol. 2, Model Code, Model 
Documentation. 
 
The California Wind Energy Collaborative (2004) describes modeling related on this topic.  
Ivey, et al. (1999) and Hirst and Kirby (2001) also describe issues regarding higher fidelity 
analyses of physical constraints on generation and transmission. 
 
Scoring 
 
Table H-3 lists the estimated service limitations for several technologies.  A lower score is better.  
The rationale describes how the estimates were reached and builds upon the attribute scoring.  It 
should be noted that combinations of technologies also depend upon the duty cycle.  For 
example, it would not be prudent to have a 50:50 mix of coal and nuclear because they are both 
baseload technologies and would be neither effective nor economic at meeting the highly time-
variant and peak period loads. Conversely, natural gas based technologies might meet the entire 
load, but this would be more costly and could greatly increase imports of fuel. Also, having a 
diversity of generation technologies and fuels makes the system more resistant to disruptions. 
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Table H-3.  Estimated Service Limitations 
 
Technology Low Most Likely High Rationale 
Pulverized Coal 20% 30% 40% Baseload currently maximized because 
cheapest, use current 
Nuclear 25% 35% 45% less ameniable to cycling than coal 
Photovoltaics w/o storage 70% 80% 90% Higher capacity credit than wind 
CSP-molten salt tower 60% 70% 85% Transmission from West req'd 
CSP-trough hybrid 60% 75% 85% Storage more costly than towers, hybrids possible 
Wind 70% 85% 90% Intermittence requires regulation 
Natural gas combined 
cycle 0% 15% 30% Dispatchable 
Natural gas combustion 
turbine 0% 5% 10% Most dispatchable of all technologies 
Hydro 90% 95% 98% Mostly exploited already (6% total), operational 
constraints 
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APPENDIX I-1.  Science and Technology Needs Criterion 
 
 
Preface 
 
Technology readiness or technology maturity are concepts that contain many elements that are 
qualitative.  For example, some technologies are capable of performing at very small scales, and 
can enter the marketplace in easily attained steps.  An excellent example is afforded by photo-
voltaic cells that can find use in powering calculators from room light or providing electric 
power in relatively modest amounts at remote locations.  By contrast, solar thermal power with 
molten salt heat storage can provide power in large quantities, including power during normal 
periods of darkness, but the installations must be large for practical application.  In both cases, 
the technology is sufficiently developed for commercial use, although the case for solar thermal 
may be arguable, because a large plant with modern technology has yet to see a practical 
demonstration.  One technology has been able to incrementally creep into the marketplace, and 
the other technology that has a built-in energy storage capability seems to be stagnating, 
although it is presently more economical, based on the maturity of available technology. 
Readiness obviously must include factors other than technology alone.  Factors of familiarity and 
comfort for the investors or users of technology may supersede technical maturity in importance. 
Here we emphasize the technical aspects, but comfort and familiarity are essential elements 
featured in the vector concerning policy. 
 
We have split our technology readiness research in two directions.  The first direction addresses 
a set of metrics adapted from a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scoring 
method, referenced in the bibliography for this section, and the second approach is more 
theoretical. For the sake of this present report, the latter effort is a work in progress, and will use 
the simplified approach  
 
Definition 
 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a systematic metric/measurement system that supports 
assessments of the maturity of a particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity 
between different types of technology. The TRL approach has been used on and off in NASA 
space technology planning for many years, and we adapted to our purposes the maturity level 
structure originally intended to determine whether new technologies would be available for space 
application. 
 
Importance 
 
To be most useful, the NASA reference claims that the general model must include: 
 
(a) “basic” research in new technologies and concepts (targeting identified goals, but not 
necessary specific systems), 
 
(b) focused technology development addressing specific technologies for one or more 
potential identified applications, 
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(c) technology development and demonstration for each specific application before the 
beginning of full system development of that application,  
 
(d) system development (through first unit fabrication), and 
 
(e) system “launch” and operations. 
 
Impacts 
 
These steps are equally useful in looking at the history and projected future of energy systems, 
but in general, we will find it more useful to look at technologies that have largely advanced 
beyond the first steps.  If we were to look at fusion energy for future power applications, then all 
the steps used by NASA would apply.  We might also note that for space applications with 
unique requirements, the cost structure requirements would differ greatly from requirements for 
electric generation on earth. The NASA criteria do not include cost, except implicitly.  Costs for 
the purpose of this study are considered only in the vector concerning that topic. 
 
Attributes 
 
Technology Maturity Levels Summary  (Note that for display purposes, our levels run in 
inverse order in comparison with NASA TRLs, and we have added a level 10 that represents 
complete technology ignorance (might apply to cold fusion), and a level zero that reflects a 
maturity level so high that little or no improvement is expected. The 0 level might be 
representative of a hydro-power turbine, for example. 
 
TML 10 – Nothing known about how to solve the problem 
TML 9 – Basic principles observed and reported 
TML 8 – Technology concept and/or application formulated 
TML 7 – Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept 
TML 6 – Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment 
TML 5 – Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment 
TML 4 – System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment—for 
example, in a power plant on a simulated power grid 
TML 3 – System prototype demonstration in the power grid environment, but using a cadre of 
special experts 
TML 2 – Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration and used on the 
grid in a commercial application 
TML 1 – Actual system capable of turn-key operation by generally available operations 
personnel 
TML 0 – The technology is so mature that substantial improvement seems unlikely 
 
Note that for a system to be applied in a distributed power system, one merely would substitute 
homeowner or building supervisor, etc. 
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APPENDIX I-2.  Alternative Approach to  
Science and Technology Needs 
 
 
The following development concerning technology maturity is a work in progress, and has not 
yet developed to a degree that will allow actual use in a scoring process.  It is included as a way 
to inspire comment and exchange.  Please contact Jeffrey Tsao with comments and suggestions.  
 
Definition 
 
We explore here the possibility of developing a useful criterion for the “immaturity” of a 
technology.  One interesting possibility is:  a predicted length of time for the technology to 
evolve to a particular performance and price.  Such a criterion has the advantage over some 
others in being both quantitative and easily understood:  a technology that is 100 years away 
(from a particular performance and price) is less mature than one that is 10 years away, which in 
turn is less mature than one that is 1 year away. 
 
Importance 
 
Such a criterion would enable families of technologies to be compared using the same units.  It 
would also serve as the foundation for additional useful criteria, such as what is the uncertainty 
in the time for the technology to evolve to a particular performance and price, and what is the 
possible influence of government policy and/or investment on both the time and the uncertainty 
in the time. 
 
Impacts 
 
Since time is a natural unit of economic analysis, this criterion would naturally lead to 
quantitative comparisons between present (discounted) values, based on anticipated future 
values, of various technologies.  The future values of those technologies could be taken from the 
various other criteria proposed in this LDRD. 
 
Attribute “Physics” or Quantification 
 
The predicted length of time for a technology to evolve to a particular performance and price 
might fold together several attributes. 
 
State of Technology.  A first attribute is an appropriate technology metric.  Ideally, the metric 
would be a relatively simple figure of merit such as $/kWh, or a number of simple figures of 
merit artfully combined to mimic market desirability.  Such a metric would allow various states 
of technology to be compared quantitatively.  Some of those states of technology might be:  the 
current state (T), the best state allowed by current technology paradigms (T), and the best state 
allowed by physics (Tp).  The current state of technology T(t) is time dependent, and evolves 
towards the best state allowed by current technology paradigms (T).  At the same time, the best 
state allowed by current technology paradigms (T(t)) is also time dependent, and evolves 
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towards the best state allowed by physics (Tp).  The rates at which the two states evolve are 
described by the next two attributes. 
 
Strength of T&E Spiral.  The second attribute is the predicted rate at which the current state of 
technology (T) will evolve towards the best state allowed by current technology paradigms (T) 
in response to market forces.  We might assume that this rate will depend on “how much room” 
there is for the technology to evolve (T- T) within the current technology paradigm, as well as 
on a coefficient αE that characterizes the strength of the intermediate goods and services markets 
that pull, as well as are pushed by, that technology paradigm.1  These intermediate markets 
represent an “onramp” that enables the “learning-by-doing” extension of the current state of 
technology towards the best state allowed by the current technology paradigm.  If such 
intermediate markets are absent, then government policy or investments would presumably be 
necessary to provide the necessary onramp. 
 
Strength of S&T Spiral.  A third attribute is the predicted rate at which the best state allowed by 
the current technology paradigm (T) will evolve towards the best state allowed by physics (Tp), 
in response to increases in our understanding of the science that underlies the technology.  We 
might assume that this rate will depend on “how much room” there is for the best state allowed 
by the current technology paradigm to evolve (Tp - T), as well as on a coefficient αS that 
characterizes the strength of the intermediate science “markets” that push, as well as are pulled 
by, the technology.2 
 
Mathematical Model 
 
As a crude initial ansatz at a mathematical model, we might write the following coupled set of 
rate equations: 
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The basic idea here is to explore the simplest possible relationship that captures the above 
discussion of attributes:  that the dependences of the rates of technology evolution on “how much 
room” and on the strengths of the various spirals is linear. 
 
Note that in the unlikely but simplifying case where both αE and αS are constant in time, these 
coupled rate equations have the solution:3 
 
                                                 
1
  The justification here is loosely borrowed from Clayten Christensen’s work, and the “onramp” ideas that Scott 
discussed at one of the team meetings.  Somehow, we want to capture the idea that no matter how much potential 
a technology might for a desired application, if it is not participating in a virtuous spiral of technology and 
engineering (read goods and services), then it may take a long time to cross the required technology gap. 
2
  The justification here for the importance of an S&T spiral is similar to that for the T&E spiral.  However, science 
enters in differently.  The idea is that science feeds the creation of new paradigms in technology, rather than the 
extending of existing paradigms. 
3
  I think the solution is correct now, thanks to help from Jason. 
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where To and To  are the initial t=0 values for the current state of technology and the best state 
allowed by the current technology paradigm, respectively.  The solution is bi-exponential with 
two rates, αE and αS.  If αS >> αE, then T evolves quickly to Tp and the subsequent and slower 
evolution is that of T to Tp.  But if αE >> αS, then T evolves quickly to T, and the subsequent 
and slower evolution is that of T to Tp.4 
 
Challenges 
 
The biggest challenge with this criterion for technology immaturity will be developing a way of 
thinking about the “physics” of the two rates αE and αS in terms of the two spirals of T&E and 
S&T. 
 
Bibliography for Technology Needs 
 
1. Office of Space Access and Technology, Advanced Concepts Office, NASA, “A White 
Paper,” April 6, 1995, by John C. Mankins. 
                                                 
4
  It’d be nice to have an analytic expression for the time τ to reach the desired state of technology Td.  Jason, care to 
take another crack at it…? 
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APPENDIX J.  Sustainability Limitations Criterion 
(Exergy Sustainability) 
 
 
Definition 
 
The term sustainability is derived from the word sustain, meaning to continue or preserve. We as 
a society want to sustain, continue, or prolong our way of life while providing an equal or better 
future for our children and theirs. The decisions we make today will be felt by our offspring 
years to come.  Historically, some Native American tribes understood that fact and made 
decisions that considered seven generations into the future.  We are assuming a 200-year time 
horizon, in the belief that new knowledge will likely result in change in direction of 
sustainability plans that we might propose today.  This period of time is somewhat similar to the 
Native American custom.  Of course, we recognize that the 200-year time frame would not be 
appropriate for considerations of species preservation or cutting forests whose trees live even 
longer; for such matters, it would be inappropriate to assign time frames shorter than growing 
times or evolution time-scales. 
 
Although several definitions exist that define the idea of sustainability, for the purpose of this 
project the definition proposed by the Brundtland Commission in 1983 will be used as the 
foundation for the development of exergy sustainability as a criterion for a multi-criteria analysis 
comparing different energy systems: 
 
A form of sustainable development which meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Barnaby, 1987). 
 
Based upon the Brundtland definition, we define exergy sustainability as a system that maintains 
the exergy needs of our current population without compromising future exergy needs.  
 
Technical Definition 
 
The technical definition of exergy, which appears in modern thermodynamics texts, is derived 
partly from the second law of thermodynamics: “A second law efficiency is the ratio of the 
minimum amount of available work required to do a particular job to the amount of work 
actually used to do the job” (Simpson and Kay, 1989).  A second law efficiency is used for this 
definition due to the fact that a first law analysis, a ratio of energy in versus energy out, does not 
take into account the quality of energy in its ability to perform useful work (Simpson and Kay, 
1989). According to the second law, exergy defines the amount of energy from a given fuel or 
other energy source that is available to do work or other useful functions, such as water or space 
heating, given the environment. Exergy analysis includes all potential uses for the energy from 
its introduction into the system of interest through its rejection into the surrounding environment. 
 
A related concept that deserves mention is entropy, a measure of the disorder that results as 
energy is used to produce work or other desired functions, such as warming our water and living 
environment.  The sustainability literature mentions entropy because minimizing entropy 
production per unit of fuel or heat energy used is equivalent to maximizing efficiency and 
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reducing fuel wastage. (Of course, a complete analysis must take into account the full energy 
cycle costs, including the energy used to extract fuel and the energy required to produce 
apparatus used in the energy cycle itself.)  Entropy measures the amount of energy per degree of 
temperature that is unavailable or has ceased to be available to do work in any system, taking 
into account the temperature of the energy conversion processes.  Entropy always increases as 
energy-related cycles are completed.  There is no economic market for entropy production, but it 
finds use in the calculations that are necessary to achieve high efficiency standards, and is used 
in developing a physical understanding of our environment. 
 
Based upon this reasoning, an alternate definition for exergy sustainability is defined as:  the 
continuous compensation of irreversible entropy production in an open system with an 
impedance and capacity-matched persistent exergy source.1 This definition implies that a 
sustainable system must utilize an energy source that is able to continuously meet our current 
and future energy needs with supplies that are greater than 200 years, and is used in manner that 
maximizes its work capability. However, the technical aspects of this definition will not be 
utilized in this criterion. 
 
In context, we intend to examine the ability to satisfy energy needs now and well into the future; 
the ability to continuously provide those needs (including during times of darkness or no wind); 
and the ability to derive the maximum possible value of benefit from each unit of energy 
available.  The last statement is equivalent to maximizing exergy use. 
 
Importance 
 
Most of our energy used today comes in the form of fossil fuels. There is significant concern 
among public officials, environmental groups, consumers, and industry regarding the longevity 
of fossil resources available and how long they will last. Fossil fuels are finite and time 
dependent and will eventually be depleted, so we need to find ways to maximize our available 
fossil fuel resources and further develop energy sources that will be more persistent.  Eventually, 
we will have to make a transition to non-fossil persistent energy sources.  When that transition 
occurs, we need to ensure that we have sufficient fossil resources or a sufficient installed 
capacity of more persistent energy sources to make that transition. 
 
Impacts 
 
Our current energy production facilities, including nuclear power, geothermal, solar, wind, and 
fossil fuel plants (coal or natural gas), depend on fossil fuels in some or all points of their life 
cycle. Fossil fuel is used in the mining of resources, processing, and transportation; construction 
of facilities; the operation and maintenance of the facilities; storage; and the reclamation of the 
facilities at the end of their productive lives. Furthermore, energy production impacts other 
resources, the environment, and investments into our energy infrastructure.  Deciding investment 
directions for energy resource development significantly affects these other activities and our 
economic well-being.  We suspect that the transition will take place gradually as increasing 
                                                 
1
  This definition is part of a working white paper entitled Exergy Sustainability.  Please see this paper for further 
details. 
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scarcity causes the cost of fossil resources to increase, and more persistent sources (that are 
presently more costly than fossil fuels) take over the market.  Of course, the transition may not 
be quite so simple, because the production costs of persistent technologies will certainly rise 
along with energy costs. Modeling of this transition would require an accurate forecast of future 
energy costs, and a reasonably accurate estimate of the costs of persistent energy technology; 
these factors are unknown, so an accurate prediction of the features of the transition to persistent 
energy sources will remain somewhat elusive, but it seems most likely that the changeover will 
be gradual, unless urgency arises from a climate emergency or some other sudden event. 
 
Constraints 
 
Sustainability is a broad topic that includes social, economic, environmental, and political, as 
well as physical factors. All of these factors must be addressed for a system to be sustainable. 
This criterion has been limited to the physical aspect of our energy resources as it relates to 
sustainability.  Furthermore, exergy sustainability will only be assessed on a national level for 
domestic resources.  Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2004 will be utilized to assess the mean 
value in quantifying exergy sustainability. 
 
Attributes Quantification 
 
Renewable and non-renewable resources have specific limitations that affect the sustainability of 
a system.  Non-renewable resources are finite and can only provide our energy needs until 
depletion. Renewable resources are not finite but they are variable in that they do not provide 
continuous needs without the use of storage.  In an attempt to develop a balanced method for 
rating the sustainability of renewable and non-renewable resources, the following two attributes 
are proposed:  (A) persistence, which is time of supply of a resource; and (B) capacity matching, 
the ability to continuously meet exergy needs. 
 
(A) Persistence (Time of Supply) 
 
A sustainable energy system utilizes an energy resource that has a duration equal to or greater 
than 200 years.  A time frame of 200 years seemed feasible because alternative energy resources 
should be developed within that time, and it seems unwise to speculate further than 200 years 
because unanticipated technologies are likely to emerge, and there is ample time to reassess and 
change direction of a given path.  Coal, for example, is a resource has been used since the 13th 
century, and oil has been used as a fuel for at least a century (Grubler, 1998).  Based upon 
Grubler’s (1998) work regarding the effects of changes in technology in society, shorter time 
frames, such as 50 years, were considered. However, we note that technological changes affect 
the application or use of an energy resource, or the method of extraction, and such changes are 
factors when determining the duration of a resource. 
 
For the ease of graphical representation, persistence is measured in years as the net supplies 
(current recoverable stocks and known reserves in physical units) of a specific resource divided 
by the current use.  The net amount of currently recoverable supplies and known reserves is 
based upon current technology (extraction methods, efficiency of the plant or other parts of the 
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system), energy payback of the system, the current consumption rate, and the current expected 
population growth.  Any changes in these factors will increase or decrease the longevity. 
This attribute may be expressed as: 
 
 Net Supplies/Current Use = Years of Supply 
 
Scoring: 
 
Scoring of this attribute assumes that a resource with years of supply equal to 200 will count as a 
one (1). Longer time frames will approach zero (0).  Shorter time frames such as 50 years will 
score a number greater than one (1).  As this number increases, the less sustainable a system is. 
 
Scoring will be calculated as: 
 
 Score = 200/Years of supply 
 
(B) Capacity Matching 
 
An energy system must continuously maintain our energy needs in order for the system to be 
sustainable.  Thus, capacity matching compares the needs on a daily basis that are unmet 
(downtime) to the amount that is required within a year in decimal form, whereas x0 is better. 
 
 Capacity Matching = downtime/required (J-1) 
 
For example, if we require 365 days of continuous energy needs and coal provides 350 days, the 
downtime is 15 days.  The capacity matching ratio for coal would be: 
 
 Downtime/required= 15/365 = 0.041. 
 
Scoring for this attribute adjusts the raw score between 1 through 10.  To accomplish this, the 
raw score is multiplied by 10.  For example, a raw score of .5 will equate to 5 on a scale of 1 
through 10.   
 
Sustainability Function F(S) 
 
The final sustainability score will be a summation of attributes (A) and (B). 
 
 F(S) = Persistence + Capacity Matching (J-2) 
 
As F(S) approaches zero, the system is considered to be more sustainable. For simplification 
purposes, “Capacity Matching” will not be utilized in the final quantification of this criterion in 
the development of the computer model. 
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The following excerpts were taken from white papers taken during the early months of work on 
this LDRD. 
 
 
THE VALUE OF MODELING, PREDICTIONS, AND POLICY FORMULATION 
Glenn Kuswa 
 
Abstract 
 
As a starting point in evaluating the merits of models, forecasts, and predictions, we first 
determine what basic types of models exist and how those models serve their sponsors. We then 
look at a few examples, including a model that is in current use, and what previous models or 
forecasts predicted and what actual results came about after several decades.  The lessons learned 
should give some perspective to the value of modeling and can provide some guidance 
concerning what factors to emphasize in making models more faithful to reality. Some simple 
lessons emerge. If a forecast is correct or partially correct, one might presume it is good. 
However, if an accurate forecast becomes known to policy makers after other less accurate 
estimates become accepted, or if a forecast is overly complex and not credible at the time it is 
released, even a good report becomes a failure.  A useful forecast is one that makes some 
difference in human events, but this difference may be very difficult to trace. 
 
We also considered some fairly recent studies that use multi-attribute criteria in a formalized 
structure to determine optimal solutions from considerations that span a large space of variables.  
We did not find any examples of such studies having strongly influenced major funding 
decisions, because economic factors must dominate such decisions, unless there are regulations 
or incentives in place to force the economically favorable solution into alignment with the multi-
attribute approach.  It appears the multi-attribute approaches are good for influencing policy 
makers to seek more optimal solutions and to break away from using purely economic arguments 
or waiting until some effect of crisis proportions forces piecemeal solutions.  With this thought in 
mind, the thrust of our LDRD was strongly influenced by the multi-attribute approach. 
 
We used in particular two references for multi-attribute decision making.  A general review of 
the subject is given in a paper by Lorna A. Greening and Steve Bernow, Design of coordinated 
energy and environmental policies: use of multi-criteria decision making, Energy Policy, Vol. 
32, No. 6, pp. 721-735, April 2004.  An interesting application that graphically demonstrates 
how one can choose  attributes in a combined way to approach a theoretically determined 
boundary is given in a paper by Stephen R. Connors, Informing decision makers and identifying 
niche opportunities for windpower, Energy Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 165-176, 1966. 
 
We examine a model, Threshold 21, produced by the Millennium Institute, that seems to have 
been effectively utilized to exert influence and to change minds during its tailored use in a 
number of countries. Customers have included countries and the World Bank. In this case there 
seems to be little critical review of the actual outcomes, but the perspectives gained from looking 
at the descriptive material can give some useful perspectives on developing a clear sense of what 
is to be expected from a model. If such consideration is given at the outset of a study, the 
chances of timely success can increase. 
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In looking at the results of past studies, we observe that modeling tools in the late 1970s were 
less developed than is the case today.  Would more detailed modeling have captured the future 
with more accuracy, or were there other dominant factors that would likely have been missed by 
modelers?  Is the detailed data being collected for today’s complex models worth the effort, in 
view of the many uncertainties that attend modeling?  These questions are not answered here, but 
are worth continued discussion. I believe that the defects in the models applied many years ago 
would likely occur again today, if modeling were to be emphasized over an approach that seeks 
the widest diversity of opinions and knowledge, including more emphasis on considering 
changes in human behavior and anticipating important technological shifts. Lessons learned from 
looking at past and current modeling will apply to studies that may be part of Sandia’s future. 
 
We note that some easily used models have been developed by Arnold Baker’s group 
(Organization 6010) at Sandia. They seem to have high potential for influencing decision 
makers, and might also find good application in heightening understanding and enthusiasm 
among energy practitioners at Sandia.  We have not chosen to highlight specifics in this paper, 
but we want to acknowledge their potential importance. We also note that because of this 
recognized importance, we have opted to work intensively with the Sandia economists to make 
the results of the LDRD available in a computer modeling format. 
 
There are some lessons learned here for Sandia studies on energy demand.  Changing social 
habits and needs drive some changes, and studies should place some added emphasis in this 
area.  Emerging technologies, such as those that led to the use of more natural gas for electric 
energy generation should be identified and possible dislocations should be thoroughly studied 
and emphasized. (Dislocations refer to brand new technology that can supplant old methods. 
Coal replacing peat as a fuel in England and the use of aircraft engine turbine variants for gas-
generated electricity are examples.) If a similar study to the RFF or Ford efforts were to be 
conducted today, here are some examples of topics that might deserve attention: 
 
1. Examine the potential for harvesting methane-hydrates; call attention to the consequence 
of a breakthrough in this technology area. 
2. Examine the impact of hybrid vehicles in the context of imports of fuel, and on other 
resources that might be needed in greater supply, such as lead or sulfuric acid. 
3. Study social trends on energy usage, and in particular find out what the aging population 
will need/expect from the transportation sector. 
4. Try to project how electronic conferencing will change transportation needs. 
5. Integrate other resources, such as water, that are needed to produce energy. 
6. Look more intensively at worldwide energy demand in making projections, because US 
prices and the relative ability of other nations to access cheap energy will do much to 
determine future pattern of prosperity and military power.  Also, the practices of the rest 
of the world will dominate potential climate modifiers such as carbon dioxide and other 
emissions. 
7. Energy security and scenario planning needs to play a stronger role in future studies. 
8. Climate trends and the influence on water supplies and energy needs need to be factored 
in. For example, will a warming earth require more or less of various fuels under 
conditions of fixed living standards? 
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9. There seems to be a need for examination of energy use changes driven by a variety of 
changes in technology and business practices.  For example, just-in-time deliveries cut 
down on space needs, but may increase fuel use in transportation. The increasing use of 
hub systems to handle air passenger and freight has some consequences for fuel use, but 
the magnitude may or may not be known.  The increasing use and improvement of solid 
state devices saves energy per unit of benefit (increases efficiency), but can increase 
demand. For example, computers are more energy efficient than in the past, but there are 
now many more computers and the electricity usage of computers is significant. The 
quantification of changes in energy use brought about by these changes needs to be 
known. 
10. Look very carefully at the entire life cycles for all technologies, and especially at the 
complex bio-renewable cycle.  In the latter case, look at all requirements for growing 
energy crops—fertilizer, water, use of waste products, changes in fuel economy 
(especially important if methanol is blended with gasoline), changes in pollution from 
agricultural run-off to end use of product, cost of long-term soil depletion, alternative 
approaches and opportunity costs, and other factors. 
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A COMBINED MEASURE OF ENERGY COMPARISON:  
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE  
CHANGE EFFECTS FROM VARIOUS ENERGY SOURCES 
Glenn Kuswa 
 
 
Abstract and Added Summary Thoughts 
 
Continued use of energy supplies, within the current constraints imposed by economics and 
regulations in the United States and in the rest of the world, may lead to climate changes that will 
cause economic dislocations and will disrupt the goal of providing a sustainable society for 
future generations.  We sought some indicator that would serve to contrast and compare all 
energy sources.  Climate change potential served as the metric for this comparison, on the 
premise that climate problems might soon eclipse other aspects such as cost and security. In the 
process of this study, we discovered surprises concerning biomass and climate change caused by 
population pressures, aside from more burning of fossil fuels, which are also noted in this 
summary. 
 
There are significant differences in the climate change potential of various energy sources, 
ranging from nearly zero effect on the heat load imposed on the earth from fuel consumption 
itself, to 59 times more heat load than results from burning fuel alone. (The number 59 is based 
on very conservative estimates of residence times of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and could 
be ten times or more underestimated.) For each energy source there are opportunities to increase 
the efficiency of use and to thereby somewhat reduce climate changing effects, but the most 
effective way to reduce climate change is to reduce fossil fuel consumption or to sequester 
greenhouse gas from burning fossil fuel, where feasible. This would most easily and effectively 
be first accomplished in stationary power plants that do not require the convenience and high 
energy density of liquid hydrocarbon fuels. This paper considers the consequences of 
civilization’s use of various energy sources, and defines the actions that may be required (or 
prohibited) to assure that energy will be available to present and future generations, with 
protection for the ecosystem.  
 
Other human activities, aside from energy production that emit greenhouse gases, may also 
influence climate, and the aggregate effect of these activities is much less understood than the 
effect of greenhouse gases from energy production. The uncertainty imposed by a collection of 
climate-changing forces that could overshadow the well-advertised effects of energy-related 
climate factors—mostly associated with carbon dioxide—demonstrates the importance of 
conducting a more vigorous campaign to understand climate change.  
 
Some “Executive Summary” Observations 
(Details and references are discussed in more detail in the full text.) 
 
Climate management will require wise application of regulation and subsidy, and the present 
allocation of resources is sometimes less driven by wisdom than by politics.  Since most 
solutions that reduce risks for influencing climate add to the cost of doing business, and do not 
offer any economic benefits within the time horizons of businesses, workable solutions to 
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reducing climate-changing emissions will usually require some government intervention. 
Conservation measures that save companies money and measures that result in positive public 
relations are beneficial exceptions that see frequent application by industry, even without 
regulation or subsidy. Some technologies enjoy large subsidies that are largely determined by 
political forces, rather that sound scientific investigation. A good example of heavily subsided 
activity that at first appears beneficial is the agricultural production and use of ethanol as a 
gasoline additive when crops are specifically grown for that purpose.  We will discuss data that 
indicate that use of ethanol may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions; its use adds to soil 
depletion and takes considerable fossil energy for fertilization, cultivation, harvesting, and 
processing. Farming can result in more water vapor release into the atmospheres, and that is also 
a potent greenhouse gas and an influence on climate in other ways. The net result of purposely 
growing more biomass expressly for fuel production may, in balance, negatively effect public 
good, but it does help Midwestern farmers and some large corporations that produce alcohol 
from farm crops. 
 
The enactment of incentives or subsidies that are small (on a per-unit of energy basis) in 
comparison with the ethanol subsidy could lead to an energy infrastructure that greatly reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions. Examples of technologies that reduce greenhouse gas on a permanent 
basis are wind, nuclear, and solar energy, and making existing processes more efficient. Growing 
forest or biomass can also be helpful in sequestering carbon, at least for the initial decades of 
new growth, but less is known about the time needed to reach equilibrium between carbon 
uptake, and decay processes that return carbon back to the atmosphere. In the initial stage or 
reforestation, carbon sequestration is positive, but after the forest reaches maturity, it appears that 
emissions of carbon may almost equal absorption. If this is true, the reforestation method to 
sequester carbon dioxide has only near-term implications, and other technologies will have to 
carry the major sequestration burden. 
 
Carbon dioxide emissions may not be the premier climate problem.  Changes in land use and 
introducing more water into the air could eclipse greenhouse gases in effecting climate change, 
especially on a local or regional scale. However, carbon dioxide is more studied, distributes its 
effects more uniformly in time and space over the entire globe, and is presently better understood 
than how land-use change, and particularly water emission, influence climate. Methods for 
carbon mitigation should be researched and might wisely be applied, at least in pilot programs, 
even before the entire climate change puzzle becomes understood in detail.  
 
World stability depends upon a fairly steady climate, and depends upon preventing 
overpopulation.  Continued supplies of energy will be useful only in a world that can support 
stable civilization, and any reasonable measure of energy sustainability must include provisions 
to keep society stable. Large climate changes would result in social instability, because of 
changes in areas where food is produced and people live, so we must assume that energy 
sustainability is attainable only if climate change is controlled. Even more important is the 
growth of world populations that increase demands for energy and food, and force more water 
vapor into the air. Technology can only delay ecological disasters if populations continue to 
expand without limit.  The problem is one of social custom and religious/moral persuasion; 
science can provide facts but no solutions for this aspect of the environmental dilemma. 
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Greenhouse gas accumulation and the attendant solar warming is far more an important 
source of heat than the burning of carbon-containing fuel itself.  We compared all energy 
sources from the vantage point of climate change. A new index, called the total equivalent heat 
generation (TEHG), describes the total environmental warming effects imposed by energy 
sources and end uses of the produced energy. This index gives a measure of the wasted heat 
deposited locally by each type of energy source, and also takes into account the side effects of 
emissions of other effects that result in bringing in or blocking radiated heat from the sun. In 
other words, taking the earth as an isolated system, the index provides a measure of the earth’s 
total gain of heat from using energy supplied by various sources. This index is based upon 
carbon dioxide emissions, and using very conservative assumptions that the residence time of 
carbon dioxide is only ten years, one finds that the heat from a typical coal-fired plant is only 
1/59th of the extra heat trapped from the sun. If a less conservative and more accepted carbon 
residence time is assumed to be 100 years, the ratio changes to 1/590! In other words, the 
“amplification factor” posed by burning fossil fuels will likely result in hundreds of times more 
solar trapped energy than is released by the combustion alone. The equivalent warming from a 
renewable of nuclear source is much less—in the vicinity of five percent of the warming from a 
fossil plant—and derives primarily from carbon dioxide emitted as a consequence of building the 
physical plant; concrete and steel and the energy needed in mining, etc., all emit carbon dioxide, 
and these emissions are amortized over the expected plant lifetime. 
 
“Traditional” greenhouse gas emissions may be less important in bringing about climate 
change than other factors introduced by civilization. The proposed TEHG index is not perfect 
or complete, because there are several other man-made contributors to climate change, including 
methane, ozone, sulfur dioxide, soot that settles on snow and changes its solar heat absorption, 
and aerosols. In addition, considerable uncertainties still exist in the understanding of all the 
pathways and rates of absorption and emission of CO2 in the ecosystem.  Some of the 
greenhouse chemicals arise from energy production, while others arise from methane leaks, 
cattle or rice farming, chemical manufacture and loss, irrigation and land fill decomposition, etc. 
TEHG does not take into account social concerns raised by air pollution or the risk of nuclear 
proliferation that could result from mismanaged nuclear energy expansion; these concerns may 
be more important in the near term, but climate change is viewed as being an overriding concern, 
for which correction of past miscalculation could prove beyond civilization’s capability.  
 
The TEHG principles could apply to all human activities, not solely energy production, but the 
complexity suggests this will not happen easily or soon.  For example, irrigation to raise crops 
influences global warming, and a process resembling the following cycle would have to be 
explored in detail to determine the effect on climate.  Consider solar energy that produces stored 
energy in caloric value of burnable mass or food.  This measures biomass energy trapped from 
the sun, and the stored chemical energy may be as high as a few tenths of a percent, enough to 
demand inclusion in a complete energy balance, but a quantity that appears to be neglected in 
current climate models. (Of course, when the biomass is burned or rots, the energy and the 
trapped carbon are returned to the environment; how close the world is to such a balance appears 
to be unknown.)  To calculate the TEHG, one would need to determine the change in solar 
balance caused by land-use change, including changes in the radiation balance as influenced by 
the leaf canopy, water vapor released (water is a strong greenhouse gas; water evaporation and 
transpiration carries latent and sensible heat, and resulting changes in clouds will also greatly 
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influence solar energy balance), the release or absorption of greenhouse gases from the crops, 
changes in soil carbon content, and the emissions associated with energy to cultivate, fertilize, 
and irrigate the crops. If irrigation is from dammed reservoirs or other features that change the 
solar balance, that would need to be considered, including energy absorption and emission from 
water surfaces, the effect of water vapor as a greenhouse gas and as a cause of clouds, and the 
carbon balance of bodies of water created or reduced for agricultural purposes. Considering a 
complete model would include all aspects of human activity, and would give some measure of 
the carrying capacity of the planet based on climate stability. The complexity of making accurate 
estimates of the effects of these factors is enormous, because many of the effects are local or 
regional, and the history of change is largely unknown and may be unknowable with any 
certainty. By contrast, ordinary greenhouse gas effects are comparatively uniform and global, the 
energy transmission and radiation of the gases can be measured with high accuracy, and the 
history of concentration is quite well known. Developing more complex and complete models is 
an unmet challenge whose importance should not be diminished by seeking a simple one-
parameter index that applies to energy. Even with this complexity, there are some data on which 
to estimate the global warming caused changes (see Pielke, 2002). 
 
Simple assumptions and calculations of the errors likely in terrestrial energy balance studies 
indicate that the magnitude of temperature changes induced by civilization’s other influences 
could easily be similar to changes attributed thus far to greenhouse gases; whether such factors 
balance out, or lead to warming or cooling appears to be beyond current understanding. The 
Kyoto protocol on climate change failed passage in the USA by unanimous vote, and has been 
the object of intense political debate over the past few years.  Some proponents believe with a 
high degree of certainty that carbon emissions, left unchecked, will cause untenable climate 
changes, and others believe that taking action would lead to economic ruin.  Both sides of the 
argument have much to learn from the science that is already understood, and both sides need to 
recognize that much more needs to learned before permanent solutions to the climate dilemma 
are implemented. At that same time, it may not be prudent to await precise answers before some 
actions are taken.  
 
Biomass fuel production that is expressly for fuel, and not part of waste recovery, is a net 
emitter of greenhouse gas, and is far less efficient than other methods to harness solar 
energy. Biomass requires the use of considerable fossil fuel for fertilizer, and also for cultivation 
and processing, and may sometimes require irrigation. Because CO2 is released from fossil 
energy sources in this production process, biomass is not neutral in its impact on the climate, as 
is often implied. Biomass has very small net useful energy gain from the sun, per unit area. 
Approximately less than .1% of the solar energy incident on a field typically ends up as energy 
content of the material produced, while about 10% of the energy falling on a solar collector field 
can be harvested and directly used.  (A table of some typical solar conversion rates for growing 
plants can be found in some lecture viewgraphs by Laurens Mets of the University of Chicago at 
the following site: http://www.lbl.gov/LBL-Programs/pbd/energy/photosynthesis/338,29). On a 
land-use basis, using solar or wind generators would do far more—perhaps by a factor of 100—
to lower greenhouse gases than growing biomass specifically for fuel.  Biomass crop growth 
captures less carbon dioxide than a permanently growing (not periodically harvested to bare 
earth) environment.  Biomass energy that results from purposefully growing crops to produce 
energy (i.e., not arising as waste from other crops) must be very heavily subsidized to be a 
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market force. If subsidy investments for specifically growing biomass fuel were made 
elsewhere—such as for nuclear, wind, solar, or geothermal energy—the United States could 
more substantially lower CO2 emissions. (This is not meant to imply that research should not go 
forth to more efficiently utilize biomass, as there are many areas for improving the treatment of 
materials that would otherwise be wasted.) Finally, the sustainability of biomass operations 
might be further questioned on the basis of topsoil depletion.  Despite these problems, the public 
seems to favor biomass, because it is touted by many environment organizations that apparently 
fail to take a broadly based systems analysis approach. 
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SELLING SUSTAINABILITY – HOW ENERGY AND  
ECOLOGY POLICY ARE INFLUENCED BY ORGANIZATIONS 
Glenn Kuswa 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Sustainability is a theme underlying many energy and resource initiatives, ranging from 
conservation to increased use of renewable resources. A white paper, also summarized in this 
list, discusses metrics for sustainability; here we assume that sustainability means that the 
present generation can satisfy its needs for the comforts of life, including ample energy 
supplies, without compromising the ability of future generations to enjoy similar benefits. 
(This is the definition defined by the Brundtland Commission published in 1987 by the United 
Nations.) We examine how government, populations, religious organizations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) view sustainability, and how these groups influence 
environmental or energy-related decisions. Understanding some of these issues can help Sandia 
and its collaborators design better ways of assembling and marketing supportable energy 
programs. Considerable influence arises from faith-oriented organizations, as well as from 
various secular groups. There is a disciplined group of scholars who study religion and ecology, 
and some of their results are outlined.  I searched with less success for similar materials that 
center on how non-religious organizations market ecology points of view, and that material 
constitutes a smaller section of the white paper. There are lessons to be learned about marketing 
and selling ecological stewardship from both faith-based and faith-neutral sectors, and we should 
not underestimate the importance of these groups in setting future directions for energy and 
sustainability issues. Unexplored areas not included in the white paper are the influence of the 
media, professional journals, lobbyists, the makeup of congressional and government staff 
offices, and educational institutions.  
 
Another important element in ecology matters has emerged during the past three decades:  the 
practice of environmental conflict resolution by government bodies, often through contracts to 
other organizations. A description of this increasingly practiced, hyper-democratic approach to 
solving environmental conflict is a third section of the draft paper. This is increasingly part of the 
ecology policy landscape, and technologists should be prepared to understand its workings, 
because new technology introduction may increasingly be regulated by such “grass roots” 
approaches. We also note a variant of this practice.  When central governments are viewed by 
sub-populations as not responding to problems, for example, greenhouse gas constraints, the sub-
groups can start independent actions.  For example, groups of states are undertaking some 
initiatives to restrict carbon emissions, and some industrial groups and some European 
governments are applying pressures by refusing to do business with entities that are not 
regulating carbon. Some of these initiatives are doubtless driven or strongly influenced by the 
non-profit community.  
 
One of the references encountered in this mini-study gave a list of attributes that serves as a good 
way to understand how groups form opinions.  Although it was aimed at religious groups, it also 
applies to other interest groups, and is reproduced below. 
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1. To identify and evaluate the distinctive ecological attitudes, values, and practices of 
diverse religious traditions, making clear their links to intellectual, political, and other 
resources associated with these distinctive traditions. 
2. To describe and analyze the commonalities that exist within and among religious 
traditions with respect to ecology.  
3. To identify the minimum common ground on which to base constructive understanding, 
motivating discussion, and concerted action in diverse locations across the globe; and to 
highlight the specific religious resources that comprise such fertile ecological ground: 
within scripture, ritual, myth, symbol, cosmology, sacrament, and so on.  
4. To articulate in clear and moving terms a desirable mode of human presence with the 
earth; in short, to highlight means of respecting and valuing nature, to note what has 
already been actualized, and to indicate how best to achieve what is desirable beyond 
these examples. 
5. To outline the most significant areas, with regard to religion and ecology, in need of 
further study; to enumerate questions of highest priority within those areas and propose 
possible approaches to use in addressing them. 
The lessons learned from this study are: 
1. There are significant differences in the ways various religions view nature and 
sustainability.  The Christian view is less well aligned with the stewardship of nature than 
some other world religions, but there is considerable difference between denominations, 
and there is some change in attitude for the better. 
2. Many non-governmental groups hold views that seem to be as embedded as views based 
on faith. 
3. Finding common ground and working with these groups is likely to be influential in the 
long run. 
Some Features of Non-Governmental Groups and Their Methods of 
Promoting Their Viewpoints 
 
As an example, we see how the Worldwatch Institute sells its point of view. Browsing the web 
sites that contain energy- or sustainability-related information shows that some organized and 
substantial efforts exist to sway the readership to their viewpoint. For an example, I visited a site 
that, by reputation, might be considered as one of the more reliable.  The Worldwatch site for 
nuclear energy turned up an article that took some delight in explaining how expensive and 
impractical nuclear power had become, with plant costs around 4000 dollars per kWh, and that 
by contrast wind power was in the 1000 dollar per kW range.  I do not know the exact present 
figures for these energy sources, but seems that the referenced numbers were quite far from 
being accurate.  There was no discussion of the need for base and peak loads, the advantages of 
encouraging a balanced mix of energy sources, and the fact that nuclear energy is not a large 
greenhouse gas producer.  No references were given.  There are many similar examples on the 
Worldwatch site alone. 
 
Incomplete information abounds in energy and sustainability reporting. It is easy to dismiss a 
decision to forgo nuclear power by stating that the reasons are lack of public trust, the inability of 
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Congress to finalize a waste disposal program, and a cost high in comparison with gas-fired 
plants.  These statements, which reflect the main reasons given in the first ten articles I pulled 
from a Google search on “nuclear power,” correctly describe the reasons for decisions made. 
Much of the public would expect to hear these reasons, or could cite those reasons without much 
prompting.  But very few of the public could discuss the underlying reasons behind disposal 
problems and plant costs escalated by cumbersome licensing and decision processes, and very 
few understand any of the issues associated with plant efficiency. The public is frozen in time 
with a view of how issues have developed, with little cognizance of what progress could be 
made. They are largely unaware of trade-off issues.  For example, Belgium and Japan have cut 
back on nuclear power plans, and will be producing significantly more CO2 than had been 
expected. The news items that reported the CO2 outcome were, in my opinion, not sufficiently 
clear in laying out the risks and consequences associated with the alternative options.  
Conversely, the public often receives excessively high expectations for other energy alternatives 
such as hydrogen, fusion, and renewables, based again on incomplete reporting. 
 
How Can We Make Technical Communications More Effective? 
 
Whose fault is the incomplete information that is mentioned above? Sometimes that fault lies 
with optimistic technologists who may either intentionally or inadvertently ignore problems with 
their technologies. Reporters are seldom equipped to probe highly technical issues. A public that 
is more analytic and questioning may ignore poor reporting and essentially drive it out of 
business, but it seems unlikely that the education system can be brought to a high standard.  A 
direct although only partial solution is for research laboratories and industry to place more 
emphasis on accurate and well-planned communications.  A more direct approach may be to 
seek more in-depth contacts between national laboratories and technical staffs within the NGO 
community.  Some contacts made during the conduct of this LDRD indicate that such contacts 
would be welcomed, and this seems to be a faster-track approach to promoting mutual 
understanding that could eventually lead to more financial support for laboratory energy 
initiatives, better legislative and regulatory decisions, and enhanced effectiveness for many 
NGOs in promoting their goals.  
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HYRDOGEN ASSESSMENT OBSERVATIONS 
Glenn Kuswa, August 2004 
 
The hydrogen initiative of President Bush and interest in the subject in previous years have given 
rise to some reviews.  This set of notes attempts to summarize some of those reviews, seeks 
common features and differences, and comments on some aspects of the reviews. Some 
comments from hydrogen economy protagonists and antagonists are included. Areas for possible 
Sandia study are suggested. An effort will also be made to determine the political forces that are 
fostering the Hydrogen Initiative. 
 
We note that much of the hydrogen movement is based upon misinformation, wishful thinking, 
and social engineering. For example, we observed in the process of reading reports and 
discussing some of our conclusions with friends and acquaintances that many people view 
hydrogen as a natural resource, much like natural gas, rather than an energy conversion and 
transfer mechanism. We have even heard anecdotes that even some members of Congress are 
similarly misinformed.  Some of the papers that describe how a hydrogen economy would work 
assume the need for higher efficiency in fuel cells will be met, and also assume super-light 
vehicles will evolve in order to keep energy usage under control. The assumption is made that 
this will satisfy the consumer. These papers do not make the same assumptions about what might 
be done to change the performance of conventionally fueled vehicles. These views at least border 
on social engineering, rather than working on satisfying market needs as they now exist. 
 
It became obvious early on in this author’s reading that creating a brand new infrastructure for 
hydrogen based upon compressed or liquid hydrogen or on likely hydride storage schemes all 
failed the total energy efficiency comparison with fossil fuels. The reasons include energy loss in 
producing hydrogen, and in compressing or cooling or otherwise containing hydrogen to make 
transport possible. The weight and volume of tanks and the driving range of vehicles carrying a 
reasonable fuel load presented some problems. The infrastructure to deliver fuel to motorists 
seemed destined to be based on natural gas as the most likely energy source, and when all factors 
are considered, it appeared that sequestering carbon would not be easily accomplished with a 
natural gas backbone with many substations where hydrogen would be produced.  Using larger 
central hydrogen plants would present an opportunity to sequester carbon dioxide, but the 
subsequent transport of hydrogen to filling stations would become more complex and costly. 
 
From these observations, and from recognition of the hazards potentially posed by rising 
atmospheric carbon, we started to consider using hydrogen to convert atmospheric carbon 
dioxide back into liquid hydrocarbon fuels that could fit in with the existing infrastructure.  The 
energy to do this would have to come from renewable or nuclear sources in order to be attractive.  
It appears that the total cycle efficiency may compare favorably with the cycle efficiency 
attainable from hydrogen, all things considered, and the current fuel infrastructure investment 
would remain in use, making it easier to introduce synthetic fuel. This synthetic fuel scenario 
would also pose virtually no climate change problems because an equal amount of carbon 
dioxide emitted from combustion would be reclaimed and “recharged” (hydrogenated) to make 
synthetic liquid fuels almost identical to gasoline. This was the genesis of efforts at Sandia to 
more thoroughly explore this concept, and work on such a project is beginning as we strive to 
complete the report on this LDRD. 
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There are many different viewpoints expressed in reports on hydrogen, and we will not attempt 
to reproduce all views in this summary, but we will list some observations from the American 
Physical Society (APS) study on the topic. Note that some of the protagonists complained that 
the assumptions in that study were too pessimistic.  In this summary, the author quotes what he 
believes to be reasonable and accurate, rather that trying to devote equal time to each point of 
view; the raw notes contain more critical and comparative comments.  
 
Summary from March 2004—American Physical Society, Panel on Public Affairs: The 
Hydrogen Initiative.  Contact Francis Slakey, (202) 662-8700. 
 
This review starts by noting the gap between promise and reality: 
 
• Hydrogen engines require 10-100 factor of improvement in cost or performance. 
• Current production is four times as expensive as gasoline. 
• Handling technology, such as storage vessels, will not allow convenient or economical 
handling. 
• If the intended goal of having the technology ready by 2020 is not met, there are no 
provisions for using bridge technologies. 
• The authors noted that a balance has to be maintained between developing the science 
and fostering demonstrations, and suggests that was not the case for the Synfuels project 
of the Ford Administration, and is certainly not the case for the Hydrogen Initiative. 
• A balanced approach might use renewable energy to produce hydrogen, but coal or other 
fossil energy might also be used. 
• A statement is made that the Hydrogen Initiative might reduce our dependence of foreign 
oil (about 2/3 of the oil goes into the transportation sector). 
• The commercial use of fuel cells in transportation, portable power, and stationary and 
distributed applications by 2012.  (This is a quote from the national energy roadmap 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/bk28424.pdf.) 
• The APS report has a table that lists the attributes for the so-called FreedomCAR. This 
chart shows a 4- to 10-fold advantage required in production costs for hydrogen to make 
it competitive with gasoline, a 2- to 3-fold advantage in storage technology to gain a 
300-mile range on a tank load of fuel, and a 10- to 100-fold improvement in fuel cell 
technology to make the motive power similarly attractive in price and performance of a 
gasoline engine. 
• The report notes that the United States annually produces 9,000,000 tons of hydrogen, 
mostly using steam reforming, a process already perfected to give close to theoretical 
yields, but costing several times more than gasoline per energy unit.  Natural gas is its 
source. Coal gasification has lower cost potential, but the added costs to sequester carbon 
dioxide and to get the required purity for fuel cell operation are unknown. 
• The science issues include: storage, whether cryogenic, high pressure, or bound systems 
such as hydrides; catalysts to improve electrolysis; better membranes and catalysts in fuel 
cells. 
 
The report goes on to make parallels with the Synfuels initiative of the Ford Administration in 
1975, which had costs in a similar range, although roughly twice as great in inflated dollars. The 
Synfuels initiative was based on the high cost of oil, and when prices fell and stabilized, the 
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initiative foundered. The demo projects were not well matched to the current state of the 
technology. Interest faded, and by 1983, the program essentially vanished.  What the report does 
not say is that the Synfuels product was compatible with all current distribution and end-use 
systems, so that production was the only concern of the program. Also, the program was not 
driven by the environmental concern of greenhouse gas. (Depending upon the audience, 
hydrogen is billed as climate friendly or as route to energy independence.)  In other words, the 
Synfuels program was on a much stronger footing than today’s Hydrogen Initiative, and it was 
more generously funded. Also, to some observers, the Synfuels program put OPEC on notice that 
there were other alternatives to their oil, and it put a cap on oil prices; whether this was truly 
intentional, and how strongly this affected world oil prices can be argued, of course. Hydrogen 
initiatives could have a similar effect on OPEC decision makers, but unexpectedly convincing 
success would be necessary.  
 
Recommendations from the APS report include: 
 
• Couple more basic science into the program, avoiding earmarking, using peer-reviewed 
research with some promise of continuity, and using some research centers along with 
academic involvement. 
• Pursue energy efficiency. 
• Pursue better renewable energy supplies to produce hydrogen—presumably including 
nuclear. 
• Consider bridge technologies—such as more fuel-efficient hybrid vehicles—and the use 
of hydrogen in the non-transportation sector. 
• Early on, the APS realizes that hydrogen will most likely be supplied from sources that 
emit greenhouse gases, so the report urges emphasis on conservation and efficiency as 
well as carbon sequestration. Why not do this anyway, whether or not hydrogen is in the 
future? 
 
My impression overall is that the APS is being political and making excuses at every turn to 
make the program appear reasonable.  The suggested associated programs all seem reasonable 
and desirable, and do not require an emphasis on hydrogen as “glue” to hold the pieces together.  
There is no mention of using alternative fuel synthesis, say from using renewable or nuclear 
energy to convert carbon dioxide from the air (or from industrial processes) into hydrocarbons 
that could go into the current infrastructure, thus bypassing the storage issue and the need to 
build an entirely new fleet. Hydrogen would come from water.  Such a cycle would eventually 
aim at being neutral in terms of dumping carbon into the atmosphere. 
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LINKS BETWEEN ENERGY SUPPLIES AND WATER NEEDS 
Glenn Kuswa, March 2004 
 
It became apparent that water and energy are closely linked, because most power plants and 
many industrial processes require a supply of water to carry away heat.  There is also 
competition for agricultural water and this sometimes competes with water for hydro-electric 
generation, and in some cases commercial or recreational navigation and ecological effects 
become issues. As population grows, individual wells and municipal requirements grow, creating 
more pressures on a finite resource. We summarize a few of our observations here. 
 
There are trades involved in the water-power nexus.  A power plant can operate dry, but this 
requires more fuel and adds to the cost of power and to competition for dwindling fuel supplies. 
Some power plants fueled by natural gas use turbines that discharge the hot exhaust into the air, 
and no cooling water is needed, but more efficient combined-cycle plants tap the otherwise 
wasted heat, and cooling water then becomes desirable. While there may be more developable 
gas supplies in the world,  the distribution of supply and the convenience of use for this fuel have 
driven costs up, so it seems unlikely that that its expanded use will have much effect on water 
needs.  Power plant location depends upon a host of factors, including proximity to markets, 
costs and availability of transmission lines and fuels, the availability of cooling water, competing 
electric sources, and a host of licensing and taxation constraints.  At some level of willingness to 
pay more for electricity, it will probably always be possible to add more generating capacity, but 
such a glib statement would dismiss the desire to work toward a sustainable society.  Vastly 
higher power costs violate the Brundtland Commission definition of sustainability that we have 
adopted for the LDRD, because much higher costs would make it difficult to satisfy current 
needs without some adjustment in the quality of life. 
 
Less pure water supplies, which are plentiful in some parts of the United States, can be used to 
make up some the shortfall, but the impurities cannot be discharged in ways that pollute, and 
there is a penalty in processing costs. Fossil-fueled power plants emit various pollutants that 
enter the water and cause various ecological problems, a common one being high mercury levels 
that concentrate in fish.  A separate initiative on water not directly related to this LDRD is in 
progress, so we will not treat water great detail here, but we have had to pay attention to water 
matters throughout the work. Early in the LDRD we developed the following set of questions 
concerning water issues, and we have kept these in mind during the course of our work: 
 
• What is the current use of water in power generation by category (none, pass-through, 
evaporative, dry, hybrid wet/dry) and efficiency (gal/kWh) by generator type both in 
terms of installed capacity (GW) and annual generation (GWh/yr)? 
 
• What is the cooling water “resource” and how much are we currently using?  This could 
be broken down into pass-through and evaporative resources and should be compared to 
other uses, such as domestic and agriculture. 
 
• If there appears to be a potential shortage looming in the future based on projected 
electricity demand growth (seems to be likely), what are the options to address it?  For 
example, increase agricultural water efficiency or reduce production, use low water usage 
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generation sources, transmit electricity over long distances from areas rich in cooling 
water resources, etc. 
 
• What are the trade-offs in terms of water use, electricity cost, and environmental 
impacts? 
 
• What are the costs associated with these trade-offs and how does that compare to the 
current and potential future cost/value of water? 
 
• What creative options exist for addressing water use or environmental trade-offs?  What 
are their cost and efficiency? 
 
• For which problems can Sandia technology or other skills solve problems? 
 
• Which issues may be influenced by technology, but might be settled by market forces or 
by regulatory action? One example of this sort of thinking would be to use agricultural 
water for cooling, and return what is left after evaporation in the power plant to 
agricultural use at a temperature that may be too high for river discharge, but not so high 
as to preclude agricultural use. 
 
Finally, we note that water is a greenhouse gas that offers much greater difficulty in assessment 
than carbon dioxide.  Water use (and land-use changes that, in turn, influence water balance, in 
addition to directly changing solar radiation and re-radiation balance) will rise in response to 
increasing population and increasing energy use.  The magnitude of climate change induced by 
changes in water emission and land use may easily outstrip problems caused by carbon dioxide, 
but the political and public awareness of this is presently limited.  Further understanding the 
relationship between water, land use, and climate and finding technical solutions may offer a rich 
set of opportunities for Sandia and its sister laboratories to serve humanity. 
 
Since water studies are being pursued separately at Sandia, we did not further pursue this topic 
within the context of this LDRD, but the perspectives gained were used in the conduct of the 
LDRD work, especially with regard to electric generation. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNOLOGIES 
Juergen Ortner, visiting scientist 
 
We tabulated information on energy usage and environmental consequences, and included 
projections to the year 2025, and in some cases to year 2050.  These data have references 
included, and can be used for subsequent studies. The results are in Excel spreadsheets that can 
be obtained from Glenn W. Kuswa or Scott A. Jones. Examples of key indicators collected  for 
the transportation sector appear in the chart below.  Using key indicators for the amount of travel 
and shipping projected to take place in the next 20 years, together with information on energy 
efficiency projections, Excel calculates carbon dioxide emissions for each category.  The effect 
on net carbon dioxide emission if substitution of each of the fuels by hydrogen were to be made 
is calculated, using the assumption that hydrogen is produced from natural gas via water gas shift 
reaction.  The result is that, with the exception of coal, more carbon dioxide would be emitted by 
replacing other fuels with hydrogen, unless the carbon dioxide from the natural gas to hydrogen 
production process were to be sequestered.  We also produced estimates of carbon dioxide 
emissions from residential, commercial, and industrial sectors from the burning of coal, 
petroleum, and natural gas, and from electricity use.  (Electricity has large nuclear and hydro 
contributions.) 
 
KEY INDICATORS 
Level of Travel (billions) 
 Light-Duty Vehicles <8500 lb (VMT) 
 Commercial Light Trucks (VMT) 1/ 
 Freight Trucks >10000 lb (VMT) 
 Air (seat miles available) 
 Rail (ton miles traveled) 
 Domestic Shipping (ton miles traveled) 
 
Energy Efficiency 
 New Light-Duty Vehicle (MPG) 2/ 
   New Car (MPG) 2/ 
   New Light Truck (MPG) 2/ 
 Light-Duty Fleet (MPG) 3/ 
 New Commercial Light Truck (MPG) 1/ 
 Stock Commercial Light Truck (MPG) 1/ 
 Aircraft (seat miles per gallon) 
 Freight Truck (MPG) 
 Rail (ton miles/thousand Btu) 
 Domestic Shipping (ton miles per thousand Btu) 
 
Energy Use by Mode 
  quadrillion Btu 
    Light-Duty Vehicles 
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    Commercial Light Trucks 1/ 
    Bus Transportation 
    Freight Trucks 
    Rail, Passenger 
    Rail, Freight 
    Shipping, Domestic 
    Shipping, International 
    Recreational Boats 
    Air 
    Military Use 
    Lubricants 
    Pipeline Fuel 
      Total 
 
  Million Barrels Per Day Oil Equivalent 
    Light-Duty Vehicles 
    Commercial Light Trucks 1/ 
    Bus Transportation 
    Freight Trucks 
    Rail, Passenger 
    Rail, Freight 
    Shipping, Domestic 
    Shipping, International 
    Recreational Boats 
    Air 
    Military Use 
    Lubricants 
    Pipeline Fuel 
      Total 
 
 
Other environmental data concerning such factors as greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide 
and water, particulate emissions, mercury, etc., were tabulated using methods specified in ISO 
14042 (year 2002) procedures.  The categories and indicators are listed below.  These data can be 
applied when assessing the consequences of various mixes of energy sources.  The materials 
needed to construct and maintain energy-producing facilities were included in these data. 
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CATEGORIES INDICATORS  
green house effect green house potential  as CO2-equivalent 
eutrophication of soils and water eutrophication potential as SO2-equivalent 
acidification of soils and water acidification potential as PO4-equivalent 
impact on human health 
lost life span 
life time with affected health as years of life lost 
damage of environment made by 
man 
cost generated by damages 
on materials and plants as $ 
consumption of primer energy 
carriers cumulated energy effort as GJ 
consumption of non-energy 
feedstock consumption of minerals as kg 
   
 
Finally, we made some estimates, also available on Excel spreadsheets, of emissions that show 
pollution consequences of electric power generation today and in the year 2050, taking into 
account expected population growth, and estimated those same emissions if hydrogen from 
natural gas were to be substituted.  Again, carbon dioxide sequestration was not assumed to be in 
use.  When hydrogen is substituted for other electric generation fuels, greenhouse gases actually 
increase, except in the case of burning coal, for which there is a substantial reduction.  This is not 
entirely surprising, because coal is carbon rich and the efficiency of the conversion process is 
rather low today.  It becomes quite clear from the data gathered that the most effective way to 
initially reduce carbon dioxide emissions, as well as other emissions such as SOx and mercury, is 
to sequester these substances at the power plant, or to replace coal with other fuels.  This 
approach to reducing carbon emissions would be easier and more cost-effective than striving to 
eliminate carbon from transportation fuels, because there are many technical options available 
for reducing emissions from central stationary energy plants. 
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MODELERS AND POLICYMAKERS:  IMPROVING THE RELATIONSHIPS 
Thomas H. Karas 
A report on this sub-topic is available in a Sandia National Laboratories Report, 
SAND 2004-2888, Unlimited Release, June 2004 
 
Early in this LDRD study, the need became evident to understand how policymakers interact 
with modelers.  By examining this need in detail, it should be possible to make such interactions 
more productive.  The Advanced Concepts Group at Sandia undertook this study by inviting 14 
policymakers, analysts, and scholars to participate in a workshop. The meeting resulted in 20 
guidelines for modelers and 10 guidelines for policymakers. If these were to be followed, the 
interactions would be more productive. 
 
Modelers need to be particularly cognizant of communications.  They must understand the 
context of what they are modeling, take special care to provide clear explanations, and must 
accept the burden of the communications effort and establish continuing dialogues.  Throwing 
results over the fence or waiting for the world to recognize the modeler’s wisdom will not be 
productive.  The modeler must be relevant by identifying the target audience, addressing the 
purpose, and concentrating on the salient questions. Modelers need to place the most emphasis 
on the problem, and not on the model itself.  The modeler must always be credible, and cannot 
assume impossible scenarios.  The modeler must tell a story that makes sense to the audience.  
Perhaps most importantly, modelers have to be timely in getting their results to the target 
audience.  Modelers need to establish and maintain credibility by paying close attention to their 
reputations and by not overly extrapolating or overreaching their sphere of understanding.  
Modelers often are hampered by insufficient data.  Credibility is aided if a modeler can point to a 
good previous track record.  Simple models that are highly transparent are generally best.  
Modelers should look closely at human wants and desires.  To assure quality, conducting reviews 
by peers and stakeholders and comparing and collaborating are very important. 
 
Policymakers likewise need to focus on communications by meeting frequently with modelers, 
thoroughly explaining their needs and purpose, and they must provide as much accurate data as 
required by the modelers.  Policymakers need to engage modelers early, and they should make 
certain there are peer reviews and make comparisons of the results for competing models. 
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THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT WOULD BE  
REQUIRED FOR TRANSPORTATION HYDROGEN FUELS 
Max Valdez 
 
During the last several years, the United States has placed considerable emphasis on replacing 
liquid motor fuels with hydrogen.  Currently, natural gas is the least costly route for producing 
hydrogen.  Hydrogen is a chemical feed stock for making ammonia fertililizer and enriching 
refined petroleum products, and today, US industry synthesizes from natural gas approximately 
ten percent of the amount of hydrogen that would be required to replace all motor fuel consumed 
in the United States. This process releases carbon dioxide.  If the transition to hydrogen is 
mandated by the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, there would be a need to trap these 
emissions.  Carbon reduction might most reasonably be accomplished by first trapping carbon 
dioxide from current sources, including fixed plants that produce hydrogen, and coal-fired power 
plants.  Of course, carbon sequestration processes require added energy, so the time to deplete 
fuel supplies would be lessened, and the costs would rise.  Carbon sequestration would only 
become reality under a strict regulatory program; without regulations, we would assume that the 
lowest cost hydrogen source would win most of the business.  Even though the prices of natural 
gas are rising, we believe that its ease of distribution and overall lower cost for producing 
hydrogen would make natural gas the raw material of choice to produce hydrogen. 
 
Hydrogen can also be produced by electrolyzing water with about 85% efficiency, and this could 
rise with further development.  This hydrogen would have to be compressed or liquefied before 
distribution, and those processes consume considerable energy that cannot reasonably be 
reclaimed with current technology. If fossil or nuclear power are used to produce electricity that, 
in turn, produces hydrogen, the thermodynamic losses incurred in making the conversion from 
heat to electricity take an efficiency toll, because power plants are typically only 35 to 60% 
efficient.  In terms of using energy as efficiently as possible to produce hydrogen, the chemical 
conversion of natural gas appears to have the advantage.  Of course, if wind or photovoltaic 
energy is the primary source of energy, electrolysis may be most attractive.  We note, however, 
that thermo-chemical processes may be developable to directly use solar heat to generate 
hydrogen at lower cost than through electrolysis.  
 
We did not study the alternative approaches to hydrogen in detail during the conduct of our 
LDRD work.  Rather, we made the assumption that the lowest cost hydrogen production methods 
currently being used would be the methods of choice during early infrastructure development.  
Therefore, we examined how the natural gas system would have to grow, as part of a new 
infrastructure to produce hydrogen for transportation. 
 
Developing a Pipeline Network for Hydrogen Production Via Natural 
Gas Reformation 
 
Producing hydrogen via natural gas reformation has been currently identified as the least 
expensive method and the first choice in transitioning to a hydrogen economy.  Several studies 
such as the National Academies of Science (NAS) 2004 report on hydrogen suggest that 
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developing a hydrogen economy may require huge investments in our energy infrastructure.1  
Although this report mentions that identifying and defining a hydrogen infrastructure on the 
national level in detail may be impossible at this time, it is possible to develop an understanding 
of the magnitude of investments that may be required, and the impacts a hydrogen economy 
could have on other infrastructures. 
 
Regional studies have been conducted to assess the technical feasibility and economics of a 
hydrogen infrastructure. In 1999 Joan Ogden from UC Davis wrote a report on a hydrogen 
infrastructure using the Los Angeles Basin as a case study. In her findings, she concluded that 
the initial development of a hydrogen infrastructure within California is feasible due to the 
excess hydrogen production capacity currently available from industrial gas companies.  
However, Ogden (1999) claims that hydrogen reformers will have to be constructed when 
demand begins to outstrip current production capacity.2 Another hydrogen infrastructure report, 
Mintz et al. (2002), states that additional investments in the natural gas infrastructure will be 
required if hydrogen becomes a significant source for vehicle fuel.3  Spath and Mann (2001) 
conducted a life cycle assessment of a natural gas steam methane reformation plant to assess the 
environmental consequences.4  They reported that the production of hydrogen via natural gas 
will require large investments in the natural gas pipeline network. With the exception of Spath 
and Mann (2001), these fore-mentioned studies discuss the need for natural gas infrastructure 
development, but they do not address the impact a hydrogen economy could have on the natural 
gas infrastructure. 
 
Two scenarios have been widely accepted for the development of a hydrogen infrastructure:  
centralized and distributed. In the centralized case, natural gas is piped to large centralized 
reformers, where it is then converted to hydrogen and shipped to the end user via pipeline or 
truck.  The distributed case assumes natural gas will be piped to small end-use hydrogen 
reformers where the hydrogen will be consumed on site. Identifying the difference between the 
two hydrogen scenarios is very important because each scenario will determine the development 
of the natural gas infrastructure.  Furthermore, understanding the current status of natural gas 
infrastructure is necessary in order to assess how and possibly where the natural gas system 
might develop. As of yet, only the centralized case is included in this draft of the white paper. 
 
Current Natural Gas Infrastructure 
 
The US natural gas pipeline network is primarily composed of transmission lines, distribution 
lines, field and service lines, storage, and compressors.  The Interstate Natural Gas Association 
of America (INGAA) defines transmission lines as pipelines with a diameter greater than 24 
inches, and defines smaller pipes as distribution lines. Transmission lines move the bulk of the 
natural gas across the country, while distribution lines tie the end users to the transmission 
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  National Academies (2004). The Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities, Costs, Barriers, and R&D. 
2
  Joan Ogden (1999). Prospects for Building a Hydrogen Infrastructure. Center for Energy & Environmental 
Studies. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton. 
3
  Marianne Mintz*, John Molburg, Stephen Folga, Jerry Gillette (2002). Hydrogen Distribution Infrastructure. 
Argonne National Laboratory, Center for Transportation Research* and Decision and Information Sciences 
Division, Argonne, IL 60439, USA. 
4
  Pamela L. Spath and Margaret K. Mann (2001). Life Cycle Assessment of a Natural Gas Combined-Cycle Power 
Generation System. National Renewable Energy Technology. 
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network.  Field and service lines are generally between 3 to 6 inches in diameter and connect the 
natural gas field to the transmission network.  Storage is primarily underground in caverns or 
abandoned mines, which are used to provide natural gas to the end users during peak demand 
periods and reserve capacity during production shortfalls.  Natural gas can also be stored in 
liquefied form, but this technique now accounts for only 2% of the total storage capacity.  
Compressors maintain the pressure in the pipeline network that enables the system to operate and 
move the natural gas from the source to the end user.  
 
Since 1960, natural gas consumption has increased from 12 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to about 
22 Tcf in 2003. Although consumption reached a high of 23 Tcf in 2002, demand for natural gas 
has remained relatively stable since 1996.  Historical trends in natural gas transmission lines 
have been relatively flat over the past four decades, averaging about 0.2 million miles, or about 
five feet per capita.  (This comparison is useful, because a 5-foot section of pipe 24 inches in 
diameter, with a ½ inch wall, contains an amount of steel that compares with that used in a small 
automobile.)  However, growth in the natural gas infrastructure has been dominated by the 
growth in distribution lines from 0.39 million miles in 1960 to just over 1.1 million miles in 
2000. Currently, the EIA reports that 1,033 miles of pipeline has been added in 2004, while 
future projections out to 2020 estimate 45,000 miles of new pipeline will be required to meet the 
future needs of the natural gas industry in the US.5  Based upon those needs, the INGAA 
estimates that 66% (30,000 miles) will be for distribution lines less than 24 inches in diameter, 
and 34% (15,000 miles) of the total projection will be for regional and interstate transmission 
lines with a diameter greater than 24 inches. 
 
Capacity utilization is a significant factor when attempting to identify when the natural gas 
system will require expansion if hydrogen consumption increases.  Obviously, when developing 
centralized natural gas reformers, new pipelines will need to be constructed to service those 
reformers. The same is true for distributed facilities when many are placed in service, but initial 
impacts of low volume facilities may not greatly perturb supporting infrastructures.  The main 
question, however, is how much will be needed? Spath and Mann (2001) estimated in their study 
that a centralized reformer will require 2,486 miles of natural gas pipeline in order to deliver the 
natural gas to the plant. Spath and Mann (2001) provide little justification for their assumption 
except that a centralized reformation plant will require large amounts of natural gas, and they 
refer to Ecobalance Inc., a consultation firm that provides life cycle assessments, as their source.  
The Ogden (1999) case study focuses on a hydrogen refueling infrastructure and provides cost 
estimates for hydrogen pipelines.  The Simbeck and Chang (2002) hydrogen report provides cost 
estimates for various hydrogen pathways; it assumes that the hydrogen infrastructure will use the 
existing natural gas infrastructure and mentions that more investments may be required. Except 
for Spath and Mann (2001), current research has not identified how a hydrogen economy will 
affect the natural gas infrastructure. 
 
The natural gas pipeline network is segregated into nine regions; each region operates at different 
capacity levels, which can lead to a misleading figure when attempting to ascertain a system-
wide utilization rate.  “Capacity utilization is defined as the annual throughput volume divided 
by the design capacity,” and in 1996, the EIA reported that the United States was utilizing 75% 
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Market. 
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of the natural gas pipeline design capacity.6  Currently, the average utilization rate reported in the 
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2004 supplemental table #108 is 57%.7  However, the EIA 
contends that utilization rates below 100% do not imply that additional capacity is available 
because pipeline companies prefer to operate as close to capacity as possible.8  Furthermore, 
capacity can be increased and utilization can exceed 100% when storage, line packing, and 
secondary compressors are added to the system (EIA, 1998).  In fact, we do not have sufficient 
data to understand the 18% drop in capacity during the eight years following 1996.  
Understanding such factors can provide insights into which areas could more easily support a 
hydrogen economy and which areas will require expansion. 
 
Case Studies for Natural Gas Infrastructure—Centralized and 
Distributed Plants 
 
The Energy Systems Analysis Group at Sandia National Laboratories conducted a preliminary 
analysis of the hydrogen infrastructure to assess the requirements necessary to bring into 
realization a full conversion of the light duty vehicle fleet to hydrogen by the year 2050, and the 
related impacts to the environment, economic security, health and safety, and the supporting 
infrastructure.  For this paper, only the natural gas portion of supporting infrastructure is 
addressed.  Due to the degree of variation described previously between a centralized vs. 
distributed case, both scenarios were utilized for this study based upon vehicle projections in the 
NAS 2004 hydrogen report.  Hydrogen demand and natural gas projections were calculated using 
a modified version of the Hydrogen Futures Simulation model (H2Sim) developed at Sandia 
National Laboratories.9  Other hydrogen and natural gas projections were calculated using a 
Markal energy model developed by Lorna Greening, a private energy economics consultant.  All 
other projections and estimates were derived using Excel spreadsheets.  The scope of this study 
was limited specifically to steam methane reforming utilizing natural gas as the feed stock.  
 
Centralized Case 
 
The amount of natural gas pipelines needed to support a hydrogen economy will depend upon 
the number of centralized hydrogen reformers and distance to source.  The size of the reformers 
is primarily dependent on the output of hydrogen required and the cost of production.  Simbeck 
and Chang (2002) looked at a variety of plant sizes ranging from 20,000 kg/day to 200,000 
kg/day, and used a 150,000 kg/day for the purpose of their report.10  The Spath and Mann (2001) 
Life Cycle Assessment of a hydrogen reformation plant assumes a 133,000 kg/day reformation 
plant based upon data obtained from the Stanford Research Institute (SRI).  The Ogden (1999) 
study refers to hydrogen reformers as large as 1mil scf/day ~ 236,239 kg/day.  Although 
Simbeck and Chang (2002) and Ogden (1999) provide complete analyses regarding the costs of 
developing and delivering hydrogen, they do not discuss how it could impact the natural gas 
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infrastructure, which is the primary mechanism for delivering natural gas to the reformers.  For 
this paper, a 100,000 kg/day reformer is chosen to coincide with the assumptions used in the 
H2Sim model. 
 
Based upon discussions with David Borns, manager of the Geotechnology & Engineering 
Department (06113) at Sandia National Laboratories, and consulting energy economist Lorna 
Greening, a hydrogen reformation plant was assumed to be located to the nearest natural gas 
source that was economically feasible. A natural gas source could be a large transmission line, 
natural gas field, or a liquefied natural gas facility.  A maximum distance of 200 miles with an 
average of 100 miles and 25 miles minimum was chosen for this study.  The size of pipe used to 
connect this facility to the source is 24 inches in diameter and ½-inch thick based upon the Spath 
and Mann (2001) study and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) specifications.  
 
Hydrogen demand was forecasted out to 2050 using H2Sim based upon hydrogen light duty 
vehicle projections developed by the NAS. Based upon the NAS projections, H2Sim calculated 
that hydrogen demand could reach 80 billion kg/year by 2050. 
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The number of 100,000 kg/day reformers required to supply the amount of hydrogen forecasted 
was calculated by multiplying the 100,000 by 365, then dividing the forecasted demand by that 
number. 
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Based upon these projections, the number of centralized reformers required could exceed 2000 
plants by the year 2050 and the natural gas system may need to be expanded by 200,000 miles in 
terms of larger pipes than presently used. This is more than twice the size of our current 
infrastructure. 
Centralized Case
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Distributed Case 
 
The use of distributed generation has been considered a more enticing method for the delivery of 
hydrogen.  Economically, Ogden (1999) claims that distributed hydrogen production is more 
attractive because no hydrogen distribution system is required, and it will continue to do so until 
geographically concentrated demand increases.  However, Simbeck and Chang (2002) contend 
that the costs for delivering natural gas to small distributed reformation plants would be higher 
than centralized generation because commercial feedstock rates for small scale reformers is 50% 
to 70% higher than industrial rates, delivery rates are 70% greater, and power cost is 55% higher. 
The distributed case has not been addressed in this paper. However, it is interesting to note that 
some researchers suggest that a distributed case is not feasible due to the difficulty associated 
with carbon sequestration. 
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NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION: 
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Jeffrey D. Brewer 
jdbrewe@sandia.gov 
 
Keywords: nuclear energy, nuclear fuel cycle, electricity generation 
 
This document summarizes key portions of the content of a SAND report being written in 
support of the Multi-attribute Criteria Applied to Electric Generation Energy Systems Analysis 
LDRD. The title of the SAND report will be Nuclear Energy for Electricity Generation: Current 
Conditions and Future Directions. The SAND report will be completed by the end of October 
2005, although it is hoped to have the document completed by September 2005. 
 
Nuclear power has proven to be a safe, reliable, and efficient method of generating electricity in 
the United States and many other countries. Nuclear power reactors do not emit greenhouse 
gasses, are not affected by the vast majority of potential weather conditions, require relatively 
small amounts of fuel by volume, and exhibit fuel supply stability. Of course, reactors also 
depend upon fissile materials that present unique hazards to people and the environment if a 
fission product release should occur either by accident or due to malicious intent. Long-term 
storage of radioactive spent fuel is also an issue that has not been resolved (i.e., conducted on an 
industry-wide scale) in any country—although the United States is one leader in this process. 
Several dramatic accidents involving nuclear power around the world (i.e., Three-Mile Island 
(TMI), Chernobyl, and a few less-well known events1) have generated concern and fear 
regarding this energy source; some have skillfully argued that concerns are excessive given the 
actual risks to the public. Unfortunately, recent surges in terrorist activities that have caused 
many fatalities, injuries, and financial burdens have also heightened concerns among the general 
public of an intentional diversion of reactor fuel for nuclear weapons or dirty bombs. In contrast, 
the threat of terrorism has also raised concern regarding the stability of fossil fuel supplies. This 
paper presents an overview of nuclear power along with the opportunities and obstacles that are 
being discussed by those who will influence the path ahead for nuclear power both in the United 
States and throughout the world.  
 
Due to the discussion of certain critical issues in the SAND report, it is anticipated that the 
document will only be authorized for limited distribution.  
                                                 
1
 Several accidents in addition to TMI and Chernobyl are discussed later in this paper. It is also important to note 
that the TMI accident did not cause any negative health effects among the general public. 
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RISK PERCEPTION AND STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING: GENERAL INSIGHTS, A 
NEW FRAMEWORK, AND SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION USING NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Jeffrey D. Brewer 
jdbrewe@sandia.gov 
 
Keywords: decision-making biases, decision-making, risk perception, human biases, nuclear energy 
 
This document summarizes key portions of the content of a SAND report being written in 
support of the Multi-attribute Criteria Applied to Electric Generation Energy Systems Analysis 
LDRD. The title of the SAND report will be Risk Perception and Strategic Decision Making: 
General Insights, A New Framework, and Specific Application to Electricity Generation Using 
Nuclear Energy. Although many examples are tailored to nuclear power, the insights, 
framework, and decision making approach presented are applicable to any high-consequence, 
technologically advanced domain. The SAND report is to be completed by the end of September 
2005. 
 
It is suggested that all decision makers, whether ordinary citizens, academics, or political leaders, 
ought to cultivate their abilities to separate the wheat from the chaff in particular decision 
making instances. The wheat includes proper data sources and helpful human decision making 
heuristics; these should be sought. The chaff includes “unhelpful biases” that hinder proper 
interpretation of available data and lead people unwittingly toward inappropriate decision 
making “strategies”; obviously, these should be avoided. It is further proposed that successfully 
accomplishing the wheat vs. chaff separation is very difficult, yet tenable.  This report does not 
support an Orwellian-type of decision making “wisdom” that enables manipulation by an elite 
group with a specific agenda, but hopes to expose and facilitate navigation away from decision-
making traps that often ensnare the unwary. Furthermore, it is emphasized that one’s personal 
decision making biases can be examined and tools can be provided that provide better means to 
generate, evaluate, and select among decision options. 
 
Understanding the factors that influence risk perception and strategic decision making is 
especially important when decisions regarding high-consequence, highly sophisticated 
technological systems are required. This report brings together insights regarding risk perception 
and decision making across domains ranging from nuclear power technology safety, cognitive 
psychology, economics, science education, public policy, and neural science (to name a few) and 
form them into a unique, coherent, concise framework and list of strategies to aid in decision 
making. Early drafts of this report focused exclusively on decision making in the “energy 
domain” as the laboratory directed research and development (LDRD) project supporting this 
work specifically dealt with energy and infrastructure systems analysis. Significant portions of 
this report are still tailored to that topic as it is believed that risk perception and decision making 
tendencies cannot be adequately presented outside the specific milieu of a particular subject. 
Fortunately, the decision making framework and approach presented here are applicable to any 
high-consequence, highly sophisticated technological system. This report is intended to promote 
increased understanding of decision making processes and hopefully to enable improved 
decision making.  
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The order of exposition of this complex topic is as follows: first, a unique framework for 
understanding decision making is briefly presented along with several illustrative examples; 
second, critical thinking processes are defined and described which are considered foundational 
to proper decision making; third, the nature of a “technologically advanced” society is briefly 
discussed; fourth, a detailed discussion (including examples) of the foundations for the 
framework is presented; fifth, a concise description of a recommended decision making approach 
is presented; sixth, a discussion of perceived risks and analyzed risks related to nuclear power is 
presented along with pointers to the proposed framework and decision making approach. Finally, 
a summary restates the essential components of the framework and approach along with an 
appeal for using this type of structured approach for decisions involving high-consequence, 
highly sophisticated technological systems where time is available for thoughtful reflection.  
 
Several key elements included in the report are included below. 
 
1. Modeling uncertainties 
 
When approaching any decision, especially one that involves complex, high-consequence 
systems, an important consideration is to consciously review what is known and suspected about 
the domain of interest and to probe areas where unknown factors may lurk. Several months after 
the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld provided an entertaining description of imperfect knowledge while responding to a 
question about what the United States knew about weapons of mass destruction and terrorist 
support activities in the country of Iraq (Rumsfeld, 2002):  
 
The Unknown 
As we know,  
There are known knowns.  
There are things we know we know.  
We also know  
There are known unknowns.  
That is to say  
We know there are some things  
We do not know.  
But there are also unknown unknowns,  
The ones we don't know  
We don't know.  
 
The above quotation, criticized by some as a bit wordy and repetitive, is quite correct. That is, 
the accumulation of knowledge about any complex topic is a challenging endeavor that involves 
an indirect journey out of ignorance. Along that journey one makes observations and proposes 
inferences in the face of many uncertainties. Some of these uncertainties can eventually be 
categorized into “known unknown”–areas of uncertainty that are known to exist, but there is no 
clear way or no practical way to increase knowledge in those areas. Always lurking are the 
“unknown unknowns”–gaps in knowledge that are critical to understanding the complex topic, 
but have not been identified at all. Figure 1 provides possible visualizations of one’s state of 
knowledge regarding a system with conceptual boundaries established by defined system goals. 
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Figure 1. One’s state of knowledge regarding a system. 
 
 
In the community of risk and reliability professionals, two words are increasingly used to 
dichotomize uncertainties as being either aleatory or epistemic in nature (Hora, 1996; Parry, 
1996; Zio and Apostolakis, 1996).  Aleatory uncertainty involves events or phenomena that 
occur in a random or stochastic fashion. A simple example of aleatory uncertainty would be 
random variations introduced when a rubber ball is dropped twice from the same location. 
Newtonian laws of motion and laws of energy conservation are very effective for enabling 
predictions of general trajectories the ball may follow and heights of intermediate bounces before 
the rubber ball comes to rest on the floor. But subtle, random variations will occur in how the 
ball is released, the specific portion of the ball that hits the floor first, imperfections in the 
spherical shape of the ball, etc. These are aleatory uncertainties in the rubber ball drop system. 
Another example of aleatory uncertainty would be anticipating the type of weather conditions 
present in the vicinity of a chemical plant at the time a pressure vessel explodes and releases 
chlorine gas.  
 
Epistemic uncertainty involves one’s confidence in the correctness of their observations and 
inferences concerning a system, and confidence in derived models or representations of that 
system. Both known unknowns and unknown unknowns fall into the epistemic category. A 
“known unknown” example of epistemic uncertainty using the rubber ball drop system could be 
the general shape of trajectories taken by the ball on successive bounces when all that is needed 
is the average time taken for the ball to come to rest on the floor. Detailed analysis could be 
performed to turn this known unknown into a known item if desired. Epistemic “known 
unknown” uncertainties include modeling structure and specific model parameters. An example 
of an “unknown unknown,” never conceived by the person analyzing the system, might be the 
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occurrence of a rubber ball splitting into two pieces upon contact with the floor due to defects 
caused during the rubber ball manufacturing process. Epistemic “unknown unknown” 
uncertainties include modeling structure and modeling completeness mistakes and omissions. 
 
2. Critical thinking processes 
 
The simple but difficult arts of paying attention, copying accurately, following an 
argument, detecting an ambiguity or a false inference, testing guesses by summoning up 
contrary instances, organizing one’s time and one’s thought for study—all these 
arts…cannot be taught in the air but only through the difficulties of a defined subject; 
they cannot be taught in one course in one year, but must be acquired gradually in dozens 
of connections.  
Attributed to Jacques Barzun, cited in Arons (Arons, 1990)  
 
This section presents ten critical thinking processes or skills that are deemed essential to enable 
one to properly understand their interactions with their environment, and with other people; 
therefore they are foundational for decision making activities. The list is not intended to be 
complete or exhaustive, yet it is intended to define key concepts which are often thrown out 
casually (i.e., rarely defined) by educators and other commentators lamenting the decline of 
“thinking-reasoning capacities,” “critical thinking skills,” “higher order thinking skills,” or 
“critical thought.” The material for this section borrows very heavily from A Guide to 
Introductory Physics Teaching, published in 1990 by the late Arnold B. Arons.  
 
Arons spent decades studying the teaching and learning of science and math by grade school 
children, science and non-science majors in college; he even included university professors in his 
research. Much of the research of Arons and his colleagues is quite astonishing, as it uncovered 
many misconceptions regarding “good teaching,” found systematic causes for deficiencies in 
teaching, and provided the discovery that a significant number of advanced students, and even 
physics professors, manage to achieve an impressive academic record without mastering 
relatively elementary mathematical, and physical science concepts. Arons pioneered new ways to 
teach math and science concepts based on this extensive research. 
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Here then is a summary of the ten critical thinking process deemed foundational for decision 
making activities. Extensive discussion and examples are provided in the full SAND report to 
elucidate the meaning of each process summarized in Figure 2 below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of critical thinking processes appropriate 
 for supporting decision making in high-consequence domains. 
 
 
3. The technologically advanced society and assembling the team of decision makers 
 
The achievements of science and technology have been important, impressive, and have helped 
to provide unprecedented physical safety and material wealth. Yet they have done so at the cost 
of substantially increasing an individual’s vulnerability to risks associated with interdependence 
(Freudenburg, 2001). This section summarizes reflections by Freudenburg (2001) regarding risk-
related decision making and, in particular, how the nature of a technologically advanced society 
as opposed to an agrarian/simple craft-based society amplifies the need for trust between 
technology experts, high-level decision makers (e.g., politicians), and members of the general 
public. This section ties strongly to the critical thinking processes introduced in the previous 
section. Furthermore, this section suggests who ought to be included in high-consequence, 
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technologically advanced decisions and when technology experts or the general citizenry deserve 
the strongest vote on aspects of those critical decisions. 
 
Freudenburg begins his discussion by reflecting upon public sentiments he heard while being on 
a US National Academy of Sciences National Research Committee reviewing the analyses 
conducted for a nuclear waste storage site. Comments from the citizens included the classic, 
“Scientists have lied to us before, and scientists will lie to us again” (Freudenburg, 2001, p. 125). 
This reflected a sentiment widely held by fellow citizens in attendance that scientists habitually 
put their organizational interests ahead of even-handed analysis. Freudenburg quickly learned 
that he was not dealing with a group of extremists who irrationally opposed the nuclear waste 
dump. What he found were people who had initially supported the idea of a “scientific process” 
for analyzing proposed sites, but who had become, over the course of the site selection process, 
convinced that the process was neither fair nor scientific. 
 
Although many of us initially believed that the citizens were simply being sore losers, we 
ultimately learned something else: in fact, the process had included not just technical 
errors, but many cases in which arbitrary decisions had been characterized as scientific 
ones. Understandably—at least from the point of view of the proponents—whenever the 
arbitrariness was questioned, the critics were accused of being “anti-science.” The 
proponents’ intent of course, had been to improve the credibility of the siting process by 
wrapping it in a flag of science. The result, however, had been virtually the opposite; 
what actually took place was instead a serious drop in the credibility of science. The net 
unintended effect, in other words, had been the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy—
accusing a wide range of people of being anti-science, and then ultimately creating just 
that result (Freudenburg, 2001, p. 125). 
 
Once the technical experts and the general citizenry descend into this polarized relationship, a 
phenomenon called the “spiral of stereotypes” may emerge in which people on opposing sides of 
an issue stop talking to one another, but not about one another. That is, rumors and a priori 
beliefs that are already accepted in each camp take on more credibility than dialogue intended to 
promote mutual understandings between the camps. The us/them thinking takes over and 
“rationality” is assumed to characterize the “us” members of the debate, and anyone who shows 
the poor judgment to disagree with “us” must therefore be exhibiting irrationality (Freudenburg, 
2001).  
 
Before proposing a solution for avoiding a polarized decision making environment, it may be 
helpful to explore some of the subtleties that encourage such a polarization. It is proposed that 
many arguments about the proper roles of experts and citizens in high-consequence, 
technologically complex decision making emerge due to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
what it means to live in a “technologically advanced” society. For instance, there have been 
some broad indications of declining public confidence in science and technology and the experts 
who defend them. How can this sentiment prevail when dramatic reductions in risk can be 
attributed to advancing technology? The prime example being the dramatically reduced risk of 
death, measured by life expectancy data (i.e., more defenses against and treatments for disease 
and physical injury, improved shelters with heating and cooling, better plumbing and general 
hygiene practices, improved quantity and quality of food, safer means of transportation, safer 
 117 
means to produce food and durable goods, etc.). To many, such improvements make them feel 
justified in denouncing many or all public concerns toward science and technology as being 
ignorant, ill-informed, and/or irrational. At least three key problems with this type of thinking 
have been identified (Freudenburg, 2001).  
 
The first problem is the personal affront caused by telling someone they must be ignorant, ill-
informed, and/or irrational. This affront may be indirectly expressed by expending considerable 
effort to exclude the public from a decision. Either form of insult tends not to engender 
receptivity of anything else that follows. The second problem is one of adaptation; scientific and 
technological achievements rapidly become part of people’s baseline expectations. There is 
likely to be very little persuasive power to the argument that all should be happy to live as long 
as did our great-great-grandparents—especially when this implies that anyone over 40 years of 
age ought to be very happy about not being dead (Freudenburg, 2001). 
 
The third problem is the most serious, most often overlooked, and has been termed the 
“fundamental misunderstanding” about what it means to live in a technologically advanced 
society. We begin with a question: Do people living today (i.e., in a technologically advanced 
society) actually “know more” than their great-great-grandparents did? Collectively, the answer 
is a resounding “yes.” Individually, however, we know much less today than did our great-great-
grandparents about the tools and technologies on which we depend (Freudenburg, 2001). 
 
In the early 1800s, roughly 80% of the US population lived on farms, and for the most 
part, those farm residents were capable of repairing, or even of building from scratch, 
virtually all of the tools and technologies upon which they depended. By contrast, 
today’s world is so specialized that even a Nobel laureate is likely to have little more 
than a rudimentary understanding of the tools and technologies that surround us all, from 
airliners to ignition systems, and from computers to corporate structures (Freudenburg, 
2001, p. 128).  
 
Therefore, people living in a technologically advanced society tend not so much to be in control 
of technology as dependent upon technology. Our increases in technical control have led in a 
sense to a decrease in social control. Stated simply, the problem is that people now must depend 
on whole armies of specialists and specialized organizations, most of whom we will never meet, 
let alone be in a position to control.  
 
The failure of an expert, or specialized organization to accomplish the job required has referred 
to by some as recreancy (Clark and Short, 1993; Freudenburg, 1993). Recreancy, and its close 
neighbor trustworthiness, have been shown by systematic research to be key factors in the 
increasingly acrimonious chemistry between technical experts and members of the general 
public. For example, an analysis of attitudes regarding a proposed low-level nuclear waste 
facility found that sociodemographic variables were weak predictors of attitudes whereas 
measures of recreancy were found to be very strong predictors of attitude (Freudenburg, 2001). 
 
Thus we have the three problems with dismissing people who express concerns regarding 
decisions involving high-consequence, advanced technologies: personal affront; increasing 
expectations for technological advancements; and increasing dependency upon advanced 
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technology (i.e., increasing need for trust). These three problems, combined with the folly of 
experts who try to pass off arbitrary decisions as scientific decisions, provide a proven recipe for 
creating a polarized decision-making environment. A polarized decision-making environment 
will severely frustrate application of the bias mitigation insights, critical thinking processes, and 
decision-making approach proposed in this report. So how does one avoid this very large 
decision-making trap? General suggestions are described below and summarized in Figure 3: 
 
1. Do not automatically brand members of the public who raise concerns over decisions 
involving high-consequence, advanced technologies as ignorant, ill-informed, or irrational. 
2. Apply the ten critical thinking processes in the previous section to ensure that technical 
experts are focused upon factual or technical questions. Poor command of the critical 
thinking processes will prevent proper identification of authentically factual or technical 
questions.  
3. Identify when aspects of a decision (model assumptions, metrics, etc.) involve answers to 
questions that are value judgments.  Examples of such questions include, is that safe 
enough? Is that level of uncertainty in the safety estimate acceptable? When it comes to 
questions of values, another word for “scientist” is “voter.”  Ordinary citizens have just as 
much legitimacy in deciding questions of values as do scientists and engineers 
(Freudenburg, 2001). 
4. Apply the ten critical thinking processes in the previous to aid in identifying blind spots. 
That is, items that have been overlooked. Additional terms for blind spots include epistemic 
uncertainties and unknown unknowns, which were discussed earlier in this report. Ordinary 
citizens are also very helpful for contributing to the discussion of blind spots as their 
thinking tends to be bounded much differently than those of a particular community of 
“experts.”  One should keep in mind Perrow’s memorable definition of an expert as one who 
can solve a question much more quickly and efficiently than most, but who runs a higher 
risk than do other citizens of asking the wrong questions altogether (Perrow, 1984). 
 
 
Figure 3. Building an appropriate decision-making team. 
 119 
4. The proposed framework of biases and tendencies 
 
Understanding the general types of uncertainties involving complex, high-consequence domains 
is helpful. But, how exactly does someone move along the path from a state of ignorance or 
impoverished knowledge to a state of adequate or extensive knowledge? In this case, adequate or 
extensive refers to the amount and quality of knowledge required to make an appropriate 
decision regarding high-consequence, advanced technology. To answer this important question, 
we begin with summarizing a unique framework. 
 
This report proposes a unique framework for understanding key aspects of risk perception and 
decision making. The proposed taxonomy of biases (see Figure 4) contains the headings of 
normative knowledge, availability, and individual specific biases. Normative knowledge 
involves a person’s skills in combinatorics, probability theory, and statistics. Research has shown 
that training and experience in these quantitative fields can improve one’s ability to accurately 
determine event likelihoods. Those trained in statistics tend to seek appropriate data sources 
when assessing the frequency and severity of an event. The availability category of biases 
includes those which result from the structure of human cognitive machinery. Two examples of 
biases in the availability category include the anchoring bias and the retrievability bias. The 
anchoring bias causes a decision maker to bias subsequent values or items toward the first value 
or item presented to them. The retrievability bias refers to the bias that drives people to believe 
those values or items which are easier to retrieve from memory are more likely to occur. 
Individual specific biases include a particular person’s values, personality, interests, group 
identity, and substantive knowledge (i.e., specific domain knowledge related to the decision to be 
made). Critical thinking skills are also offered as foundational for competent risk perception 
and decision making as they can mute the impact of undesirable biases, regulate the application 
of one’s knowledge to a decision, and guide information-gathering activities. In addition to 
borrowing insights from the literature domains mentioned in the introduction, the formal 
decision making approach supported in this report incorporates methods used in multi-attribute 
utility theory.  
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Figure 4. This figure attempts to provide assistance in exploring the types of biases/tendencies 
that researchers have identified, the ways in which these may be related and the ease with 
which one may become a better decision maker. The unique aspects introduced by the author, 
following a review of relevant data, include (1) the three primary categories into which previously 
investigated biases are ordered, (2) strong interdependencies hypothesized between biases as 
indicated by solid lines with arrows, (3) degrees to which these biases may be mitigated via 
focused efforts by a specific decision maker indicated by dashed lines with arrows; high, 
medium, and low ratings; and the green, blue, and red boxed items. This report is intended to 
present strong arguments supporting the face validity of the unique framework above and the 
associated decision-making improvement strategies.  
 
 
A powerful example illustrating a number of biases in the framework includes the following 
hypothetical scenario: a respected energy expert who specialized in electricity production using 
fossil fuels was confronted with risk data showing the outstanding safety record and cost 
competitiveness of nuclear energy relative to electricity from fossil fuels (i.e., dramatically 
higher safety and comparable or even lower costs—without the emission of airborne pollutants 
or greenhouse gases). Instead of acknowledging the data and allowing himself to be open to the 
possibility that nuclear power might be as viable an energy source as fossil fuel, he recalled 
watching the TMI accident unfold on television in 1979 and expressed how dangerous the 
situation was and how close to disaster we had come. He could recall salient images of people 
racing to leave the nearby communities and the recommendation that all pregnant women be 
evacuated within a five-mile radius. He could also recall contradictory information being 
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presented by “experts” regarding the severity of the event. Following this comment about TMI 
he was presented with data showing how there was essentially no danger to the public from that 
accident and also with data showing how slight the dangers would likely have been from even a 
severe “reactor core meltdown.” In response, the fossil fuel expert stated, “Yes, but nuclear 
energy was supposed to be the energy panacea–it was supposed to be too cheap even to meter—
free electricity for all.” 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned topic areas, the SAND report contains a step-by-step 
decision-making approach and an extensive application example based on the review of the topic 
areas. 
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CONCEPTS FOR DETERMINING AN OVERALL  
TECHNOLOGY SCORE AND PORTFOLIO MIX 
Jason V. Zuffranieri 
 
Among the many benefits made possible through the Energy Systems LDRD is the ability to 
compare technologies on the basis of their scores in each of the nine individual criteria 
categories.  As a general rule, the methods for determining the criteria scores are varied, with 
some more quantitative than others, usually depending on how well-defined the data are.  Still, it 
would be valuable to combine these scores into an overall technology score, especially when one 
considers the difficulty in determining which technology is preferred over another; consider the 
case where one technology scores better in five categories while scoring worse in four.  It is vital 
for a user to have the ability to give additional weight to the categories which he feels are more 
important than others, and similarly to lessen the importance of those which he feels are less 
important. 
 
However, even if one were able to cogently weight the categories to his liking, there is no telling 
whether the scales of numbers are even comparable.  The criteria have been formulated to return 
scores from 0 to 10, but there is no inherent benchmarking.  Even if it were true that a score of 5 
were deemed to be an “average” score, the concept of “average” cannot be very clearly defined. 
 
What follows is a possible method that allows for user-defined weights and has built-in 
benchmarks; a similar but simplified version of this method was utilized in the quantification of 
the Environmental and Natural Resource criterion.  The effect of the benchmarks is to always 
give the user a conceptualization of what certain scores truly mean.  Portfolio optimization will 
be examined in a later section, and a summary concludes the paper. 
 
Before going much further, it is important to emphasize that what is described below is a 
remapping of the scores; this process can take any numerical value and transform it to a value 
from 0-10.  Each technology has nine values associated with it, based on how well it performs in 
the nine criteria defined earlier in this report.  For clarity’s sake, let the criteria values before 
they enter this process be known as intermediate values, which will then be transformed into 
criterion scores by the process. 
 
This method is similar to those illustrated in [1] and [2], although different enough to warrant a 
separate explanation. 
 
Finding a Criterion Score 
 
It has been decided that criterion scores should always range in the single digits, so as to put 
everything on a similar scale.  Since there is value in standardizing scores across criteria, it is 
useful to give meaning to certain scores (0-10), so that a criterion score of 2 will mean roughly 
the same thing regardless of which criterion it was.  To this end, the following is proposed: 
 
 123 
Criterion scores will run from 0 to 10,1 inclusive, and will be determined by where a 
technology’s intermediate value falls along the following piecewise linear function. 
 
10 – The upper-limit intermediate value determined by legislation; e.g., if the government has set 
a daily/yearly limit for a certain amount of pollutant.  In those instances where the government 
has not set a bound, this will instead be a value which, if surpassed, would thereby disqualify a 
technology on account of its extreme nature.  Such a value would be determined from expert 
opinion, and should be a limit generally accepted by the community at large.  For many of the 
more qualitative criteria, this value should be whatever maximum was chosen by the criterion’s 
creator, and will often be exactly 10.  Note: the selection of 10 as the score corresponding to the 
“upper-limit” value is fixed, since it is indeed the largest possible score for a criterion. 
 
6 – The highest intermediate value for any top-five electricity-producing technology currently 
employed at the regional or national level.  These five categories are coal, nuclear, natural gas, 
hydropower, and oil, which comprise 99% of today’s electricity portfolio.  Note: the selection of 
6 (as opposed to 5 or 7) as the score corresponding to the “high” value is variable – this choice is 
up to the user.  Furthermore, this may not correspond directly to an intermediate value of 6. 
 
3 – The weighted-average intermediate value for the top-five energy-producing technologies 
currently employed at the regional or national level.  This will require taking the intermediate 
value for each of the five technologies and weighting them by their share of the overall portfolio; 
these weights are found in the following table.  Note: the selection of 3 (as opposed to 2 or 4) as 
the score corresponding to the “median” value is variable – this choice is up to the user.  
Furthermore, this may not correspond directly to an intermediate value of 3. 
 
Table 1.  Proportion of current electricity portfolio devoted to five largest sources. 
 
Coal Nuclear Natural Gas Hydropower Oil 
53% 21% 15% 7% 3% 
 
1 – The lowest category value for any top-five energy-producing technology currently employed 
at the regional or national level.  Note: the selection of 1 (as opposed to 0.5 or 1.5) as the score 
corresponding to the “low” value is variable – this choice is up to the user.  Furthermore, this 
may not correspond directly to an intermediate value of 1. 
 
0 – A value of zero for the category.  This is the ideal.  For many of the more qualitative criteria, 
this value should be whatever minimum was chosen by the criterion’s creator, and will often be 
exactly 0.  Note: the selection of 0 as the score corresponding to the “lower-limit” value is fixed, 
since it is indeed the smallest possible score for a criterion. 
 
The 0-10 normalization described above seeks to do several things.  First off, it will keep all 
criterion scores within the single-digit range, which has already been decided.  Secondly, the 
extremes are clearly true extremes, while the intermediate values are sensible and will keep all 
                                                 
1
  It is possible, due to special and possibly unlikely circumstances (e.g., grandfather clauses), that a technology 
may surpass the legal limiting value for a category.  In these instances, the category score should be determined 
by using a linear extrapolation on the 6 and 10 basis values. 
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scores within a logical range among the single digits.  Furthermore, it allows for constant 
updating; as the electricity portfolio changes, the percentage weights (and perhaps the five 
technologies themselves) will be adjusted appropriately.  In this manner, the criteria scores will 
always have a basis in reality. 
 
A spreadsheet illustrating the determining of criteria scores is included at the end of this paper. 
 
Combining Into One Overall Score 
 
Now that the criteria scores have all been put onto similar scales, combining them into one 
overall score can be performed.  For this, the user will choose weights (totaling 100%) and 
assign them to each of the different categories.  These will strictly be up to the user, as there is no 
scientific reason to restrict a weighting.  The technology’s overall score will be determined by 
summing all of the results from multiplying each criterion score with its associated, user-defined 
weight. 
 
This may appear to be propagating uncertainty too much – so-called “weightings of weightings” 
– since value judgments may have been used to find the initial, unadjusted intermediate values.  
However, the reality of the situation dictates that a user simply must be allowed to participate in 
the weighting of the criteria; without this ability, all efforts would have proven to be fruitless, 
since they would not be adaptable to each user and his situation.  Also, a distinction can be found 
between the two types of weightings.  The user-defined weights reflect a preference on the part 
of the user, whereas the weightings that may have gone into finding an intermediate value were 
based on scientific dependencies and relationships.  As an illustrative example – while it is 
difficult to combine deaths and illnesses into one cohesive number, it is certainly true that the 
former are of greater import than the latter.  Such an absolute statement cannot be made 
regarding the importance of environmental concerns vis-à-vis cost.  It is the distinction between 
the two types of weightings that prevents any biases from affecting the outcome of this method 
adversely. 
 
A spreadsheet illustrating the combining of criteria scores into one overall score is included at 
the end of this paper. 
 
Portfolio Optimization 
 
With the relationships within a criterion being strictly defined and scientifically justified, and 
with the relationships between criteria being up to the user’s discretion, the output of the above 
methods is an overall score for each technology.  These scores can certainly be compared to one 
another, and relationships can be quickly determined.  However, since the technology-related 
issues have been effectively reduced to a single value, and since multiple technologies are used 
to generate electricity, it is possible to do a numerical optimization on these overall scores to find 
a split of technologies that delivers the lowest weighted-average portfolio score.  Furthermore, 
this optimization can take into account the restrictions on what percentage of national production 
a certain technology could deliver (both minimum and maximum values). 
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The optimization itself can be quite easily implemented using a software package such as 
Microsoft Excel; the solver function performs optimizations with east.  The advantage with 
undertaking such a process is that service limitations can be taken into effect.  For example, it 
may appear that a certain technology (e.g., wind) has an advantage over longtime stalwart energy 
technologies like coal or nuclear.  However, wind cannot account for more than a small fraction 
of the overall portfolio.  Similarly, some technologies only achieve such low costs by running at 
full power for long periods of time, thereby delivering only large shares of the portfolio.  By 
using these optimization techniques, the true impact of a technology can be felt by looking at it 
in a national context. 
 
Admittedly, there is significantly more to the national energy portfolio than just a simple 
optimization exercise.  Even if some real insights were determined through its utilization, the 
realities of today’s portfolio, plus the sheer amount of current infrastructure that would need to 
be replaced or renovated, make any optimizations more of a theoretical exercise.  As such, these 
results would perhaps best be something for which to aim, or could give true guidance in 
developing markets where the infrastructure is waiting to be determined. 
 
A spreadsheet illustrating portfolio optimization is included at the end of this paper. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are many ways to combine several criteria scores into one overall score.  The method 
described here does so in a consistent manner well suited for an interactive program, since it 
leaves important decisions in the hands of the user.  Moreover, the decisions are made based on a 
thoroughly analytical outlook of the criteria.  With this capability, as well as a quick method for 
optimization, the techniques described in this paper will satisfy users who wish to combine 
several categories from several candidates into one overall mix. 
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Determining Criteria Scores
These hypothetical intermediate values are for 
currently employed technologies in the energy 
portfolio, and come from the different criteria 
definitions.  Some are continuous, unbounded 
variables, while some run from 0-100 and some 
from 0-10.
The benchmarks are determined by taking absolute 
maxima (10) and minima (0) for the different criteria, 
finding a weighted-average (3), and taking the best (1) 
and worst (6) intermediate values for the top-five 
technologies.  In the cases where the best top-five 
intermediate value is exactly 0, the benchmark value at 1 
is exactly 0.
The intermediate values have been transformed into 
criteria scores (all 0-10) based upon where they fall 
compared to the benchmark values.  Note that each 
highest score in the top five rows of the intermediate 
values table shown at the top of the page corresponds to 
a value of 6 in the criteria scores table.
Ranking
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User2: Where this researcher feels R&D money 
should go, thinking towards the future
User1: This researcher's opinion of what's important 
for the next ten years
Future: Optimistic about the future, with strong 
belief in public's acceptance of promising 
technologies
USLC (US Low Cost): Concerned more with 
keeping prices low in the near future
Green: Concerned with the environment and 
emphasizing renewables; less concerned with cost
These scores come from the previous slide, 
and are to be weighted on this slide, based 
on the weights (in the possible weightings 
table) determined using the motivations 
listed below.  To determine a weighted 
result, each column of criteria scores was 
multiplied by each row of weightings, with 
the sum of these products being the overall 
score.
Combining Into One Overall Score
Overall scores are seen here.  Lower 
numbers are better, and preferred 
technologies for each motivation are listed in 
bold.
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Portfolio Optimization
These criteria scores come from the 
previous slides, based on this 
researcher’s opinion of where R&D 
money should go.  These numbers will 
be used to find an optimal portfolio 
based on this user’s preferences and on 
service limitations.
This table shows the individual scores 
in each criterion for each technology 
based on this researcher’s opinion of 
which criteria are important.  To get 
these numbers, the above raw 
criterion scores were multiplied by the 
weights listed in the Weights row.  Of 
note is that three criteria were 
deemed unimportant, and contribute 
nothing to the next step.
The leftmost table shows the approximate current 
portfolio.  Based upon certain service limitations 
regarding how high and how low a share of the 
portfolio a technology can handle, these 
percentages were adjusted.  On the right is the 
breakdown that returns the lowest score, and 
therefore the most-preferred portfolio, based on 
this researcher’s opinions of what criteria are 
important.  This optimization was performed in 
Microsoft Excel using the Solver function.
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ENERGY SECURITY: DEFINITIONS AND ISSUES 
Orman Paananen 
 
1.  Definition and Scope 
 
Establishing a definition and scope of issues surrounding energy and national security is not 
simple, because of the large number of factors that determine the connection between energy and 
security.  For example, in the short term, an act of terrorism or a natural disaster might disrupt 
supplies, but in the long term, maintaining sufficient supply at affordable cost might be of great 
concern. Threats to the climate stability from burning fossil fuels, or the threat of nuclear 
weapons proliferation might cause great international tension.  A recent energy fest workshop at 
Sandia National Laboratories [7], which included members of Sandia staff and management, 
explored three broad energy security topics: 
 
• Global and US economic oil dependence (and natural gas) 
• Potential security implications of global climate change 
• Vulnerabilities of US domestic energy infrastructure 
 
Workshop members found that these three broad energy security topics tended to share several 
challenging characteristics: 
 
• They are worldwide in scope 
• They involve public goods and market externalities 
• Their solutions (or neglect) involve intergenerational transfers of costs and consequences 
• They involve multiple decision makers 
• Different parties contribute to them and suffer their consequences in different ways 
• Policies to address them will interact significantly with other policies 
• There are pervasive uncertainties in assessing them and their solutions 
• Their inertia is such that they can be turned around only in decades 
 
Workshop participants noted the importance of understanding the psychological, social, and 
economic dimensions of these characteristics. 
 
A somewhat less wide-ranging scope of energy security has been suggested by Ahearne [1], 
which also contains three elements: 
 
• The United States has adequate energy supplies to support a healthy economy 
• Our allies also have adequate supplies 
• We and our allies in concert have the capability to protect our vital energy supplies if 
they are threatened 
 
This white paper focuses on the first two elements of Ahearne’s definition in an initial attempt to 
establish potential overall quantitative measures of energy security.  However, in these times of 
terrorism and uncertain military futures, we recognize that scenarios that include disruptions of 
supplies should be developed to provide a complete picture of energy security.  Barnett [3] 
argues that oil supply disruptions may be more damaging to developing nations since they lack 
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resources to mitigate oil shortages with other energy sources.  This view suggests that energy 
security has a specific link to national security because major disruptions may result in instability 
in developing nations, which in turn may require military intervention. This issue is beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, it is important to note this wider national security issue with its 
international implications. 
 
Given the narrower definition of energy security used in this white paper, indicators of national 
economic well-being become the important measures of economic security related to energy 
demand and supply scenarios.  Gross domestic product (GDP) and employment are the most 
common indicators used.  This relates generally to the first energy security topic explored during 
the energy fest workshop, while putting aside the global climate change and infrastructure topics.  
In fact, in the context of the framework used for this study, climate change enters into our 
evaluation in other “vectors.” 
 
Energy supply issues have largely centered on world oil supplies, and, more recently, world 
natural gas supplies.  The citations discussed here deal with energy security at the national, or 
macroeconomic, level.  Different measures of energy security may be required when considering 
infrastructure aspects of energy security, or energy security issues at the regional of local levels, 
e.g., potential vulnerability of the electric power grid in a specific community. 
 
The following is a sample of discussions and analyses of energy security, reflecting different 
viewpoints on the issue. 
 
2.  Oil and Energy Supply Security 
 
Most of the writings over the last 10 to 15 years have focused primarily on imported oil as the 
main element affecting US energy security.  Three types of oil-related energy security challenges 
are considered: 
 
• Major supply disruption – oil shortages similar to those in the 1970s 
• Supply disruptions that result in price spike but not actual physical shortages 
• Volatile oil prices 
 
In the last few years natural gas supply has increasingly been viewed as facing similar 
challenges.  Increasingly, natural gas is becoming a commodity comparable with petroleum, 
because the increasing use of liquid natural gas tankers makes it possible to establish a world gas 
market, whereas in the past delivery was tied to pipelines connecting specific sources to fixed 
markets. The citations summarized here, while not a complete listing of references on energy 
security associated with oil and natural gas import dependence, give a sense of the scope of 
issues. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, The Effect on 
National Security of Imports of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products 
 
 131 
The energy security issue addressed: vulnerability to an oil supply disruption. 
 
Vulnerabilities: 
 
• Capability of the United States and Office for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries to offset a major supply disruption has not improved in the last decade. 
In fact, the production margin and the availability of refineries to deliver specific 
products is probably less robust today. 
• Most of the world spare production capacity is in the politically unstable Persian Gulf 
region. 
• Government oil stocks (Strategic Petroleum Reserve, SPR) provide less protection from 
interruption than in the 1990s because of continued growth in domestic demand. 
• No viable substitute for oil in transportation will be available for at least a decade, and, if 
introduced, technology under development is likely to result in actual increase in demand 
for fossil fuels. 
• We can achieve enhanced energy security by promoting increases in non-OPEC oil 
production. This statement was true during the oil crisis of the early 1970s, and there has 
since been considerable diversification of supply, but this principle can be further 
extended. 
• Lower oil prices may benefit economic activity but not reduce vulnerability from 
imported oil dependence, and in fact may increase vulnerability, because reduced prices 
will increase the tendency to use a resource.  
 
An example of enhancing energy security – Article 605 of NAFTA – provides reciprocal 
provisions for energy security between the United States and Canada: 
 
• No cross-border restrictions on energy delivery during a supply disruption 
• Shortfalls are shared equally based on historical percentages 
• No disruption of the prevailing proportion of energy goods supplied 
• Will not charge prices higher than prevailing domestic prices 
 
Alan Larson, The Role of Energy in U.S. Foreign and Security Policy 
 
Energy affects national security to the extent that our dependence on foreign energy sources 
limits flexibility in directing economic and foreign policy agendas. The United States and its 
allies remain vulnerable to a major oil supply disruption because of two factors: 
 
• Where the oil is, and 
• Where the domestic oil is increasingly going.  The current trend in the United States and 
its allies is toward increasing concentration of oil demand in the transportation sector.  
Promoting diversification of oil supplies and use of other energy types is an important 
energy security and foreign policy issue. Of course, the convenience of oil for 
transportation makes substitutes unlikely. 
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Baker Institute, The Importance of Diverse Supply  
 
A similar view to Larson’s comes from the Baker Institute (Rice University).  The stakes for 
developing diverse sources of oil are high since lasting price increases can have a dampening 
effect on economic prosperity.  Further, prolonged oil price volatility poses risks to the national 
economy by diverting real resources toward activities that deal with risks arising from 
supply/price uncertainties. 
 
Forum for International Policy, Energy and National Security  
 
Domestic and international vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is real and increasing.  Possible 
answers/responses: 
 
• Increase energy efficiency in the transportation sector 
• Maintain contingency planning – grow the SPR 
• Promote a strong competitive US oil industry abroad.  Promote an even business playing 
field in terms of tax structures, and international support for continued non-OPEC oil 
supply development 
 
Woolsey et al., Energy Security:  It Takes More Than Drilling  
 
Oil energy security requires an oil delivery system that makes large-scale failures impossible or 
at least extremely unlikely, and makes local failures benign.  Energy efficiency starts with using 
less energy far more efficiently to complete the same tasks.  The next step is to obtain more 
energy from sources that are inherently less vulnerable because they are dispersed, diverse, and 
increasingly renewable.  At minimum, the U.S. must not increase reliance on existing vulnerable 
systems.  Moving away from reliance on Middle East oil and a vulnerable domestic 
infrastructure, such as the Trans-Alaska pipeline system (TAPS), will reduce the oil security 
dangers for the United States and its allies. 
 
3.  Energy Security Beyond Oil 
 
Some recent articles have started to address energy security in a wider context that includes 
consideration of more energy resources than oil.  These papers point out that the United States 
will become more dependent on natural gas imports, as well as having continued (and growing) 
dependence on imported oil.  In addition, all of the current US nuclear fuel supplies are 
imported.  In this view, considerations of energy security need to address issues around all of 
these fuel types simultaneously.  In addition, some authors include environmental aspects of 
energy use as part of energy security. 
 
Zweifel and Bonomo, Energy Security: Coping With Multiple Supply Risks 
 
The United States and other developed nations are exposed to multiple risks for energy 
supplies – oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel.  Energy security policy is more effective if supply 
risks to all energy sources are considered simultaneously.  For example, the risks of an oil supply 
 133 
disruption may be positively correlated with natural gas supply disruption, particularly if both 
energy supplies come from the same geographic region. 
 
A more complete energy security focus: 
 
• Fuel-specific rules (e.g., 90 days of oil reserves) neglect the fact that modern economies 
rely on a multitude of energy sources to operate effectively. 
• Decision rules that focus on a single risky energy supply type tend to yield suboptimal 
results, and may induce improper policy adjustments. 
• As a result, energy security policy should focus on an approach capable of dealing with 
multiple energy supply risks and their specific risks, including different energy types. 
 
The overall energy security goal is to minimize the expected costs of maintaining multiple 
energy supplies, which means minimizing the expected losses (e.g., decreased GDP) resulting 
from disruptions from more than one energy source.  This requires understanding the impacts of 
disruptions of different risky energy supplies and the trade-offs in use between the energy types, 
including time lags to achieve trade-offs.  If energy security policies do not evaluate all potential 
energy source disruptions simultaneously, minimizing the expected cost of energy security will 
in general not be achieved. 
 
Stern, A Multivariate Cointegration Analysis of the Role of Energy in the U.S. 
Macroeconomy  
 
Stern also shows that different energy sources are cointegrated into the structure of the United 
States macroeconomy.  Energy security policies directed toward one energy source exclusively 
are likely to invoke changes in the use, and potentially the security conditions, of other energy 
sources.  This is particularly true where energy users have the ability to use different energy 
sources to satisfy their energy needs (e.g., cogeneration capability).  Optimized energy security 
policy needs to consider the risks and associated costs for all energy sources.  Diversification of 
energy types and diversification of supply sources for any type of energy both play a role in 
optimizing energy policy. 
 
Lidsky and Miller, Nuclear Power and Energy Security 
 
These authors, in addition to energy security issues around oil and natural gas supplies, add 
potential disruptions to uranium supplies as an energy security issue.  As such, their focus on 
energy security is both near term and medium term, rather than the near-term rapid responses to 
oil or natural gas supply disruptions.  They suggest that establishment of a strategic uranium 
stockpile, similar to the SPR, for oil would enhance energy security in two ways.  First, in the 
near term, such a strategic stockpile of natural or low-level enriched uranium would ensure a 
domestic supply of uranium for electric power production, since currently there is no mining and 
production of uranium in the United States.  Second, in the medium term, guaranteeing a 
continued source of uranium would encourage development of new nuclear power facilities and 
support movement away from the current “monocultural” dependence on the light water reactor 
(LWR) fleet now deployed in the United States. In turn, this would decrease the risk of the loss 
of all nuclear power if a major fault or disruption occurs for the current LWR technology. 
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Thomas Neff, Diversification and Risk Reduction for Fossil and Nuclear Fuels 
 
Neff argues that the best measure of energy security is couched in terms of energy dependency, 
based on a combination of physical and economic conditions.  The focus must be on a 
combination of factors and policy responses.  For example, an industrial policy that encourages 
knowledge-based industries over energy-intensive industries is also a form of energy policy, and 
may have as much consequence on energy security as an energy supply policy. Of course, this 
change in policy might make sense for economic security, but might not serve the interests of 
military defense, at least in protracted conflict that could demand a strong and diverse domestic 
production capability.  As part of the energy supply measures, Neff focuses on diversification of 
energy supplies and energy technologies, using portfolio theory to obtain risk diversification, and 
quantifies energy supply diversification through use of the Herfindahl Index: 
 
 =
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Where xi is the fraction of one type of energy supply from source i.  A lower value of the index 
means greater diversity, and greater opportunities to avoid a major disruption in the energy type.  
Thus energy security would be enhanced by policies that lead to diversification and result in 
lower Herfindahl index values. 
 
Hossein Razavi, Economic Security and Environmental Aspects of Energy Supply 
 
Razavi presents a methodology for analyzing a national energy strategy in relation to energy 
security and environmental impacts of energy supply and consumption.  He concentrates on two 
policy decisions: (1) the appropriate mix of fossil fuels, and (2) the desirable level of petroleum 
inventories.  Four exogenous factors or attributes are considered: 
 
• Growth in energy demand 
• International price of crude oil 
• Possibilities of oil supply disruption 
• Availability of natural gas supplies 
 
Razavi defines energy security as security of energy availability and the economic cost of energy 
supplies.  Given the multiple attributes, use of optimization methods is difficult, and, where 
objectives conflict, may not be solvable.  The author’s approach is to use trade-off analysis. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the trade-off approach. 
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Figure 1.  Energy Supply Trade-off Analysis Framework 
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Institute for National Strategic Studies, Energy and National Security 
 
This report summarizes different measures and opinions about energy security: 
 
• House Energy Subcommittee: the enduring security question is the concentration of oil 
reserves, production, and surge capacity in the Middle East.  Energy security will be 
improved through diversification. 
 
• Amoco: energy security is best maintained by ensuring the United States is fully 
supportive of free trade and market forces worldwide.  Opposes a buffer stock (SPR) in 
the event of a supply disruption, which is likely to be felt as a price spike, which would 
force the economy to adjust to the disruption.1 
 
• Resources for the Future: energy security is an empty concept – the 1981 decision to end 
price controls led to spot and futures markets which disrupt the ability of any country to 
control oil prices.  Implicit in this is that there is a continuation of a free market, and the 
influence of a war or natural disaster seems not to be considered. 
 
• US DOE: dependence on energy imports can reduce foreign policy options.  In general, 
there is a need for a military component to energy security – specifically, the growing 
dependence of China as a large-scale oil importer may lead to future confrontations 
between the United States and China over oil supplies.  There is a need for a clearer 
policy view on the role of the SPR.  Increased use of nuclear fuel affects both energy 
security and larger national security issues because of proliferation concerns. 
 
4.  Key Issues and Questions 
 
Some generally common themes emerge from this sample of the literature on the challenges to 
energy security: 
 
• Major oil and/or natural gas disruptions – anywhere in the world, and for any reason – 
have the potential to cause damage worldwide as well as domestically. 
 
• Oil and/or natural gas price volatility also has the potential to cause economic damage by 
diverting resources toward activities and institutions that can manage price risks. 
 
• Disruption in uranium supplies, while not a short-term challenge to energy security, is 
still an important element. 
 
• US dependence on foreign energy sources limits flexibility in directing economic and 
foreign policy options to address energy security issues. 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that this position by petroleum producers may be directed by their well-being rather than the 
well-being of the nation as a whole. 
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• Lack of diversity of energy types and sources, and increasing dependence on an energy 
source in sectors of the economy, tend to make it more difficult to achieve energy supply 
security.  Diversification of sources for each energy type, as well as diversification across 
energy types, will contribute to energy security. 
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ASPECTS OF WASTE PRODUCTS AND PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
Jason Zuffraneiri 
 
There are certain facets of electricity production that are important enough to mention but 
perhaps not widespread enough to be included as a separate metric.  This section delves into two 
of them. 
 
An issue unique to electricity production by nuclear means is the potential risk associated with 
the by-products of the energy-generating reactions.  These reactions produce radioisotope waste 
that could theoretically be used to create a weapon of mass destruction.  Furthermore, due to the 
radioactive decay that is produced, there are issues with nuclear waste even if it all were to be 
securely stored.  No other source of electricity has by-products that provide such a significant 
cause for concern; the emissions and thermal waste from non-nuclear technologies are much 
more benign, and the public has come to understand and accept such waste.  This section serves 
as an examination of radioactive waste, which deserves mention despite not fitting neatly into 
one of the aforementioned metrics. 
 
Fuel rods are not rechargeable and do not last forever.  Every 12 to 18 months, plants shut down 
and the fuel rods are replaced, with the spent rods put into a spent fuel pool before being bolted 
shut inside of steel containers.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that 
2,000 metric tons of fuel are consumed and then subsequently warehoused each year. 
 
However, recently federal regulators have been charged by the GAO with being lax with security 
measures, resulting in the loss of spent radioactive rods.  Plants in California, Vermont, and 
Connecticut have temporarily lost track of spent rods.  In each case, there has been no evidence 
to show that the material left the plant location, but the initial confusion is troubling enough. 
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sees things differently, and notes that none of the 
missing fuel has ever fallen into the wrong hands.  Furthermore, the NRC feels that since 
security has generally increased since the September 11th attacks, spent nuclear reactor fuel is at 
even less of a risk of theft than before, especially since sophisticated on-site protection measures 
are now in place. [1] 
 
Part of the problem with maintaining a secure on-site storage of spent fuel is that the proposed 
national spent fuel repository has not been opened yet.  Yucca Mountain, a permanent 
underground storage facility in Nevada that has been in the works since being commissioned in 
1982, has seen its construction delayed while various political factions express vehement 
disagreements.  The site, now scheduled to open in 2010, is anticipated to hold 70,000 tons of 
nuclear waste, which would lessen (but not eliminate) the burden of on-site storage at each of the 
active reactors. 
 
A possible solution to the issue of spent fuel is twofold, and requires the same kind of ingenuity 
that went into the push for recycling aluminum, paper, and other household goods.  Researchers 
with the Fuel Cycle Initiative have determined that separating out the highly radioactive 
materials from spent fuel, while adding an initial cost, could have extremely beneficial effects.  
Additional nuclear fuel could be made from some of these products, and the amount of high-
level waste that would require storage in a repository would be only a tiny fraction of the original 
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total.  With such a practice in place, the need for further Yucca Mountain-like facilities would be 
reduced, and today’s finite uranium reserves would be extended greatly.  Without such a 
strategy, on the other hand, the need for further repositories may become too great for nuclear 
technologies to take a larger role of the nation’s energy portfolio, especially considering all the 
difficulties that have been encountered with Yucca Mountain, a site which is believed to be as 
remote and secure as there is to be found in this country. 
 
While the radioactive material from nuclear power plants is generally contained, the same cannot 
be said for another somewhat unlikely radioactive source of concern: coal.  Scientists estimate 
that a coal-fired power plant gives off more radiation than a nuclear-fired power plant.  On 
average, coal has 1.3 ppm of uranium and 3.2 ppm of thorium, both of which are radioactive.  
Radon-222, a radioactive gas, goes straight up the chimney when coal is burned.  Adding 
everything up, one sees that coal plants dump much more radioactivity (up to 100 times) into the 
biosphere than a nuclear-fired power plant.   
 
In all, a total of 73 different elements have been identified in coal.  A single 1000-megawatt 
plant annually emits 5.2 tons of uranium, 12.8 tons of radioactive thorium, and 0.22 tons of 
radioactive potassium-40.  This includes enough uranium-235 to make a World War II-style 
bomb each year; ironically, the radioactive metals in coal contain 50% more energy than the 
carbon.  These isotopes are contained in fly ash, the airborne ash that escapes from coal power 
plants utilizing older technologies; today’s clean coal plants, such as the US FutureGen plant, do 
not have such pollutant issues. 
 
Despite the radioactivity inherent in much of the coal waste, there are some who feel that the cost 
to society is negligible.  Studies have shown that the maximum radiation dose to an individual 
living within 1 km of a modern power plant is equivalent to, at worst, a 5 percent increase above 
the radiation level from the natural environment; this number is even lower for the average 
citizen.  Changes to drinking water purity on account of fly ash are similarly benign.  While it is 
true that coal technologies may be larger emitters of radiation than nuclear ones, it seems these 
additional emissions are not hazardous to human health at their current levels. 
 
The results presented here offer both worries as well as possible hope for the future of electricity 
production in the United States.  By taking a more strict approach towards radioactive waste, 
both with regards to nuclear and coal technologies, the country could improve its efficiency, 
lessen its need for repositories, and extend its fuel supply.  Those possibilities make for a 
winning blueprint, regardless of how much concern there should be for the waste products 
mentioned above. 
 
References 
 
[1] “Nuclear Waste in the Hot Seat.”  Available at: http://www.commodities-
now.com/content/market-news/market-news-2005041652842.php.  September 28, 2005. 
 
[2] “Radioactive Elements in Coal and Fly Ash: Abundance, Forms, and Environmental 
Significance.”  Available at: http://greenwood.cr.usgs.gov/energy/factshts/163-97/FS-163-
97.html.  August 8, 2005. 
 
[3] “What else might be in your Ceiling Dust?”  Available at: 
 http://www.lead.org.au/lanv5n3/lan5n3-8.html.  September 14, 2005. 
 141 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
1 MS 0601 Jeffrey Y. Tsao, 1130 
1 MS 0701 Peter B. Davies, 6100 
5 MS 0708 Juan Torres, 6202 
1 MS 0708 Scott A. Jones, 6202 
5 MS 0708 Glenn W. Kuswa, 6202 
1 MS 0710 David F. Menicucci, 6251 
1 MS 0724 Les Shephard, 6000 
1 MS 0724 Teresa A. Mills, 6030 
1 MS 0736 Marianne C. Walck, 6860 
1 MS 0741 Rush D. Robinett III, 6210 
1 MS 0748 Mark S. Allen, 6861 
1 MS 0748 Jeffrey D. Brewer, 6861 
1 MS 0748 Jason V. Zuffranieri, 6861 
1 MS 0749 Thomas E. Drennen, 6010 
1 MS 0749 Arnold Baker, 6010 
1 MS 0749 Orman Paananen, 6010 
1 MS 0755 Maximo M. Valdez, 6202 
1 MS 0771 Dennis B. Berry, 6800 
5 MS 9741 Marjorie Tatro, 6200 
1 MS 1231 LDRD Office 
   Attn: Donna L. Chavez 
 
1 MS 9018 Central Technical Files, 8945-1 
2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4536 
 
 142 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
 
 
